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Summary 
Whenever multiple individuals contribute to the care of offspring, the optimum level of 
investment for each carer depends on the behaviour of the others. Previous theoretical and 
empirical work has largely focused on carer contributions within a single stage of a breeding 
attempt, neglecting the potential for investment during earlier stages to influence later care 
decisions. Typically, mothers have much greater control than other carers over the number 
and quality of offspring, and hence by altering her investment during offspring production a 
mother can adaptively adjust offspring phenotype to match or exploit the predicted care 
paradigm. In this dissertation, I use theoretical, empirical and comparative methods to 
investigate the influence of maternal tactics on investment rules in cooperative breeding 
systems, where ‘helpers’ care in addition to parents. In three chapters I model maternal 
control of offspring quality and offspring number across a cooperative breeding attempt, and 
investigate how the costliness of different reproductive stages, the kin-structure of the care 
group, and the consequences of offspring early-life condition influence the investment rules 
of carers. During offspring rearing, fair division of labour within a cooperative group can 
theoretically be resolved using simple turn-taking rules, leading to efficient outcomes for all 
carers. To test whether such a rule is employed in nature, a later chapter analyses empirical 
provisioning data from the chestnut-crowned babbler (Pomatostomus ruficeps), a 
cooperatively breeding bird endemic to the Australian outback. I use a Markov chain Monte 
Carlo approach to determine whether individuals alter their provisioning rate when other 
carers visit the nest, and identify both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ turn-taking behaviour. Finally, I 
present a comparative analysis of studies on provisioning rules in cooperatively breeding 
birds, and investigate whether the level of investment mothers must contribute to offspring 
influences the later care paradigm observed. My results indicate that maternal costs contribute 
to variation in both breeding group size and female provisioning behaviour. I conclude that 
maternal investment tactics are an underappreciated influence on carer investment rules in 
both the theoretical and empirical literature, and that incorporating them is crucial to 
understanding variation in cooperative care behaviour in nature. 
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Abstract 
The subject of maternal investment tactics in cooperative care systems is complex, as it exists 
at the interface of several larger fields, each with their own substantial literature. The 
evolution and maintenance of cooperative behaviour, the causes and consequences for 
offspring of early-life care or initial quality, and the trade-offs surrounding parental care will 
all influence the decisions made by a breeding female in a cooperative group. Although full 
reviews of all the pertinent literature would require far too much space, some context is 
needed for the work presented in this dissertation, and so this introduction comprises three 
mini-reviews of highly relevant topics to the following chapters. The first section reviews 
game theory and its applications to animal behaviour, unfortunately neglecting much of the 
expansive economics literature and many key models to focus instead on the four 
fundamental two-player cooperative games (and their extensions to greater numbers of 
individuals) in relation to cooperative offspring care. I then examine what has been modelled 
within the current literature on specific models of parental care, and identify areas that require 
further work. The second mini-review covers cooperative breeding in birds, with brief 
reviews of the prevalence and systematics of cooperative behaviour within birds, the potential 
benefits of helping, and the various possible forms of offspring care in a cooperative species. 
The review concludes with an attempt to broadly classify cooperative birds into fundamental 
types using the identity and routes to fitness of typical helpers. The final mini-review of the 
chapter discusses the potential scope and importance for maternal effects during parental care, 
with particular reference to cooperative bird species. I review the different stages of 
investment during the course of a breeding attempt, and the effects of differing early-life 
investment on later outcomes for offspring.   
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Cooperation and game theory 
Evolutionary game theory 
Game theory is a mathematical framework used to explore decision-making when individuals 
(or ‘players’) interact in ‘games’ which comprise, for each player, (i) a particular set of 
possible strategies and (ii) a set of resulting payoffs (Barron 2008). Games can be 
symmetrical or asymmetrical: in symmetrical games players always receive the same payoffs 
when adopting the same strategies (i.e. only the strategy is important, not the individual 
playing it). In the context of evolutionary biology, strategies are traits that are inherited rather 
than deliberate courses of action, and the resulting payoffs are in terms of Darwinian fitness: 
the reproductive success of the individual players (Sigmund & Nowak 1999). Individuals 
within a natural population that has played the same ‘game’ over evolutionary time will 
collectively approximate rational behaviour, as natural selection in an optimising process 
favouring individuals that consistently behave in their own best interest, although within a 
population not all individuals will necessarily behave optimally (Maynard Smith & Price 
1973). The expected outcome of any game with rational players is that each will choose the 
best strategy available, given the rational strategies of the other player(s) (the ‘best response’). 
If the players adopt a set of strategies such that none can benefit from changing their 
strategies unilaterally, then that set of strategies represents a ‘Nash equilibrium’ for the game 
(Nash 1951).  
Nash equilibria can occur with both ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ strategies. A pure strategy defines 
how a player plays exactly, such that every possible situation has a well-defined move 
associated with it. In contrast, a mixed strategy assigns a probability to two or more pure 
strategies for each possible situation, and selects randomly between then each time that 
situation occurs. A player’s ‘strategy set’ is the set of all pure strategies available to a player; 
mixed strategies are in principle infinitely variable as the probabilities associated with them 
are continuous values. Nash (1951) proved that any game with both a finite number of players 
and a finite number of pure strategies has a least one Nash equilibrium if mixed strategies are 
allowed, and when restricted to two strategies (often termed ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’ in games 
of cooperative interactions), every symmetric game has at least one pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium (Cheng et al. 2004). 
1: Introduction – Cooperation and game theory 
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In practical terms, Nash equilibria for particular games are found by calculating the expected 
payoffs to each player under every possible combination of strategies. When a game has 
multiple steps that are non-independent, the equilibrium must be calculated by backward 
induction from the final step, by calculating the Nash equilibria of the subgames that 
comprise each step. The result is a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy for the entire multi-
step game. Order of play is very important if information is shared between players: 
sequential rather than simultaneous choice of strategy may lead to entirely different optimal 
strategies even in single-step games. In general, simple games with restricted (often two) 
possible strategies are useful for being easy to analyse, while still illustrating relationships 
between strategy and payoff that are common to more complex games. 
While finding Nash equilibria is necessary to determine the outcome of a game, another 
useful concept is that of Pareto optimality, which can be seen as a measure of how efficient 
the outcome of a game is. A particular game’s outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no 
alternative outcome that delivers a greater payoff to at least one player with equal payoffs to 
all the others. In other words, no Pareto optimal outcome can be improved upon except by 
reducing the payoffs of one or more players. The Nash equilibrium of a game need not be 
Pareto optimal, as in many games players are prevented from cooperating with each other by 
a rational fear of being exploited by others. However, natural systems should be expected to 
evolve mechanisms to facilitate Pareto optimal strategies when possible, as these ultimately 
result in greater payoffs for everyone when games are played repeatedly (Axelrod & Hamilton 
1981).  
 
The four fundamental cooperative games 
When modelling cooperation between individuals, the simplest games assume that individuals 
have exactly two options: ‘Cooperate’ (C), in which their action results in some collaborative 
benefit between the individual and the other player(s), and ‘Defect’ (D), in which no mutual 
benefit accrues. With this assumption there are four potential outcomes in a simple two-player 
game: one where both players cooperate (the ‘Cc’ outcome), one where both defect (Dd), and 
two where one cooperates and the other defects (Cd and Dc; the capital letter corresponding to 
the strategy of the focal player). The order in which these outcomes are preferred for players 
1: Introduction – Cooperation and game theory 
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determines what game is being played, as games in which outcomes are equivalently ordered 
will generate identical (pure) equilibrium strategies.  
In terms of parental care, parents can choose to either provide an optimum amount of food or 
defence for the offspring (C), or reduce or abandon care (D). Each individual benefits from 
the contribution of its partner(s) (either because of an increase in productivity or a reduction 
in the necessary costs of rearing the offspring), and each pays a certain cost when cooperating 
through investing personal resources in the offspring (Williams 1966a). How this personal 
cost relates to outcomes for offspring is a major determinant of which fundamental game 
caring for offspring becomes, and hence what strategies parents should employ when jointly 
investing in offspring. 
Cooperation between parents implies that the payoff to the focal player for outcome Cc must 
be greater than that for Cd, and that the payoff for Dc must always be greater than Dd, and 
consequently only four symmetrical two-player games are directly relevant to the study of 
cooperation (or offspring care), each with a characteristic payoff order. These games are the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’, the ‘hawk-dove’ game, the ‘no conflict’ or ‘soldier’s dilemma’ game, 
and the ‘stag hunt’ (Macy & Flache 2002; Archetti & Scheuring 2012). Which of these games 
a particular care behaviour falls into will have strong implications for how stable and efficient 
cooperation is likely to be, as games differ in how much the rational ‘best response’ strategy 
aligns with the Pareto optimal strategy (Table 1.1, Figure 1.1). 
The prisoner’s dilemma (Tucker 1950) and its N-player equivalent (Hamburger 1973) (the 
‘diner’s dilemma’) are the games least conducive to effective offspring care, as the Nash 
equilibrium is pure defection (because Dc > Cc and Dd > Cd). Prisoner’s dilemmas result in 
outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient, as both players would receive a higher payoff if both 
cooperated, and in natural systems this should lead to selection pressure for behavioural 
mechanisms facilitating cooperation. Prisoner’s dilemmas are highly relevant to offspring 
care, as carers will almost always benefit from contributing somewhat less than their fair 
share, such that their partner bears a greater proportion of the total costs. Theoretical work 
suggests that this fear of exploitation results in inefficient investment levels (Houston & 
Davies 1985; McNamara et al. 1999; Johnstone et al. 2014), and empirical studies have 
provided evidence that this conflict between the sexes can reduce offspring fitness (Royle et 
al. 2002, 2006). Much research has revolved around mapping the conditions under which the 
prisoner’s dilemma can be resolved in more complex cases (reviewed in Doebeli & Hauert 
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2005), including when strategies are continuous (Killingback et al. 1999; Wahl & Nowak 
1999) and/or when the game is played repeatedly between individuals (Axelrod & Hamilton 
1981; Boyd 1989). 
The opposite of the prisoner’s dilemma is the ‘no conflict’ game or ‘soldier’s dilemma’ 
(Clutton-Brock 2009), in which the Nash equilibrium is pure cooperation as defecting never 
improves an individual’s payoff (Cc > Dc and Cd > Dd). In natural cooperative interactions, 
soldier's dilemma-like situations might occur in group territorial defence, provided that the 
costs of losing the offspring or territory exceed the costs of possible injury or energetic 
expenditure while defending it (Heinsohn & Packer 1995). Sentinel behaviour by group 
members might appear altruistic (e.g. if sentinels have less foraging time) while actually 
directly benefiting the sentinel through greater predator awareness: if so, individuals should 
adopt a sentinel role whenever their energetic reserves are high enough (Bednekoff 1997). 
This type of cooperative relationship is often termed a ‘by-product mutualism’ (Bergmüller et 
al. 2007), as it is beneficial to all individuals concerned without requiring any deferred or 
indirect benefits: individuals cooperate for immediate selfish rewards, and explaining 
universal cooperation is straightforward.  
The hawk-dove game (Maynard Smith & Price 1973), also known as ‘chicken’ (Rapoport & 
Chammah 1966), or the snow-drift game (Sugden 1986), is characterised by individuals 
benefiting from exploiting each other, but suffering when exploitative strategies meet (Dc > 
Cc, but Cd > Dd), leading to a mixed equilibrium strategy. Hawk-dove games provide a good 
model for parental care in the cases where offspring will die should both parents fail to 
contribute (Dd), but where a single parent is able to raise offspring alone. If uniparental care 
Game  Payoff structure  Best strategy  Behavioural example 
Prisoner's dilemma  Dc > Cc > Dd > Cd  Always defect  Joint offspring provisioning 
Hawk‐dove  Dc > Cc > Cd > Dd  Oppose partner  Desertion → uniparental care
Soldier's dilemma  Cc > Dc > Cd > Dd  Always cooperate  Sentinel behaviour 
Stag hunt  Cc > Dc > Dd > Cd  Match partner  Mobbing 
Table 1.1: Summary of the four fundamental two-player care games. Cooperative behaviours such 
as joint offspring provisioning and adult-adult reciprocity may occur in natural systems despite 
conforming to a prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure, as repeated interactions change the best 
strategy of individuals.
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Figure 1.1: Visual representation of the 
order of payoffs (to the row player) in 
the four fundamental two-player games. 
The arrow moves from lowest to highest 
payoff. Cooperation over offspring care 
is straightforward if care takes the forms 
of a soldier’s dilemma, but requires 
progressively stronger enforcement in 
the stag hunt, hawk-dove and prisoner’s 
dilemma games as individuals receive 
greater temptation to defect. 
is possible, the partner most likely to gain further (short-term) breeding success is tempted to 
desert and leave the other to care for offspring (Dawkins & Carlisle 1976; McNamara et al. 
2000): this deserter may, depending on the species, primarily be the male (Ezaki 1988), the 
female (Emlen & Wrege 2004), or be split relatively evenly between the sexes (Beissinger & 
Snyder 1987; Van Dijk et al. 2007) depending on cost and benefit asymmetries between the 
sexes.  
The final fundamental game is the stag hunt (Skyrms 2001), which remains poorly studied as 
a model of parental care. Also known as the ‘trust dilemma’, the stag hunt describes cases 
where individuals benefit from cooperating but suffer if their partner defects, leading to a 
temptation to defect if partners are unreliable. Stag hunt games may plausibly model parental 
care decisions when mobbing predators, provided that individuals can effectively mob as a 
group with low risk (Krams et al. 2009), but suffer costs should they attempt to ‘mob’ alone. 
When biparental care is necessary to rear offspring, a stag hunt might similarly arise if 
cooperation (staying with the current partner) (Cc) is better than defection (abandoning and 
finding a new partner) (Dc / Dd) and both are preferable to attempting to raise offspring with 
a partner that will defect (Cd). In this case, cooperation is the best strategy unless your partner 
is likely to irrationally defect, however high mortality among carers might tempt an individual 
to abandon care if it suspects its partner to be at risk of ‘defecting’ through death.  
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Repeated games 
In natural systems individuals do not normally interact with each other only once, but instead 
play multiple ‘rounds’ of the same game with the same individuals over the course of their 
lives or through an extended association such as a breeding season. If individuals can modify 
their behaviour in the current round of the game based on their past interactions with others, 
the best strategy for a player across all rounds will be influenced by not only the strategy of 
their partner, but also the number of rounds that will be played, and any limitations on 
cognition that restrict the potential complexity of strategies (Macy & Flache 2002). As with 
single-round two-player games, the error rate can also influence the best choice of strategy. 
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is probably the best-studied multiple-round game, having 
been the subject of a tournament to determine the most effective strategy in a mixed 
population of individuals with different strategies (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). The 
tournament results supported a tit-for-tat (TFT) type strategy as the most effective: individuals 
should be optimistic and cooperate by default, but punish partners that defect by retaliating in 
kind on the following round. The TFT strategy can never be exploited beyond the first round 
by a defecting strategy (and hence has very similar fitness when there are many rounds), and 
gains the maximum possible payoff when playing against itself or any other strategy that 
cooperates by default. If mistakes are possible then a similar but more forgiving strategy that 
allows a single defection before retaliating can be even more successful, as it allows 
cooperation to persist between retaliating strategies despite errors (at the cost of greater 
vulnerability to strategies that occasionally deliberately defect) (Axelrod 1984). An even 
better strategy in this case is ‘contrite tit-for-tat’ (CTFT) (Sugden 1986), in which the player 
accepts a single retaliation by its partner as punishment for an accidental defection on the 
previous round (Boyd 1989). When the iterated prisoner’s dilemmas is extended to include 
continuous strategies, generous strategies capable of cooperation are also favoured (Bendor et 
al. 1991), although cooperative equilibria may be less stable than non-cooperative equilibria 
(Le & Boyd 2007).  
The lessons of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma apply similarly to repeated versions of the 
other fundamental games. The hawk-dove game generates similar best strategies to the 
prisoner’s dilemma, with an even greater bias towards cooperative, retaliatory strategies 
(Carlsson & Johansson 1998; Dubois & Giraldeau 2003): as with the iterated prisoner’s 
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dilemma, cooperative strategies are able to beat exploitative strategies by conforming to 
Axelrod’s (1984) guidelines of being ‘nice’, ‘forgiving’, ‘non-envious’ and (crucially) 
‘retaliatory’. As one might expect, trusting strategies rapidly come to dominate in an iterated 
stag hunt (Fang et al. 2002), and it should be obvious that soldier’s dilemmas are not 
influenced by iteration, as they are already fully efficient at their single-game equilibrium.  
In N-player repeated games the maintenance of cooperation depends largely on whether or not 
individuals are able to effectively retaliate against defectors in the same way as is possible in 
two-player games. The ‘public goods’ game is an N-player game that illustrates the problem: 
players each own a number of tokens, and can secretly invest any number of their tokens in a 
common pot, the total of which is multiplied (by some value greater than 1) and then shared 
between all players. The maximum payoff for the group is obtained when all players invest all 
of their tokens, but as in the prisoner’s and diner’s dilemmas each player always benefits 
more by exploiting the contributions of the other players. The Nash equilibrium for this game 
is pure defection, i.e. retaining all tokens for oneself, with the result that a group of purely 
rational players gain the minimum (zero) payoff from the game (Frank 2010). When this 
game is iterated it is not possible to identify or punish a defector individually, and hence there 
is no way to adopt a retaliatory strategy and prevent defecting strategies from outperforming 
cooperative strategies. When punishment of specific defectors is possible, efficient outcomes 
of the public goods game can be reached, provided that defection on punishment duty is 
somehow prevented (Colman 2006), or if the game (or punishment regime) resembles a 
volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann 1985) in which only a single cooperative individual is 
needed to deliver benefits to the entire group (Archetti 2011; Raihani & Bshary 2011). 
Alternatively, cooperation might remain common if players benefit by accruing a good 
reputation that carries over to interactions beyond the public goods game (Milinski et al. 2002; 
Sylwester & Roberts 2010).  
To summarize, the four possible outcome arrangements in a symmetrical, costly game of 
cooperation can be used to place the game into one of four ‘families’: the prisoner’s dilemma, 
hawk-dove game, soldier’s dilemma, and stag hunt game (Table 1.1, Figure 1.1). The division 
of games into these families holds both when dealing with greater numbers of players, and 
with more complex models of cooperative investment than the binary choice presented above. 
Each game can plausibly represent behavioural interactions that occur when parents cooperate 
to raise offspring, and the game’s ordering of payoffs will alter the fundamental predictions of 
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which strategy to adopt: in some cases repeated interactions, directed punishment, and 
information about other players will be necessary to maintain cooperation, but in other cases 
it will always be favourable to cooperate. 
 
Quantitative models of offspring care 
When individuals cooperate to raise offspring, decisions to cooperate or defect may occur as 
single binary events that determine how the breeding attempt will progress (e.g. mate 
desertion), repeated binary events that provide opportunities for reciprocity (e.g. joining in 
with predator mobbing), or may be extremely frequent events, allowing a particular level of 
cooperation to be chosen along a continuum (e.g. provisioning rate). In addition, individuals 
may care for offspring alone, in pairs, or as groups, and when in groups may direct care 
entirely or preferentially towards their own offspring, or provide it equally to all offspring in 
the group. Offspring care may be restricted to a single homogenous period or encompass 
multiple discrete stages of care during which different carers have different roles (Clutton-
Brock 1991), and these stages of care may be largely independent from each other (Van De 
Pol et al. 2006), or instead have important knock-on effects on future stages (Heckman 2007). 
However, as with simple cooperative games, it is helpful to review simple offspring care 
models first to establish basic principles and provide context for later extensions. The simplest 
models of offspring care are those wherein two individuals cooperate to raise a single brood 
over a single stage of development, a scenario that has justifiably received great theoretical 
attention due to the large number of biparental species (particularly among birds) and the 
relative ease of testing predictions within a single stage of care.  
 
Ultimatum games 
If we wish to allow for asymmetry between carers and near-continuous possible values of 
investment in offspring, possibly the simplest game that can model biparental care to some 
degree of accuracy is the ‘ultimatum game’ (Rubinstein 1982). This game was initially 
formulated to model two individuals dividing a sum of money between them, but it translates 
well to the dynamics of offspring care. The first player makes an offer proposing how to 
divide the money, and the second player can either accept the offer and receive the proposed 
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share, or reject the offer (resulting in both players receiving nothing). The Nash equilibrium 
for this game is for the first player to offer the minimum possible amount of money to the 
second, as there is no reason for the second player to reject any offer (greater than zero) as 
rejecting guarantees receiving nothing. Interestingly, when humans play repeated rounds of 
this game, the offers made are typically closer to 50% than to 0%, and irrational punishment 
of the other player (by rejecting the offer) is common if too low an offer is made (Oosterbeek 
et al. 2004). 
Although simplistic, the ultimatum game is more appropriate in one aspect than many more 
complex games that model parental investment, as it is strongly asymmetric with one player 
acting first and thus controlling the game. In natural vertebrate systems the mother often has 
the ability to modify her investment in offspring size and/or number before other carers can 
invest, and hence she can present him with an investment ultimatum that he may have little 
choice but to accept. Symmetric games based only on the largely symmetric rearing period 
may miss important effects on offspring investment caused by this earlier asymmetry, 
however well they model investment within a single stage. 
 
Sealed-bid games 
The Houston-Davies or ‘sealed bid’ model (Houston & Davies 1985) treats biparental care as 
a game in which the parents contribute a variable (continuous) level of investment to 
offspring that is optimised over evolutionary time. Both gain reproductive success as a 
function of the total investment delivered to the offspring, reduced by the costs they pay to 
invest. Each parent’s investment bid is chosen without knowledge of how the other parent is 
investing, and cannot be changed afterwards in response to the other partner: it is optimised 
only over evolutionary time. The solution to the sealed-bid model suggest that an individual’s 
optimal bid should incompletely compensate for changes in the bid of its partner, i.e. if the 
partner bids higher the focal individual should decrease their bid, but not to the extent of 
completely offsetting the partner’s increase. A purely cooperative variant of the Houston-
Davies model, in which each parent attempts to maximise their combined reproductive 
success, may alter this prediction as lone parents may not always invest more than they do 
when in a pair (McNamara et al. 2003). 
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Although the sealed bid model’s predictions do not in fact specify response rules that are 
stable in behavioural time (McNamara et al. 1999), incomplete compensation to short-term 
changes in partner effort is nonetheless a common empirical finding. Among birds, 
compensatory responses to changes in partner effort have been observed in many species: a 
comprehensive review and meta-analysis by Harrison et al. (2009) showed that in biparental 
species the mean response to partner removal and partner handicap was indeed incomplete 
compensation.  
 
Negotiation games 
The ‘negotiation’ model (McNamara et al. 1999) improves upon the Houston-Davies model 
by explicitly accounting for the ability of each parent to respond in behavioural (as opposed to 
evolutionary) time to changes in the effort levels of its partner. The result is a negotiation 
process in which both partners modify their effort until they stabilize at a rule presenting the 
best return possible for them individually, given the response of their partner. Within the 
negotiation framework the Houston-Davies model represents a special case in which neither 
partner can flexibly respond to the partner from their initial bid (McNamara et al. 2003). 
The response rules generated by the negotiation model are qualitatively similar to those of the 
Houston & Davies model, as both predict incomplete compensation to changes in partner 
effort, however in quantitative terms negotiation leads to lower predicted effort levels 
(McNamara et al. 2003). All empirical studies that report parental responses to changes in 
partner effort are implicit support for negotiation strategies over sealed bids, and further 
empirical evidence is found when quantitative predictions of negotiation are tested explicitly 
(Lendvai et al. 2009). Nevertheless, it is clear that individuals in some species do not respond 
to changes in effort by their partners (Schwagmeyer 2002; Tajima & Nakamura 2003; Trnka 
& Grim 2013), suggesting that sealed bids are also reasonable strategies to adopt in some 
cases. In principle, difficulties in accurately observing other individuals (or costs associated 
with doing so) might obviate any advantage that could be gained by attempting a responsive 
strategy, resulting in individuals preferring to rely largely on intrinsic knowledge to determine 
their investment levels. 
 The importance of available information in determining an individual’s response rules has 
been demonstrated directly by Johnstone and Hinde (2006), who extended the negotiation 
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model to incorporate uncertainty among carers regarding offspring need. Changes in 
investment levels by one parent might then serve as a signal of offspring need to the other, 
leading to the other parent benefiting by matching (rather than compensating for) its partner’s 
change in investment. If the sexes differ consistently in their information about brood need, 
this asymmetry might serve to explain the differences in behaviour between females and 
males that are often found in empirical studies of partner response (e.g. Duckworth 1992; 
Sanz et al. 2000) 
Although more biologically relevant than a simple sealed-bid model, the negotiation 
framework is still an imperfect representation of natural behaviour. If the model is interpreted 
as an initial (cost-free) negotiation phase followed by an agreed-upon sealed bid (McNamara 
et al. 1999), then an individual capable of deception during the negotiation phase would 
outcompete an honest negotiator: a further extension incorporating costly initial negotiation is 
needed (Houston et al. 2005). Alternatively, if one interprets the negotiation as a continual 
response rule across an entire breeding attempt, individuals are unrealistically restricted to the 
same response rule throughout the care period (Lessells & McNamara 2012). Furthermore, 
when partners are extremely responsive to changes in each other’s effort levels, negotiation 
can lead to offspring receiving less total investment from a pair than they would from a lone 
parent (McNamara et al. 2003): this is never true when parents adopt a sealed-bid strategy. 
More recent extensions to the negotiation framework allow for multiple bouts of negotiation 
over the course of a breeding attempt, to allow for response rules to change over time. While 
further increasing the verisimilitude of the model, repeated bouts also have the effect of 
further lowering parental contributions to care (Lessells & McNamara 2012), leading to sub-
optimal outcomes for both parents and offspring (Johnstone et al. 2014).  
 
Alternation rules 
One possible line of investigation is to continue to look at finer scales of investment 
behaviour, ultimately asking how individuals organise their contributions by each quantum of 
care, such as a provisioning visit. By analogy to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma we might 
expect optimal strategies analogous to ‘tit-for-tat’ to give the most efficient outcome for both 
parents, by preventing exploitation while ensuring that ‘nice’ contributors gain the maximum 
possible payoff. Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that a simple strategy of turn-
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taking by parents can efficiently organise care for young, and provides empirical evidence 
that great tit parents adopt such a strategy during provisioning (Johnstone et al. 2014). Parents 
adopt a strategy of lowering their visit rate after they visit, and raising their visit rate after 
their partner visits: while this is not as efficient as perfect visit alternation, it still generates 
more efficient care than a sealed-bid or negotiation rule (Johnstone et al. 2014). Further 
empirical evidence for turn-taking is currently lacking, but other studies have shown that 
where there is scope for intra-group conflict over food allocation, coordination of 
provisioning visits can improve outcomes for offspring (Shen et al. 2010), supporting further 
analysis of nest visits on a finer scale. 
 
Models of cooperative systems 
Models that describe offspring care by more than two individuals are extremely rare when 
compared to those of biparental care, and what little work exists has been restricted to only 
three individuals: either a pair with a single helper (Johnstone 2011) or a female with one or 
two helpers (Härdling et al. 2003). Although N-player extensions to simple games suggest 
that two-player and many-player games of offspring care are likely to lead to similar results, 
attempts to generalise models of biparental care to cooperative care are hampered by two 
main problems. Firstly, adding additional carers affects some of the assumptions of models 
used to describe biparental systems, particularly those about the level of information available 
to carers. In a biparental system each carer only has to observe the investment level and 
responses of one individual, whereas in a group of six each must observe five others, and 
unless visit rate increases linearly with group size each individual will be contributing less 
often and hence be potentially harder to observe. Secondly, helpers can differ more than 
parents in their relatedness to offspring and in the benefits they receive from caring for young; 
for example, if a helper benefits directly from their contribution to care (e.g. by gaining 
experience feeding chicks that improves their future direct fitness), they may have little 
reason to respond to the contributions of others as they are largely unconcerned with the 
number and fitness of offspring that are produced. Helper investment might be further 
complicated by preferring to rear one sex of offspring, if their benefits accrue primarily from 
group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001) through the phylopatric sex; by contrast parents will 
normally always benefit from successfully rearing their descendants of either sex. 
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Summary 
Understanding how individuals invest in offspring is fundamentally tied to how the payoffs of 
different strategies are influenced by the investment of others. Existing models of biparental 
care provide mostly consistent predictions for individual response rules to changes in partner 
effort, and these predictions are largely borne out by empirical studies. The prisoner’s 
dilemma-like nature of contributing to care means that carer investment behaviour is not 
generally Pareto efficient, as both carers would increase their payoffs if both increased their 
investment levels, however neither is able to do so because of the threat of exploitation by 
their partner. Models of care that allow response rules such as turn-taking require further 
attention as a possible solution to this problem, as do models that incorporate multiple, 
potentially asymmetric stages across a breeding attempt. Two major topics have been under-
studied as potential influences on investment behaviour during offspring care: cooperative 
breeding, particularly in how non-parents should invest in contrast to parents, and maternal 
effects, as the majority of models have been restricted to a single investment stage. 
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Cooperative breeding in birds 
Cooperative breeding occurs whenever more than two individuals contribute to offspring care 
(Cockburn 2004). This definition covers a broad range of breeding systems, including both 
species where all carers breed and those with true helpers (non-breeding individuals assisting 
a breeding pair). The presence of non-breeding carers can be used to draw a distinction 
between true cooperative care (Ligon & Burt 2004) and other, superficially similar systems 
such as cooperative polyandry (where multiple males mate with a female and assist her with 
offspring care) or cases where multiple pairs raise offspring together within a social group, 
sharing care between them. The core question in cooperative systems with non-breeding 
helpers is why helpers choose to forego their own reproduction to assist others, a behaviour 
that initially appears to run contrary to natural selection. It may be no coincidence that the 
first paper that drew significant attention to ‘helpers at the nest’ was a review (Skutch 1961) 
published shortly before the first work on kin selection suggested a mechanism for this 
apparently maladaptive behaviour to be beneficial (Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith 1964). 
More recently, detailed explorations of the benefits and costs of cooperation have been of 
considerable interest to behavioural ecology as a whole, with many studies exploring the 
particulars of why, when and where cooperative breeding occurs. 
Although all cooperative systems involve multiple individuals rearing offspring, there is great 
variation between species in mating system, the identities of helpers, the benefits helpers 
receive, the social environment, and the prevalence and intensity of cooperative care. Pairs 
may be monogamous (for life or sequentially), or they may be polyandrous, polygynous, or 
polygynandrous within or outside the social group (Cockburn 2004). Helpers may be relatives 
that have failed in their own breeding attempt, or they may be philopatric offspring, or 
subordinate breeders, or unrelated immigrants to the group (Riehl 2013). The benefits of 
helping may accrue by indirect fitness through relatives surviving and reproducing, or there 
may be direct benefits arising from experience, prestige, or group augmentation (Bergmüller 
et al. 2007), and when individuals in a breeding group do not benefit from caring for offspring, 
they may refrain from helping entirely (Emlen & Wrege 1989; Sherman 1995; Sloane 1996; 
Magrath & Whittingham 1997; Cockburn 1998). Most species are facultative cooperative 
breeders, in that pairs are capable of rearing at least some offspring successfully without 
helpers being present, but in others such as the white-winged chough (Corcorax 
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melanorhamphos, Heinsohn 1992), and apostlebird (Struthidea cinerea, Woxvold & Magrath 
2005), unhelped nests universally fail. In other species (e.g. Noisy and Bell Miners; Manorina 
melanocephala, M. melanophrys), nests always have more than two attendants due to shared 
help across a large social group: these species are obligate cooperative breeders in practice, 
but it remains unclear whether they could rear offspring as a pair if necessary (Clarke 1988; 
Dow & Whitmore 1990). 
 
Prevalence and systematics 
Breeding systems involving more than a single pair rearing young have been recognised in 
some bird species for over a hundred years (Boland & Cockburn 2002), however this 
behaviour was often interpreted as multiple females laying in the same nest (e.g. North 1904). 
The first depiction of more than two carers attending a nest is most likely an illustration from 
Gould’s Birds of Australia (1841) showing two male superb fairy-wrens simultaneously 
feeding a cuckoo chick. It is unsurprising that it was Australian cooperative species that were 
first recognised as such, as that continent contains a very high proportion of cooperative birds 
(Brown 1987; Russell 1989; Cockburn 2006); the relative rarity of cooperative breeding in the 
more populated regions of Europe and North America no doubt slowed recognition of the 
prevalence of the behaviour among birds as a whole.  
Current estimates for the proportion of bird species exhibiting cooperative breeding are 
around 9% (Cockburn 2006), depending on the precise definition used: some authors count 
any species where a certain proportion of nests have more than two attendees (Cockburn 
2006), while others attempt a definition based on non-breeding helpers (Brown 1987; Ligon 
& Burt 2004). Although almost all bird species worldwide are now described, outside of 
Europe and North America the breeding systems and life histories of many species are 
relatively unstudied, and many cooperative species not currently recognised as such may still 
exist in clades such as parrots (Psittaciformes) whose social behaviours in the wild are still 
poorly known. Furthermore, even well-studied pair breeding species may have unstudied 
populations that exhibit regular cooperative care, as in carrion crows (Corvus corone, 
Baglione et al. 2002) and house sparrows (Passer domesticus, Sappington 1977). 
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Cooperative breeding is unevenly distributed among avian lineages, suggesting a large 
phylogenetic component to the behaviour (Edwards & Naeem 1993; Cockburn 1998, 2006). 
Cooperation is more common among passerine birds than non-passerines, but varies greatly in 
prevalence within both groups. Certain passerine families contain only cooperative species 
(e.g. Maluridae, Pomatostomidae), some a range of pair-breeding and cooperative systems in 
fairly equal proportions (Corvidae, Aegithalidae), and some have no confirmed cooperative 
breeders at all (Hirundinidae, Alaudidae). Outside Passeriformes, several orders contain no 
cooperative breeders, including Columbiformes, Suliformes, and (until relatively recently) 
Psittaciformes (Cockburn 2006). Several authors have concluded that cooperative breeding is 
ancestral to the passerine clade, which is thought to have radiated from Gondwanaland 
(Ekman & Ericson 2006), and hence the high proportion of cooperative species in Australia is 
due to its history as the cradle of early passerine radiation. Despite its clear phylogenetic 
component, cooperative breeding has evolved numerous times independently within some 
lineages (e.g. Rallidae, Timaliidae, Meliphagidae), suggesting that it can also be an adaptive 
response to particular ecological conditions (Cockburn 2006). 
The ecological, demographic and life-history traits that lead to cooperative breeding remain 
unclear, not least because all contributing factors thus identified are also shared by many pair-
breeding species (Koenig & Dickinson 2004). Life-history traits such as high adult survival 
and a sedentary population are thought to bias species towards cooperative breeding (Arnold 
& Owens 1998), and of course some degree of parental care must exist for multiple 
individuals to contribute. In terms of ecology, diet has been suggested as a contributing factor 
due to the rarity of seed-eating and frugivorous cooperative breeders, and the observation that 
most cooperative species forage from the substrate (Ford et al. 1988); helpers that reduce 
offspring starvation will contribute more effectively when individual variance in food 
delivery is high. Alternatively, if offspring rarely starve but do benefit from active defences 
against potential predators (rather than passive crypsis), cooperation might increase breeding 
success through reducing predation risk (Rabenold 1984; McGowan & Woolfenden 1989; 
Innes & Johnston 1996; Hatchwell 1999). In general, ecological volatility is thought to bias 
animals towards cooperative breeding (Wells 2012), usually with the argument that the 
presence of helpers functions as a bet-hedging strategy to prevent total losses of offspring 
under harsh or unpredictable conditions (Rubenstein 2011). While recent analyses have 
suggested that the prevalence of cooperative breeding is partly explained by environmental 
uncertainty (Jetz & Rubenstein 2011), there still remains much potential variation to account 
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for (Cockburn & Russell 2011). In particular, the existence of cooperative species (and 
entirely cooperative clades) that have a broad habitat range throughout which cooperation 
persists indicates that ecological conditions cannot be the only important factor. 
 
Benefits of helping 
In a cooperative breeding system, the predicted investment behaviour of individuals is 
influenced by the relative values of the different options each has at the start of the breeding 
season. These options will generally include helping the dominant to rear offspring, 
dispersing to a new territory, floating (doing nothing), or competing for a breeding position, 
and the relative costs and benefits of each alternative will differ greatly between species 
(Ekman et al. 2004). In addition, environmental conditions vary in space and time, and may 
lead to different behaviours being favoured within a species across different populations or 
conditions. For tactical maternal investment to be successful in influencing helper investment, 
helpers must (i) have predictable responses to changes in offspring size or quality, and (ii) be 
sufficiently constrained from alternative beneficial behaviours that female manipulation is 
unlikely to make helpers abandon care. The decision of helpers to help is distinct from their 
decision to delay dispersal (Dickinson & Hatchwell 2004; Ekman et al. 2004), and helpers 
will refrain from contributing to offspring care unless by doing so they avoid some cost or 
receive a fitness benefit, whether it be current (within this breeding attempt) or future, and 
direct or indirect. 
 
Kin selection 
Helping may be a favourable alternative to breeding if it is directed towards individuals that 
share the helper’s genetic material (Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith 1964): helpers are 
expected to attempt to maximise their fitness, but personal reproduction is not the only way 
for an individual to increase the frequency of its genes in the population. Individuals are as 
closely related to full-siblings (on average) as they are to their own offspring, and so raising a 
full-sibling that would otherwise not have been raised delivers the same fitness benefit as 
raising an offspring of one’s own. This indirect fitness may be preferable to attempting to 
breed directly if ecological constraints make founding a new group difficult (Emlen 1982), if 
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competition is strong and the individual is of low quality, or if the individual is young and has 
little breeding experience. 
The condition for kin-directed helping is 0r b c    (Hamilton 1964), where b is the benefit 
to the recipient of help, c is the cost to the helper, and r the relatedness of the recipient to the 
helper (relative to the mean relatedness of individuals in the population). Helpers are hence 
most likely to assist close kin because a much smaller benefit is required to overcome any 
costs of helping a brood of full-sibs ( 0.5r  ) over half-sibs ( 0.25r  ), cousin-level relatives 
( 0.125r  ) or unrelated birds ( 0r  ). Helping kin can be beneficial by increasing the 
number of offspring currently being raised, increasing offspring quality, or by reducing the 
costs paid by other, related carers, such that these relatives are more likely to survive and 
breed in future seasons (Dickinson & Hatchwell 2004). Helpers that reduce the costs to the 
breeding female by ‘lightening the load’ of offspring care (Crick 1992) benefit indirectly 
through the related offspring that she will produce in future years. However, one important 
caveat to kin-selected benefits is that helping to raise kin is less beneficial the greater the local 
competition in a system, as individuals are unlikely to benefit from rearing direct competitors 
for themselves or other existing kin (Murray & Gerrard 1984; West et al. 2002). As a 
consequence, the pattern of dispersal will influence how easily cooperation can evolve in a 
given species. 
 
Breeding experience 
The most obvious direct benefits of helping, beyond breeding personally, are those accruing 
straightforwardly from the act of helping itself, such as gaining experience of caring for 
offspring that can be applied to future direct breeding attempts (Selander 1964; Komdeur 
1996). Helping in this manner is a by-product mutualism, provided that offspring are able to 
benefit from the additional care, and hence one should predict little within-group conflict over 
investment levels. Importantly, however, experience benefits are much less influenced by 
whether or not the breeding attempt is successful, which might lead to different predictions of 
helper investment behaviour in response to changing conditions or maternal tactics. Empirical 
evidence for the value of helping experience is available in some cooperative birds (Komdeur 
1996; Hatchwell et al. 1999), although several negative results suggest that it is by no means a 
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universal effect (Dickinson et al. 1996; Khan & Walters 1997; Koenig & Walters 2011; Duval 
2013).  
Pay-to-stay 
An alternative explanation is that offspring help in order to ‘pay rent’ or ‘pay-to-stay’ on the 
natal territory (Gaston 1978; Mulder & Langmore 1993; Kokko et al. 2002). When there are 
few positive effects of larger group size, and additional group members lead to competition 
for resources, delayed dispersers may be evicted by the breeding pair unless they convey a 
benefit to offset their associated costs. For pay-to-stay to be favourable to helpers, the 
dominant pair must be able to credibly threaten eviction, and staying in the natal territory 
must have positive effects on helper survival even after the costs of helping. 
 
Group augmentation 
Group augmentation benefits occur when rearing offspring has direct positive effects on a 
helper’s future fitness through improving the group’s survival, competitive, or reproductive 
ability (Brown 1987; Kokko et al. 2001). Under ‘passive’ group augmentation the presence of 
extra group members leads to better territories, better predator defence, or similar effects, 
however group augmentation can also be ‘active’: individuals may benefit from rearing more 
helpers despite no group size benefit, provided those helpers then contribute to the future 
breeding attempts of the donor (Wiley & Rabenold 1984; Kokko et al. 2001). As with indirect 
fitness benefits, the strength of group augmentation effects will depend on the difference 
between potential productivity with and without helpers, and group augmentation also shares 
with kin selection the need for a breeding attempt to be successful before any benefits can be 
reaped. 
 
Social prestige 
A final class of direct benefits to helping are those that revolve around accruing some form of 
‘reputation’ that positively biases future interactions in the helper’s favour, often termed 
‘social prestige’ or ‘image scoring’ depending on whether reciprocal investment is required to 
obtain the benefit (Zahavi 1995; Roberts 1998; Lotem et al. 2003; Bshary & Bergmüller 
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2008). Higher-prestige individuals may be more likely to attract mates or helpers when 
dispersing, and if helpers form a ‘queue’ for breeding status in the current group, social 
prestige is one way in which individual position within the queue might be determined. 
Prestige requires that care behaviour can function as a costly signal (Doutrelant & Covas 
2007), and hence that it is observable and quantifiable by other group members. Evidence for 
social prestige remains scant, but explicit empirical tests have rarely been performed 
(McDonald et al. 2008; Nomano et al. 2013). A related benefit occurs if reputation acquired 
through helping can lead to direct reciprocity from the current breeders, for example if current 
breeders sometime become helpers at the nest of a bird that previously helped them (Ligon & 
Ligon 1978). 
 
Summary 
Inclusive fitness theory remains the primary explanation for cooperative care among close 
relatives (Abbot et al. 2011), and is important even in species with relatively low helper-
offspring relatedness (e.g.   0.15r   in the long-tailed tit; Aegithalos caudatus, Nam et al. 
2010) due to the complex relationships between individual effort, quality, future fitness, and 
survival probability. All direct benefits (apart from those constrained by inbreeding avoidance) 
are also available to related helpers, and so we should generally expect cooperation to be 
more common among kin than non-kin. Nevertheless, there are substantial other potential 
benefits that deserve attention. While it is indisputable that most cooperative species live in 
family groups, in a surprising number of cooperative species some or all helpers are unrelated 
to offspring (Riehl 2013), and in these direct benefits must exist to maintain cooperation. 
Fundamental differences in investment strategy will be determined by the conditions 
necessary to reap the benefit, not the fitness route through which it acts: both group 
augmentation and kin selection require offspring to be successfully reared, and hence may 
lead to similar strategies, while developing breeding experience is less contingent on 
outcomes for offspring. 
The potential benefits of helping are fundamentally tied to the potential productivity and 
reproductive tactics of the breeding female, among other factors. If mothers can reliably raise 
a brood without help, and are unable to alter brood size or quality in response to the presence 
of helpers, direct benefits contingent on producing offspring are weak, and indirect fitness 
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benefits are limited to increasing maternal survival (where possible). When helpers can reduce 
costs paid by other carers, but brood size and quality are fixed, the benefits of helping will be 
high initially but decrease per helper as more helpers join the group, leading to each helper 
contributing only small indirect benefits. In this case we can envisage a helper choosing to 
help at a nest of (for example) a more distant relative because the group size allows for a 
greater fitness benefits. By contrast, if the mother is able to produce offspring of the number 
and quality optimal for the number of helpers in the group, helper benefits will remain high 
over a large range of group sizes. Both scenarios are likely to exist in practice (both across 
and within natural populations), as optimal offspring production will always be subject to the 
limits of fecundity of the breeder. 
 
Offspring care in cooperative breeders 
The developmental periods of many cooperative species are long, providing many 
opportunities for carers to invest in offspring care in multiple independent ways. Each mode 
of care will yield different costs and benefits to carers and offspring, different opportunities 
for cheating and enforcement, and different asymmetries between carers. As a result, different 
care behaviours may represent different fundamental cooperative games, and hence have 
different outcomes when conflict occurs between group members. In this section I briefly 
review the main types of offspring care observed in cooperative species, and the respective 
costs and benefits each confers. 
 
Provisioning 
A major component of reproductive investment in many species takes the form of effort 
expended on finding and delivering food to dependent young. This provisioning behaviour is 
generally required continuously until offspring become mobile (fledging age in birds), and 
may persist for several months afterwards as juveniles develop foraging skills. The costs of 
provisioning to parents have been well documented in a multitude of taxa and breeding 
systems (Canestrari et al. 2007; Field et al. 2007; Guindre-Parker et al. 2013), although the 
relationship between parental effort and survival is not entirely straightforward (Santos & 
Nakagawa 2012). As one might expect from the high costs that breeding females pay to 
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produce offspring (often also incubating alone), when only one individual enjoys reduced 
costs in larger group sizes, that individual is generally the breeding female (Anava et al. 2001; 
Browning et al. 2012b). 
Because provisioning behaviour is common, near continuous, and relatively easy to observe, 
it has been the focus of almost all empirical studies on cooperative investment. However, 
despite empirical support for incomplete compensation in biparental species (Harrison et al. 
2009), cooperative species fail to show consistent responses to changes in helper number. 
Some species compensate entirely for the presence of extra carers (Brown et al. 1978; Luck 
2001), others show the expected partial compensation (Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1990; 
Wright & Dingemanse 1999), while in some no change in individual investment occurs 
(Mumme & Koenig 1990; Emlen & Wrege 1991). One study even reports an increase in 
individual investment with more carers (Valencia et al. 2006). In some species unrelated 
males are more likely to provision offspring, because of opportunities for mating (Magrath & 
Whittingham 1997), however in others there is a positive effect of helper relatedness on 
provisioning rate, presumably due to indirect fitness benefits (Wright et al. 2010; Browning et 
al. 2012a).  
Although provisioning is the most common and most quantifiable form of helping, it is not 
necessarily the most important contribution helpers can make to offspring fitness. In scrub 
jays, helpers are actively prevented from provisioning nestlings, but contribute strongly to 
both predator mobbing and territorial defence (Burt & Peterson 1993), and in grey jays 
helpers only feed fledglings (Waite & Strickland 1997). In species that suffer from nest 
predation, but where offspring starvation is rare, parents may benefit instead from limiting the 
number of individuals around the nest and limiting or synchronising visits to the nest in order 
to reduce the likelihood of attracting predator attention (Skutch 1949; Martin et al. 2000; 
Raihani et al. 2010). 
 
Predator mobbing 
Another common form of parental care is mobbing of potential predators (Curio et al. 1978), 
and empirical studies suggest that a common cause of increased reproductive success in 
cooperative groups is a reduction in predation risk to offspring (Hatchwell 1999). Mobbing 
predators is costly due to losses of foraging time in addition to potential dangers from the 
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predator, however the benefits are substantial if offspring would otherwise be predated 
(Montgomerie & Weatherhead 1988). Collective action by many individuals is the most 
effective means of mobbing (Krams et al. 2009), but given the costs incurred by individuals 
for a shared benefit, mobbing potentially represents a public-goods type problem in which 
individuals are tempted to hang back, reducing overall effectiveness. 
Mobbing has been studied explicitly in some cooperative species (Arnold 1999; Maklakov 
2002; Graw & Manser 2007), but since it is difficult to make quantitative assessments of 
individual contributions to the same degree as with provisioning, and because natural 
mobbing is generally infrequent in comparison to offspring feeding, studies of individual 
contributions to mobbing remain rare. Further complications arise in attempting to measure 
the costs and benefit of mobbing when predators are dangerous to both adults and offspring, 
because mobbing may then confer immediate direct benefits on an individual by lowering 
personal predation risk: in these cases mobbing is by-product mutualism and hence requires 
no indirect or deferred benefits to explain its prevalence (Russell & Wright 2009). In addition, 
prolonged mobbing may actually be harmful to offspring, if it attracts more predators to the 
vicinity of the nest (Krams et al. 2007). 
 
Sentinel behaviour 
While group defence and vigilance are contributions to group-living rather than specific care 
behaviours, young offspring are considerably more vulnerable and less experienced than 
adults, and hence their presence may lead to additional investment by other group members. 
Sentinel behaviour has been well-studied in Arabian Babblers (Wright et al. 2001a, 2001b) 
and Florida Scrub Jays (McGowan & Woolfenden 1989; Bednekoff & Woolfenden 2003) 
among other species, and similarly to mobbing has been interpreted as a by-product 
mutualism (soldier’s dilemma) rather than helping for indirect or deferred direct benefits 
(Bednekoff 1997, 2001). However, sentinel behaviour might also represent a stable form of 
costly offspring care, particularly if a single sentinel can provide benefits to a large number of 
relatives (or valuable group members) simultaneously (Archetti 2011; Raihani & Bshary 
2011).  
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Classification of avian cooperative systems 
Cooperative breeding is a highly variable breeding system that defies attempts at hard 
classification (Cockburn 1998), however a simple overlapping categorisation based on helper 
identity and routes to fitness is useful when making predictions about helping behaviour and 
maternal strategies. One approach is to use dispersal to classify species into ‘avian-’, 
‘mammalian-’ and ‘insect-’ type systems (Russell & Lummaa 2009), although major variation 
remains within each type. Another option is to use the potential benefits helpers receive from 
helping, and the degree to which they have outside options, as this will determine both the 
level of conflict between carers and the degree of asymmetry inherent in their investment 
tactics. When classifying cooperative behaviour in this way, I identify five primary types of 
cooperative care in birds (Table 1.2): Collaborative, Redirected, Developmental, Queuing, 
and Altruistic. Multiple types of helper may help simultaneously, and hence particular species 
may represent several of the four types of cooperation simultaneously. 
In ‘Collaborative’ (or ‘joint-nesting’) cooperative systems, carers are all active breeders in the 
current breeding attempt (Vehrencamp & Quinn 2004). Among birds, the most common 
example of this system is cooperative polyandry (Cockburn 2006), where a single breeding 
female is attended by several males who share paternity of the offspring and all contribute to 
offspring care. Sometimes this behaviour will be driven by female attempts to elicit extra 
parental care, leading to dominant males attempting to monopolise reproduction (e.g. Davies 
1985), but if a pair cannot reliably raise a large brood by themselves it may benefit breeders to 
collaborate in exchange for greater numbers of offspring or lower personal costs 
(Vehrencamp 1978). Conflict between males can be reduced if males are related, as less 
dominant individuals can then benefit from inclusive fitness despite low paternity 
(Vehrencamp & Quinn 2004). Polyandrous care can occur even with greater numbers of 
males than there are chicks, provided secondary males have a chance of fathering some 
offspring (or the mating group is stable over several seasons), however the reduction in 
relatedness to the brood with each extra male limits the potential group size (Hartley & 
Davies 1994). Joint-laying, when multiple females lay in the same nest, may be asymmetric 
(like cooperative polyandry) with a single male (Frith & Davies 1961), or symmetric with 
both multiple males and multiple females collaborating to rear offspring (Jamieson 1997; 
Vehrencamp & Quinn 2004; Yuan et al. 2004); in these cases group sizes are potentially 
larger as helpers face a weaker dilution problem. The number of females will however 
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influence patterns of care seen during the breeding attempt, as individual females no longer 
have total control over investment prior to chick rearing and hence must adapt to the potential 
investment strategies of each other during offspring production as well as later care behaviour. 
In ‘Redirected’ cooperation, helpers are failed breeders from the current season who have 
insufficient time or resources to breed again. These helpers typically help relatives who still 
have active nests, in order to boost their indirect fitness by increasing the number or condition 
of offspring fledged, or to ‘load lighten’ (Crick 1992) the costs of breeding for related carers 
(who are then more likely to survive and breed again). Redirected care requires that (i) 
individuals breed close enough to relatives that they can feasibly find them to begin helping, 
and (ii) that the benefits of group-living and helping are sufficiently low that helping before 
your own attempt fails is unfavourable. Compared to most other forms of cooperation, the 
scope for maternal tactics is limited in Redirected cooperation systems, as helpers will 
generally only arrive partway through the breeding attempt, and their presence is highly 
unpredictable. The best-studied examples of this care system are probably the long-tailed tit 
(Aegithalos caudatus, Russell & Hatchwell 2001; Hatchwell et al. 2013) and white-fronted 
bee-eater (Merops bullockoides, Emlen 1990). 
In ‘Developmental’ cooperative species helpers are juvenile offspring who contribute to care 
prior to dispersing (Gibbons 1987). Helping to raise a new brood may benefit juveniles 
though indirect fitness or through the development of skills for future breeding (Selander 
1964; Komdeur 1996; Sparkman et al. 2010) with few associated costs if juveniles do not yet 
benefit from dispersing. Eventual dispersal by the helper may happen once sexual and skill 
maturity are reached, or may be delayed (Ekman et al. 2004) to facilitate helping at more 
breeding attempts: individuals may delay dispersal because they are unable to survive or 
successfully breed when young, either because of low competitiveness or because adverse 
environmental conditions make attempting to breed unfavourable (Emlen 1982; Hatchwell & 
Komdeur 2000). Helper effects will be generally low in ‘developmental’ systems, as juveniles 
will rarely provide much care compared to experienced breeders, and neither the helper nor 
the parents want the helper to incur high costs before dispersing. If juveniles must be retained 
for an extended period to avoid high mortality, their presence may even be costly to parents 
(Pravosudova & Grubb 2000); in this case offspring retention can be thought of as the final 
stage of parental care (Ekman et al. 1994, 2004; Strickland & Waite 2001; Doerr et al. 2007). 
Where there are costs to retaining offspring until they can disperse successfully, helping 
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behaviour might be enforced by parents as ‘rent’; the offspring thus ‘pay to stay’ (Gaston 
1978; Mulder & Langmore 1993; Kokko et al. 2002). The relative costs and benefits of 
dispersal and helping (to all carers) will combine to explain why offspring choose to (i) 
remain on the natal territory rather than developing elsewhere, and (ii) why they choose to 
help rather than simply waiting (Ekman et al. 2004). 
 Cooperative ‘Queuing’ systems are diverse and the best studied, representing all cases where 
non-breeding helpers in a persistent social group eventually succeed the current breeding pair 
to breed directly. Helpers are generally offspring that are philopatric indefinitely, and who 
help to gain either indirect fitness or direct benefits from additional breeding experience, 
social prestige (Zahavi 1995), group augmentation effects (Kokko et al. 2001), or ‘delayed 
reciprocity’ from offspring they raise (Wiley & Rabenold 1984). The mating system, 
individual quality, and how likely helpers are to inherit breeding status will influence whether 
indirect or future direct fitness benefits are dominant for particular helpers. Unrelated 
immigrants may also become helpers in these systems, gaining fitness through the same future 
direct benefits. In contrast to ‘developmental’ cooperative systems, related helpers are more 
likely to ‘pay-to-stay’ (Gaston 1978; Kokko & Ekman 2002) under queuing systems as 
helpers are both more capable of contributing, and in greater conflict with their parents who 
they are waiting for an opportunity to replace (Cant & Johnstone 2008).  
The final type, ‘Altruistic’ cooperation, represents cases where helpers no not attempt to 
breed personally, and contribute to care despite little opportunity for future direct fitness. 
Altruistic cooperation requires helpers to be relatives, as they must gain their entire fitness 
indirectly through helping kin. Because indirect fitness benefits are greatest when rearing full 
siblings, one should expect young helpers in Altruistic systems to adopt costly helping 
behaviours immediately (before either member of the breeding pair changes) and hence to 
survive at a lower rate than breeders (e.g. Heinsohn & Cockburn 1994). This form of 
cooperation represents the boundary between cooperative breeding and eusociality, as the two 
social systems are generally divided by the presence or absence of non-reproductive castes 
(Crespi & Yanega 1995). The ability of a breeding female to create such helpers to improve 
her own lifetime productivity is a potentially important factor in the evolution of cooperation 
(Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
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Social organisation is likewise highly variable among cooperative breeders, and has the 
potential to influence helping decisions through the availability of outside options (Cant & 
Johnstone 2009). Multiple females breeding within a larger social group may lay eggs either 
within the same nest, in the same restricted area such as a tree or complex nest, or in separate 
locations some distance apart while retaining high social connectivity. When breeding units 
are isolated within a breeding season, they may nevertheless associate with a social group 
when not breeding, and this group may influence cooperation by collective decisions on when 
to begin breeding, or by forming the pool from which helpers are drawn. However the 
appropriate terminology for describing these systems is unclear, as commonly used terms (e.g. 
‘colonial’ and ‘plural’) are conflated with those used to describe non-cooperative sociality, or 
those describing mating systems. A more rigorous and comprehensive classification system is 
Cooperative 
system  Primary helpers  Benefits of helping 
Potential for adaptive 
maternal tactics 
Collaborative  Active breeders  Current direct fitness  Medium (one female) 
Low (multiple females) 
Redirected  Failed breeders  Indirect fitness  Low 
Developmental  Juvenile offspring 
Indirect fitness 
Experience 
Pay‐to‐stay 
Medium 
Queuing  Philopatric offspring 
Immigrants 
Indirect fitness 
Experience 
Social prestige 
Group augmentation 
Medium 
Altruistic  Philopatric offspring  Indirect fitness  High 
Table 1.2: Forms of cooperation observed in birds with more than two carers at a nest. Categories 
are defined by the usual origin of the additional carers, and by the routes to fitness that make 
helping beneficial to these helpers. The potential for adaptive maternal tactics in cooperative 
species arises from three key factors: (i) The existence and relative value of alternative options 
available for helpers to gain fitness, (ii) The predictability of later care when the mother invests in 
offspring production, and (iii) The willingness of females to exploit helpers, influenced by helper-
mother relatedness and any direct benefits of group size. For example, when helpers have other 
options, carer number is unpredictable, and helpers are relatives of the breeding pair (as in most 
‘Redirected’ systems), exploiting helpers by altering offspring size or numbers is both difficult and 
potentially costly. 
1: Introduction – Cooperative breeding in birds 
 
30 
 
needed for cooperative breeders, in terms of both social and breeding organisation. 
Many natural systems contain multiple helper types or social organisations and so exhibit 
several of the above forms of cooperation simultaneously, for example if either or both sexes 
exhibited ‘Developmental’ cooperation prior to dispersal and then another form of helping in 
their destination group. Nevertheless, in cooperative breeders the most significant differences 
in payoff between collaborators come about because of the differences in costs and benefits 
between carers, which will largely be determined by who helpers are and why they are 
helping. The final piece of the puzzle of how individuals should invest during cooperative 
care is the level of asymmetry between carers in the cooperative group, which arises through 
the alternative options available to helpers (Cant & Johnstone 2009), and the level of control 
the breeding female(s) have over early investment behaviour (Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
Maternal tactics can be exercised through control of offspring size and number, limited by the 
mother’s confidence in the future care paradigm, but the success of such tactics relies on her 
decisions having lasting effects on the fitness of other members of her cooperative group 
(Table 1.2). 
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Maternal effects and cooperation 
Maternal effects occur when an individual’s phenotype is causally influenced by the 
phenotype or genotype of its mother, such that evolutionary changes in the distribution of 
maternal traits will lead to corresponding changes in offspring traits through the causal 
linkage (Wolf & Wade 2009). Maternal effects may be straightforward by-products of 
maternal condition and physiology (‘passive’ effects), but can also take the form of adaptive 
maternal tactics to adjust offspring phenotype (‘active’ effects) (Badyaev 2005), and hence 
may influence how particular traits evolve (Bernardo 1996). In species with parental care, the 
scope of potential maternal effects broadens to include environmental effects during the 
dependent period that are mediated by the mother (Mousseau & Fox 1998a), and (while not 
strictly a maternal effect) strategies of mate choice by mothers will also influence offspring 
through genetic or environmental influences from the father. Similarly, in cooperative species 
in which the breeding female recruits helpers or influences their contributions to care, the 
entire rearing environment is mediated by the female and hence represents a maternal effect. 
Mothers will attempt to maximise their fitness by producing offspring of the phenotype or 
range of phenotypes that delivers the highest fitness to them, given the current conditions 
(Mousseau & Fox 1998b; Crean & Marshall 2009), and this may variously be achieved 
through maximising offspring fitness (‘anticipatory maternal effects’) or maximising maternal 
ability to produce further offspring while reducing individual offspring fitness (‘selfish 
maternal effects’) (Marshall & Uller 2007). Adaptive maternal strategies are expected to be 
most common when there is a strong relationship between strategy and fitness, when there is 
mother-offspring conflict in allocation decisions, and when environmental variability is high, 
predictable, and significantly influences the viability of alternative maternal strategies 
(Russell & Lummaa 2009; Hoyle & Ezard 2012). 
Maternal decisions when adjusting offspring size, number or other maternally-controlled 
parameters are complex and variable. Changes in one reproductive parameter may influence 
others, as in simple size-number trade-offs affecting all offspring in a given brood (Stearns 
1992; Roff 2002), potentially restricting maternal strategies. Offspring traits can be adjusted 
in unison, in anticipation of particular conditions, or applied differently across a single brood 
as a bet-hedging strategy when conditions are uncertain (Marshall & Uller 2007; Crean & 
Marshall 2009). In species that breed more than once, mothers must also choose what level of 
1: Introduction – Maternal effects and cooperation 
 
32 
 
resources to invest in a given bout of reproduction (Sockman et al. 2006), a decision which 
may be based on partner quality (Cunningham & Russell 2000) or current environmental 
conditions, and ‘good conditions’ of different forms may potentially lead to either reductions 
or increases in total investment depending on the specific costs and benefits involved (Russell 
& Lummaa 2009; Harris & Uller 2009).  
In birds, offspring are produced by the female as eggs, which creates several different 
potential routes through which maternal effects can manifest. Before hatching, opportunities 
for mothers to adjust offspring phenotype include choosing the timing of breeding, the choice 
of nesting site (and quality of nest), and the pattern of incubation for eggs (Price 1998), in 
addition to the choice of offspring size, number, and potentially sex (Komdeur 2004). Overall 
energetic investment in eggs is variable (Williams 1994; Christians 2002), and differential 
allocation of hormones (Groothuis et al. 2005), maternal antibodies (Smith et al. 1994), 
antioxidants (Royle et al. 2001), or nutrients such as carotenoids (Cucco et al. 2007) to the 
eggs provide further mechanisms for adjusting offspring phenotype that are wholly controlled 
by the mother. Mothers can potentially influence offspring competition by adjusting laying 
order, as this often imposes a gradient of the above nutrients on the eggs (Badyaev et al. 
2008), and this may influence sex determination (Rutkowska & Badyaev 2008). After egg 
production, females are usually primarily responsible for care during the incubation period, 
and when they begin incubation will also largely determine size variation within a given 
brood and influence offspring survival (Magrath 1990; Amundsen & Slagsvold 1998). After 
hatching, effects of other carers also become important as all can adjust offspring 
environment by altering the level of care they provide, however these adjustments are 
fundamentally reactionary to the initial investment chosen by the female.  
 
Stages of investment 
When choosing how to invest in offspring, breeding females face a trade-off between three 
fundamental factors: (a) How much to invest in each offspring, (b) how many offspring to 
produce; and (c) the level of resources to retain to improve the prospects for personal survival 
and future reproduction (Lack 1947; Smith & Fretwell 1974; Stearns 1992), and the decision 
of how much to invest in each offspring is not a single value but one that must be split 
appropriately between investment stages (Heaney & Monaghan 1995; Monaghan et al. 1998). 
1: Introduction – Maternal effects and cooperation 
 
33 
 
In most animals that cooperate to raise offspring, mothers must contribute investment across 
more stages than other carers, leading to high personal costs of reproduction when compared 
to other carers. Costs borne uniquely by the mother include, but are not limited to: 
• Direct energetic and nutritional costs of producing eggs (Visser & Lessells 2001) or 
young (Clutton-Brock 1991; Schultz et al. 2008) 
• Impaired agility during pregnancy (Webb 2004) or prior to egg laying (Kullberg et al. 
2005). 
• Energetic costs of feeding young when they rely on milk or other resources only she 
can provide (Lochmiller et al. 1982; Kurta et al. 1989) 
In addition, costs that the female will often be exposed to more significantly than other carers 
include: 
• Vulnerability to predation through repeated visits to, or time spent at, a static nest/den 
(Björklund 1990; Magnhagen 1991) 
• Loss of potential foraging time spent incubating / brooding young (Visser & Lessells 
2001) 
• Risk of attracting predators when signalling for a mate (when compared to helpers, or 
in species where males do not signal) (Cushing 1985) 
Ti
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←―
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  Nest building     
Producing eggs 
Nest maintenance, 
supplemental feeding of 
primary carers 
Nest defence 
(predator mobbing) Incubating eggs 
Feeding / Brooding 
nestlings 
Feeding fledglings    Fledgling defence (predator mobbing) 
 
Figure 1.2: Typical stages of investment during the breeding attempt of a passerine bird. Lightly 
shaded cells are stages during which the mother or parents are often the sole contributors to care, 
and the mother is usually entirely responsible for the energetic expenditure required to produce the 
eggs (dark shading). 
1: Introduction – Maternal effects and cooperation 
 
34 
 
If investment at a particular stage is completely or primarily delivered by a single individual, 
that individual will pay higher costs than other carers during that stage, but can also 
unilaterally alter the investment delivered to offspring, and hence influence the investment 
behaviour of all contributors during all later stages. Consequently we would expect mothers to 
have considerable control over reproduction in species with parental care, and hence maternal 
strategies to be an important influence on investment decisions. 
Birds represent an ideal model system for investigating the effects of multi-stage investment 
during care, as they have multiple clearly defined stages within their breeding attempts 
(Monaghan & Nager 1997), and often several concurrent investment behaviours within each 
stage (Fig 1.3). Birds also vary widely in their allocation of resources to eggs, from 
Procellariiformes and kiwis that produce a single egg of ~20% of maternal mass (Rahn et al. 
1975; Calder et al. 1978), and tits (Paridae) where the total clutch mass can exceed maternal 
body mass (Robinson 2005), to cuckoos which lay eggs that are typically below 5% of 
maternal mass (Rahn et al. 1975). Even within species, eggs investment can vary considerably: 
in song sparrows, some eggs can be 70% larger than others (Arcese & Smith 1988). The 
incubation period, a stage not found in most mammals, can also alter in duration within 
species (Ricklefs & Smeraski 1983), and parental care behaviour ranges from Megapodes 
providing only indirect incubation to offspring after laying (Jones & Birks 1992), to obligate 
cooperative species with an average of ten helpers per nest (Grimes 1980). Cooperative 
breeding provides further scope for maternal effects, as within-species variation in care is 
high, and offspring are often retained in the group to help their mother raise the following 
brood of offspring. 
 
Consequences of early-life investment 
Two final considerations in parental care over multiple stages are that (i) investment may be 
more valuable to offspring at different points during the breeding season, and that (ii) the 
future reproductive success or development of offspring traits may be constrained by 
conditions encountered early in life (Lindström 1999; Lummaa & Clutton-Brock 2002; Royle 
et al. 2005). When compensating for low levels of early investment is difficult, it follows that 
the relative value of investing in offspring at later stages may be determined by how much 
was invested previously (Cunha & Heckman 2007). In contrast, if compensatory investment 
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can raise offspring of poor condition to the same size or attractiveness as those that received 
greater early investment (e.g. Walling et al. 2007), a straightforward trade-off emerges 
between investment at different stages. Which condition applies will strongly affect how 
maternal tactics are likely to operate with respect to changing environments or numbers of 
helpers. 
The influences of differential maternal allocation and parental care on offspring structural 
traits are highly variable in birds (Price 1998). Maternal effects on offspring size are often 
visible in the first few days after hatching, when they may be crucial to survival (Price & 
Grant 1985; Williams 1994). The amount of parental care received sometimes has little effect 
on adult skeletal traits when estimated from diet or cross-fostering experiments in birds 
(Smith & Dhondt 1980; Dhondt 1982; Wiggins 1989; Smith 1993; Criscuolo et al. 2011); 
while in other cases a significant relationship is detected (Boag 1987; De Kogel & Prijs 1996; 
Tschirren et al. 2009). In general, the ability of carers to compensate for variable egg 
investment is likely to be contingent on good (or at least reasonable) conditions during rearing, 
as many species show declines in structural traits through a breeding season as conditions 
worsen and parental care reduces (Price 1991). Early life experience can also reduce the 
condition of migrating birds (assessed through fat levels) (Merilä & Svensson 1997), and 
zebra finches reared on a poor diet have low adult flight speed despite attaining the same size 
as those raised on a good diet (Criscuolo et al. 2011). 
Reproductive traits are also subject to early-life conditions. In pied flycatchers, poor condition 
while still in the nest has lifelong consequences for the egg size that offspring produce (Potti 
1999), and both zebra finches and great tits have reduced adult clutch sizes when reared in 
poor conditions (Haywood & Perrins 1992). Furthermore, when male secondary sexual traits 
are influenced by nestling conditions (Gustafsson et al. 1995; De Kogel & Prijs 1996), early 
conditions can have pervasive impacts on offspring reproductive success through both the 
ability to attract a mate and their mate’s allocation to offspring sired by them. In summary, 
early life conditions and maternal strategies during them have potentially enormous effects on 
the fate of offspring, and are likely to be particularly important in cooperative species due to 
high variation in parental care and multiple potential routes to fitness, which may be 
condition-dependent. 
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Maternal effects in cooperatively breeding birds 
Maternal effects are of great potential great importance in cooperatively breeding species, as 
high variation occurs in the prevalence, intensity, and utility of helping both within and 
between species, and this variation strongly influences both maternal and offspring routes to 
fitness (Russell & Lummaa 2009). In addition to the usual maternal effects during offspring 
development, helpers in many cooperative species are phylopatric offspring from previous 
breeding attempts, and hence maternal interactions with them represent a further stage of 
potential influence (Russell & Lummaa 2009). Furthermore, the ability of mothers to 
influence dispersive and competitive tendencies of offspring (Marshall & Uller 2007; 
Groothuis & Schwabl 2008) raises the possibility for selfish maternal strategies to produce 
offspring in poor condition specifically to become helpers rather than breeders, and hence 
increase future maternal fitness. However the viability of this strategy will depend on the 
relationship between offspring condition and potential helping contribution, in addition to the 
predictability of female tenure as a dominant breeder (Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
What maternal strategies should we expect in cooperative species? Firstly, if maternal-
restricted costs (such as egg production) are low and all-carer costs (such as provisioning) are 
high, then many carers will be able to contribute effectively to the breeding attempt: even if 
offspring size and number are fixed, the investment from helpers will still ‘load-lighten’ 
(Crick 1992) the costs incurred by the breeding female. In contrast, if mothers must produce 
costly offspring and provide some of the following care themselves (e.g. solo incubation), and 
costs during provisioning are relatively low, then helpers cannot load-lighten maternal costs 
effectively and one might expect only small numbers of helpers to be beneficial (in the 
absence of direct benefits to helping). As a result, one should expect species with helpers to 
shift the point at which helpers can meaningfully contribute to as early in the breeding attempt 
as possible; either through producing offspring that are more altricial (i.e. offspring that 
require less initial investment and more rearing investment), or by greater involvement of 
helpers in earlier investment stages such as incubation. One reason why biparental care and 
cooperative breeding systems are more common in birds (Cockburn 2006) than in mammals 
(Lukas & Clutton-Brock 2012) may be the existence of the egg stage, which facilitates 
investment by carers other than the mother over a greater proportion of the total 
developmental period. 
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Secondly, in stable cooperative groups we should expect maternal tactics related to dispersal 
dynamics and breeding tenure. Under harsh conditions or when group size is below the 
optimum (Russell & Lummaa 2009) one might expect greater production of the sex more 
likely to help (Pen & Weissing 2000), and although adaptive sex allocation is generally weak 
(West & Sheldon 2002), evidence suggests that is does occur in cooperative breeders (Griffin 
et al. 2005). Likewise, below-optimum group sizes or poor conditions might result in a selfish 
strategy of mothers lowering investment in offspring quality to encourage them to stay and 
help, while under optimum group sizes mothers are more likely to adopt anticipatory 
strategies to maximise offspring fitness (Russell & Lummaa 2009). When dispersal is male-
biased, such that mothers will potentially compete with their own offspring for breeding 
positions, one might expect a mixed strategy depending on tenure length and predictability, 
perhaps with mothers initially producing helpers to avoid competition, followed later by high-
quality female offspring to inherit the breeding position. Under female-biased dispersal 
mothers are left with only relatives as potential mates when the breeding male dies, and hence 
breeding tenures are shorter as mothers typically leave or are evicted from the group upon 
partner death (Hannon et al. 1985; Hatchwell et al. 2000). When not rearing competitors it is 
likely that unselfishly producing competitive, dispersive female offspring is a good strategy, 
although large numbers of poor dispersers might be beneficial in an unsaturated population. 
The evidence for adaptive maternal tactics in relation to group size is now substantial. Among 
birds, superb fairy wrens (Russell et al. 2007, 2008), carrion crows (Canestrari et al. 2011), 
southern lapwings (Santos & Macedo 2011), and sociable weavers (Paquet et al. 2013), have 
all demonstrated lower egg investment in larger groups, an effect often fully compensated for 
by the helpers. Cooperative cichlids have shown a similar reduction in egg size in response to 
larger numbers of helpers (Taborsky et al. 2007). Beyond egg size, shorter inter-clutch 
intervals are a common benefit of receiving help (Dickinson & Hatchwell 2004), and 
increases in clutch size with increasing group size have been reported in several cooperative 
birds (e.g. Davies & Hatchwell 1992; Lloyd et al. 2009; Klauke et al. 2013). A related 
strategy occurs in smooth-billed anis, where joint-laying females lay more eggs in larger 
groups to bias the clutch towards their own eggs (Schmaltz et al. 2008), and in colonial 
breeders evidence suggests that females may alter offspring quality to prepare them for a 
competitive rearing environment (van Dijk et al. 2013). Evidence for facultative adjustment of 
offspring sex ratio is also abundant (Komdeur 2004; Griffin et al. 2005; Dubois et al. 2006), 
however similar support for female manipulation of offspring dispersive ability is weak, 
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except within insects (Mousseau & Dingle 1991). One example of both tactics occurs in 
western bluebirds, in which females produce dispersive, competitive males under poor 
conditions, and non-dispersive, passive males under good conditions by adjusting sex bias in 
laying order (Duckworth 2009), and also adjust the sex ratio of clutches according to helper 
presence (Dickinson 2004). 
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Abstract  
When multiple individuals contribute to rearing the same oﬀspring, conflict is expected to 
occur over the relative amounts invested by each carer. Existing models of biparental care 
suggest that this conflict should be resolved by partially compensating for changes by co-
investors, but this has yet to be explicitly modelled in cooperative breeders over a range of 
carer numbers. In addition, existing models of biparental and cooperative care ignore potential 
variation in both the relative costs of oﬀspring production to mothers and in maternal 
allocation decisions. If mothers experience particularly high costs during oﬀspring production, 
this might be expected to aﬀect their investment strategies during later oﬀspring care. Here we 
show using a game-theoretical model that a range of investment tactics can result depending 
on the number of carers and the relative costs to the mother of the diﬀerent stages within the 
breeding attempt. Additional carers result in no change in investment by individuals when 
production costs are low, as mothers can take advantage of the greater potential investment by 
increasing oﬀspring number; however this tactic ultimately results in a decrease in care 
delivered to each oﬀspring. Conversely, when production costs prevent the mother from 
increasing oﬀspring number, our model predicts that other individuals should partially 
compensate for additional carers and hence oﬀspring should each receive a greater amount of 
care. Our results reinforce the importance of considering investment across all stages in a 
breeding attempt, and provide some explanatory power for the variation in investment rules 
observed across cooperative species. 
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Introduction 
Whenever an animal invests in a reproductive attempt, the amount invested represents a trade-
off between the benefits accrued to the current brood of offspring and the costs to the investor 
in terms of survival and future reproductive potential (Williams 1966b). In breeding systems 
where multiple individuals contribute jointly to oﬀspring care, carers additionally should 
benefit when the other(s) contribute a greater share of the total investment (Trivers 1972). In 
such systems, the lifetime fitness consequences for each individual investing in a breeding 
attempt will depend significantly on the amount invested, with the optimum amount emerging 
as a function of the probability of success of the attempt, the individual’s relatedness to the 
oﬀspring, the possibilities of current and future direct fitness gains, and by the behaviour of 
the other partner(s) contributing to care. The predictability of this investment by others, their 
likely relative contributions, and the point during the breeding attempt at which they invest 
will all influence an individual’s investment decisions. Without understanding these varied 
influences on investment behaviour, the causes and consequences of caring can easily be 
misinterpreted, and the adaptive benefit to individuals forming a social pair or group to raise 
oﬀspring will remain obscured.  
Joint contribution to offspring care can arise either through biparental care, where both 
parents contribute to raising offspring, or through cooperative care, where at least one parent 
and non-parent contribute. Biparental and cooperative care systems are fundamentally similar 
in that they divide offspring care between individuals that benefit from caring, but in 
cooperative systems both the number of carers and their average relatedness to each other are 
typically greater. In both systems the breeding female gains a potential tactical advantage in 
the conflict over care through her ability to choose offspring size and number, but also often 
pays a greater cost because she must invest in offspring before other carers. The extent to 
which she can capitalize on her advantage will depend in part on these personal costs, as well 
as on the number and predictability of additional carers available (Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
Despite many theoretical analyses of investment in oﬀspring, little attention has been given to 
the eﬀects on carer investment rules of maternal tactics prior to the joint rearing period, and 
likewise the possible effects of multiple and variable numbers of carers has remained 
relatively unexplored. 
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Most models of biparental systems (e.g. Houston & Davies 1985; McNamara et al. 1999) 
suggest that the conflict over care should be resolved by each parent investing less than if 
raising the brood of young alone, and by responding to changes in their partner's investment 
with incomplete (partial) compensation, such that a change in investment by one partner (or 
the presence/absence of a partner) leads to a change by the other of smaller magnitude and in 
the opposite direction (but see Jones et al. 2002; Johnstone & Hinde 2006). This prediction 
has received considerable empirical support (e.g. Bart & Tornes 1989; Raadik et al. 1990; 
Wright & Cuthill 1990; Whittingham et al. 1994; Markman et al. 1995; Royle et al. 2002; 
Hinde 2005; reviewed in Harrison et al. 2009), and recent theoretical work has shown that 
incomplete compensation should also stabilize negotiations involving three carers (Johnstone 
2011). However, support for incomplete compensation in biparental care is by no means 
ubiquitous (Johnstone & Hinde 2006; Harrison et al. 2009), and empirical studies 
investigating the effect of additional carers on individual investment levels in cooperative 
systems have found an even wider range of carer investment strategies. These range from 
carers completely compensating for the additional helper, such that there is no net increase in 
investment by the group as a whole (Brown et al. 1978; Legge 2000), through the expected 
incomplete compensation (Hatchwell & Davies 1990; Wright 1998a) to no compensation, 
where individual investment remains steady (Mumme & Koenig 1990; Emlen & Wrege 1991), 
or even an increase in individual investment (Valencia et al. 2006). In addition, within a given 
species, individuals can show a range of response reactions depending on their status (breeder 
vs. non-breeder) and/or the number of other carers in the group (Hatchwell 1999; Clutton-
Brock et al. 2004; Gilchrist & Russell 2007; Browning et al. 2012b). This variation in carer 
responses is poorly understood, but has been suggested to reflect variation in the probability 
of offspring starvation: where starvation is likely, partial or no compensation is expected so 
that additional helpers have some positive effect on brood provisioning frequency (Hatchwell 
1999). Nevertheless, it is unclear why apparent evidence for both complete and no 
compensation is relatively common in cooperative breeders (Cockburn 1998; Heinsohn 2004) 
when theoretical work generally predicts incomplete compensation. One possibility is that 
complete compensation arises in conjunction with a non-zero relatedness value between 
carers, such that additional individuals can improve the survival of related carers after brood 
demand is satiated. Another possibility is that the level of compensation varies depending on 
the costs to the breeding female of producing offspring, providing she is able to predict the 
number of potential helpers and adjust offspring number accordingly (Russell et al. 2008). To 
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our knowledge, no previous model has explored the consequences of tactical investment in 
offspring production by mothers, or the consequences of having variable numbers of other 
carers on the optimal investment strategies for each individual during offspring rearing.  
As with simpler single-stage models of offspring care, when considering the influence of 
production costs on investment behaviour one would expect the precise amounts invested to 
depend upon the relative costs and benefits of care (Chase 1980; Winkler 1987), and these in 
turn to depend upon the number of offspring in the brood (Smith & Härdling 2000). The 
integration of models of optimal clutch size with those of investment in care has been largely 
overlooked (but see Smith & Härdling 2000), primarily because existing work suggests that 
females should produce a size and number of offspring that maximizes their return per unit 
investment regardless of the total amount invested (Smith & Fretwell 1974; Winkler & Wallin 
1987). However this conclusion is based on an analysis of the tactics of a single parent, and 
one cannot assume that investment in offspring production and in subsequent care will be 
independent if other individuals can also contribute. Different numbers of offspring will elicit 
different levels of investment from other carers, and hence the individual choosing offspring 
number can potentially 'manipulate' the investment levels of others. If a breeding female is 
assisted by one or more individuals in raising offspring, and can adjust the number of 
offspring she produces in response to the presence of these helpers (e.g. Russell et al. 2003; 
Woxvold 2005), one must consider the evolution of offspring number and individual 
investment together in a single model. Smith and Härdling (2000) demonstrate the importance 
of considering this joint evolution and show that it can affect the stability of the mating 
system, however they do not address the specific investment levels or strategies that are 
expected under different cost parameters or numbers of carers. 
The need for further theoretical work on reproductive investment is supported by the lack of 
consistent empirical results showing incomplete compensation (particularly in studies on 
cooperative breeders), which suggest that some underlying assumptions of current models 
need to be re-evaluated. Primary amongst these is that female investment in offspring size and 
number is independent of the subsequent investment by all carers, particularly given the work 
already linking them (Smith & Härdling 2000). Breeding females occupy a unique position in 
many care systems, as they are often capable of altering initial offspring size and number, and 
the idea that females can tactically invest in offspring in response to the number of carers has 
support from empirical studies (e.g. Davies & Hatchwell 1992; Taborsky et al. 2007; Russell 
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et al. 2007; Santos & Macedo 2011; Canestrari et al. 2011). The breeding female also may 
pay a greater cost than other carers, as she invests time and energy producing and caring for 
young before other carers are able to invest. High costs to the breeding female at this initial 
production stage can have significant effects on her survival or later fecundity (Heaney & 
Monaghan 1995; Visser & Lessells 2001), leading to a trade-off for the female between the 
amount invested in the pre- and post-helper stages. While females are still expected to 
maximize their return per unit investment in offspring care, the number of helpers and relative 
costs of the two stages (pre- vs. post-birth/hatching) will affect how the female should 
optimally divide her investment. Any complete model of investment in offspring must 
consider both the number of carers and the relative costs of these different stages of 
investment to fully understand the trade-offs involved in breeding, in addition to resolving the 
familiar conflict between individuals over investment. The benefits different carers gain from 
raising the offspring are also critically important when considering investment in a 
cooperative system. 
The model that we introduce is a game-theoretical model of investment with variable numbers 
of carers (2-12) and choice of oﬀspring number by the breeding female. Investment is divided 
into two stages: in the first stage (offspring production) the female pays a cost to produce her 
chosen number of oﬀspring, then in the second stage (offspring rearing), she and all other 
carers invest in oﬀspring care. The relative costs of the two stages are modified to explore the 
consequences of breeding systems in which oﬀspring production costs are dominant 
compared to those in which rearing costs are dominant, i.e. in which a greater or lesser 
proportion of the costs incurred by the breeding female fall before or after the point at which 
helpers are able to invest. The relative costs of investment between the female and other 
carers are also manipulated to determine their eﬀects on investment. We evaluate our results 
in terms of the eﬀects of helper number and timing of costs on the numbers of oﬀspring 
produced, the individual investment rules of group members, and the amount of care 
delivered to each oﬀspring.  
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The Model 
Description 
Our aim is to explore the outcome in terms of productivity, total investment per oﬀspring, and 
response to additional carers when the female is able to alter the number of oﬀspring based on 
the number of other carers (hereafter helpers) in the group. For simplicity we assume that the 
breeding male, if present, has a similar payoﬀ function to the helpers (see discussion) and 
hence can be grouped with them in the model. Our model is a sequential game of two steps, 
similar to that developed by Smith and Härdling (2000). The female first chooses the number 
of oﬀspring n, with knowledge of the number of helpers in the group z, and pays a cost 
derived from the number of oﬀspring produced. Following this all carers play a simultaneous 
game to determine their individual investment levels. The choice of level of investment in the 
second step is assumed to be simultaneous and independent by all individuals, a 'sealed-bid' 
interaction following Houston and Davies (1985), rather than a 'negotiation' in which carers 
repeatedly interact in behavioral time to reach a stable investment level (as in McNamara et al. 
1999, 2003; Johnstone & Hinde 2006). In general sealed-bid and negotiation models generate 
qualitatively similar results: for analogous models the results from sealed-bid approaches are 
reproduced in negotiations where individuals are inflexible in their response to each other's 
bids (McNamara et al. 1999). In our model we used a sealed-bid rather than negotiation 
approach because this allowed us to obtain analytical solutions for all numbers of carers, 
however individuals are assumed to be able to adjust their investment bid in the second step in 
response to the size of the brood set in the first step. 
We first calculate the response of a breeding female and z ‘helpers’, (including the breeding 
male, if present) to a given brood size n. Breeding females choose an amount xf to invest, and 
simultaneously all helpers choose an amount, termed ihx  for the i
th individual. The vector of 
other carer investment amounts is hx where 
1 2 3 1,  ,  ,   ,( ),  z zh h h h h hx x x x x
x . Investment in 
offspring influences their survival and future reproduction, and we assume all offspring 
benefit equally and regardless of the particular individuals contributing. The benefit b to the 
brood of offspring depends on n and the total investment all individuals provide totx , where 
1   
z i
tot f i hx x x   . We assume that there is some constant minimum level of investment per 
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offspring xmin below which individual offspring gain no benefit from being helped, such that 
the response of b to investment is a function of /   –tot minx n x . 
We include a constant kb to scale benefit as appropriate with our cost functions. We assume 
that the first derivative of the benefit function (bꞌ) is positive, such that increasing investment 
leads to increasing benefit to the offspring, but that the second derivative (bꞌꞌ) is negative, 
such that increasing investment leads to diminishing returns. Given these assumptions, for 
illustrative purposes we use a quadratic function that yields analytical solutions: 
2
min min
tot tot
b
x xb k x x
n n
                 
 
Reproduction is costly (Williams 1966), as it requires the investment of resources such as 
time or effort that otherwise would have a positive effect on future fitness. The total cost to 
the female cf depends on the number of offspring she produces n, and her investment in 
rearing the brood xf as well as two constants: the relative cost of offspring production kp 
(which acts on n), and the relative cost of offspring rearing kr (which acts on xf). The total cost 
to the female is calculated from the sum of the costs of the two steps, an approach supported 
by studies demonstrating a trade-off between investment in producing and rearing broods (e.g. 
Heaney and Monaghan 1995). We assume that for all individuals the first derivative of the 
cost function (cf) is positive, such that increasing investment leads to increasing costs, and that 
the second derivative (cf) is also positive, such that costs accelerate with greater investment. 
Similarly, for the ith other carer the cost ihc  depends on that individual's investment level 
i
hx  
and the relative cost of offspring rearing (ks to allow for differences from the female's rearing 
costs). Unlike the female's cost function it does not depend on n as the other carers do not 
produce offspring themselves. As before, for simplicity we choose a quadratic function for 
both cost functions: 
 
2 2
2
f p r f
i i
h s h
c k n k x
c k x
   
    
Optimization of investment levels in a given brood requires trading off the benefit an 
individual receives from current reproduction against the costs from reducing survival 
probably or future reproductive success, and must also account for the relatedness between 
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the investing individuals. Inclusive payoff functions for the female and helpers (respectively 
wf
  and ihw  for the i
th helper) are generated by taking the benefit individuals receive from 
helping and subtracting the costs individuals pay as a result of investment by themselves and 
by related individuals (weighted by their relatedness to the focal individual). For simplicity 
we assume that all other carers are equally related to the offspring, and that all individuals 
receive a benefit directly proportional to their relatedness to the brood (rfb or rhb). The 
breeding female and other carers are also all related equally (female-helper rfh, helper-helper 
rhh). To summarize, the inclusive payoffs are given by: 
1
1
z
i
f fb f fh h
i
z
i i i
h hb h hh h
i
w r b c r c
w r b c r c


    
    


  
 
Solving the model 
At equilibrium, neither the female nor any helper should be able to increase their payoff by 
altering their investment levels. Formally: 
0
i
f h
i
f h
w w
x x
      
There are no differences between helpers aside from their investment decisions, so the same 
response to investment by the rest of the group will be made by all helpers, and at equilibrium 
i
hx  will be identical for all i. Solving the above produces rules for xf and 
i
hx  in terms of n and z 
at equilibrium, which are termed ˆ fx  and ˆhx  respectively. 
We can now calculate the optimal strategy for the female to play in the first step. The female 
should choose a value of n such that it maximizes her payoff wf given that ˆf fx x  and 
ˆih hx x  at equilibrium. For simplicity we assume that n is large, and thus approximately 
continuous. Formally: 
0f
w
n
   
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After solving this we have rules for xf , 
i
hx  and n at equilibrium that depend only on helper 
number z and the extrinsically specified parameters. 
 
Comparison of analogous breeding attempts 
From these rules we can plot expected investment levels by females and helpers across a 
range of carer numbers, and substitute them back into the original payoff equations to 
determine the equilibrium payoff. However, although the above results can elucidates the 
costs of the two stages will affect investment decisions (by manipulation of kr and ks versus 
kp), we need a way of equating the costs of the two stages before we can meaningfully 
examine the effects of different cost parameters on breeding attempts. To do this, we consider 
the simple case of a lone female investing in offspring. 
As before, we calculate the optimal investment levels by maximizing the payoff equation wf, 
but this time ignoring any investment by helpers (z = 0, ihx  = 0). With no individuals other 
than the female, the game simplifies and is functionally single-step; the female must simply 
maximize her payoff (for this simplified case relabeled 0fw ) with respect to both her 
investment 0fx  and the brood size 
0n . Formally: 
0 0
0 0 0
f f
f
w w
x n
     
Solving this equation for 0fx
 and 0n  generates equilibrium values 0ˆ fx  and 
0nˆ  which can then 
be substituted into wf
0 to yield an equation for female payoff that depends only on the 
constants of the system. Plotting production cost kp against rearing cost kr (Fig. 2.1) then gives 
us contours of equal female fitness that each represent a set of analogous breeding attempts 
differing only in the “balance” between the production and rearing costs. We can now alter kp 
and kr to produce conditions where the breeding attempts are dominated either by production-
stage or rearing-stage costs, but where the total payoff for the attempts are the same; this 
allows us to make comparisons between the two kinds of breeding attempt under conditions 
where they are analogous. 
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Figure 2.1: Contours of equal lone female payoﬀ 0fw  under varying values of production cost kp  
and rearing cost kr. Along these contours, paired values of kp and kr give the same payoﬀ for a 
female raising a brood alone. 
To generate results, we chose three pairs of values for kp and kr that fell along a typical payoff 
contour. The three pairs represent a low, moderate, and high production cost respectively, and 
correspond to values of kp that differ by a factor of five. The values of the other constants (see 
supplementary material) were chosen either for approximation to real cooperative systems 
(e.g. in the case of relatedness values), or so that the resulting numbers of offspring fell within 
a normal range for a terrestrial vertebrate. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that females 
and helpers have the same cost constant during the rearing stage (kr = ks), and that relatedness 
values are 0.25 between the helpers and offspring, helper and other helpers, and helpers and 
the breeding female. Throughout, 'carers' refers to all individuals including the breeding 
female, while 'helpers' refers to every individual except the breeding female. 
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Results 
(i) Productivity 
Females produce more offspring as helper number increases (Fig. 2.2a). When the majority of 
costs fall in the rearing stage, offspring number and fitness are nearly linearly related to helper 
number, as helpers are able to contribute more effectively to the breeding attempt. In contrast, 
when the costs at the production stage are higher the positive effect on the payoff of having 
additional helpers plateaus quickly. This effect arises because the female rapidly reaches a 
level of initial investment in offspring that is extremely costly, and so is unable to capitalize 
on the presence of additional helpers by producing more offspring. This limitation on 
offspring production leads to a reduction in the benefit of acquiring additional helpers (to both 
the breeding female and existing helpers) as the number of helpers increases (Fig. 2.2b). This 
decrease is far more rapid, and the benefit to recruiting more helpers far lower, when 
production costs are relatively higher than rearing costs. 
 
(ii) Investment levels 
Investment levels have a more complicated dependence on helper number and the timing of 
costs. When there are few helpers the addition of another helper can lead to 'superadditive' 
investment, where all carers (helpers and breeding female) increase their individual 
investment in the brood (as in Valencia et al. 2006). As the number of helpers increases this 
positive effect on individual investment decreases, leading first to 'no compensation' (all 
carers maintain their individual investment, as in Wright et al. 1999) and then to 
compensatory care ('load-lightening'; all carers reduce their individual investment) (Fig.2.3a). 
The type of care received affects the amount of investment per offspring: when it is 
superadditive each offspring receives less investment as more helpers are added, but under 
compensatory care each receives more (Fig.2.3b). This apparent contradiction, whereby an 
increase in individual carer investment leads to lower per-offspring investment received (and 
vice-versa) is due to the greater number of offspring produced by the female in the production 
stage. The timing of costs is also crucial, as when rearing costs are dominant superadditive 
care and no compensation appear over a larger range of helper numbers, whereas dominant 
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production costs favor compensatory care. In all cases the total amount of investment 
delivered to the brood by all carers increases as the number of carers goes up, but this total is 
higher when rearing costs are dominant. 
 
(iii) Variable rearing costs 
We have generally assumed above that rearing costs are the same for identical levels of 
investment across breeding females and helpers. This assumption will often be violated in 
natural systems, as helpers are frequently found to differ from breeders in their foraging 
ability (e.g. Heinsohn 1991; Clutton-Brock et al. 2002), and young helpers may be poorer 
foragers than older helpers (e.g. Heinsohn and Cockburn 1994). Breeding females may also 
pay a unique cost when the offspring are young (but after other individuals are able to invest), 
for example from brooding the young before they can self-regulate their temperature. Taking 
this variation into account, we see that load-lightening by the female starts at larger numbers 
of helpers the greater the cost to helpers relative to the female (Fig. 2.4a). As expected helpers 
invest far less when their costs are higher, but they too show load-lightening at greater helper 
numbers when their costs are higher than those of the female (Fig. 2.4b). This relationship is 
fairly simply explained: the poorer the ability of helpers to provide investment, the more 
helpers are needed to reach the female's constraint on investment at the production stage. This 
of course assumes that the overall 'quality' of the helpers is predictable by the female at the 
time offspring are produced.   
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(2.2a) 
 
  
(2.2b) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Increasing carer number increases oﬀspring number, and more oﬀspring are produced 
when rearing costs are higher than when production costs are higher (a). For both the breeding 
female and other carers, recruiting an additional carer always leads to a greater payoﬀ (b), but this 
benefit is larger when rearing costs are higher than when production costs are higher (the figure 
shows the payoﬀ to a helper, but the breeding female exhibits the same relationship). Three sets of 
cost parameters (equivalent for a lone female) are displayed: Rearing costs dominant (solid); 
balanced costs (dashed); production costs dominant (dotted). Payoﬀ is expressed in arbitrary units. 
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(2.3a) 
 
  
(2.3b) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Additional carers reduce the eﬀort expended by all individuals when production costs 
are high (incomplete compensation), and increase or maintain the eﬀort (superadditive care or no 
compensation respectively) when rearing costs are high (a). In general, increasing carer number 
leads ultimately to load-lightening for any set of cost parameters. Individual oﬀspring receive a 
greater amount of investment each when care is compensatory, but when it is superadditive they 
receive a lesser amount (b). The same sets of cost parameters are plotted: Rearing costs dominant 
(solid); balanced costs (dashed); production costs dominant (dotted). Investment is expressed in 
arbitrary units. 
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(2.4a) 
 
  
(2.4b) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Diﬀerences between females and other carers in the cost of investment during the 
rearing stage alter whether compensatory care is expected from the female across diﬀerent numbers 
of helpers (a). Compensatory care begins at smaller helper numbers when helper costs are lower 
than female costs, and the female is able to reduce her investment faster as helper number 
increases. Investment by other carers shows a similar relationship (b), but changing their cost 
parameter has a stronger eﬀect on their total investment. Plots show costs to other carers half those 
of the breeding female (ks = kr /2) (dashed); equal costs (ks = kr) (dot-dashed); other carer costs 
double those of females (ks = 2kr) (dotted).  
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Discussion 
Our results suggest that when rearing costs (rather than production costs) are dominant, 
females are expected to produce many offspring to capitalize on the presence of helpers. As 
the number of other carers in the system increases, all individuals will work harder and invest 
more in the brood both individually and as a group (superadditive care). However this 
increase in investment only partially compensates for the greater number of offspring initially 
produced, such that each individual offspring will have less invested in it than it would have 
had in a smaller brood with fewer helpers. The opposite pattern is predicted when production 
costs are dominant. In this case females still produce more offspring with additional helpers, 
but to a lesser extent. Each additional helper reduces the levels of investment of all carers 
(load-lightening), and each individual offspring has a greater amount invested in it when there 
are more helpers in the system. Whichever stage of costs is dominant, 'no compensation' or 
'superadditive care' is more likely to be observed when helper costs are greater than female 
costs. Larger groups of carers are biased towards load-lightening, as the female will always 
eventually be constrained by her initial investment. Our finding that investment rules are 
symptomatic of particular cost parameters may help to explain some of the inconsistency in 
empirical studies of investment, as we would not expect the same investment rules across 
species that differ in factors of breeding biology or life history that restrict flexibility in 
offspring number, predictability of helpers, or the subsequent costs of incubating, 
provisioning or protecting the offspring until independence. 
Existing analyses (e.g. Houston & Davies 1985) predict that in biparental systems each carer 
should respond to the investment of the other by incompletely compensating, and thus escape 
part of the costs of care (load-lightening). This result holds in general for both sealed-bid and 
negotiation analyses (though see Jones et al. 2002; McNamara et al. 2003; Johnstone & Hinde 
2006), and recent work extending negotiation to three individuals suggests it also holds for 
three carers (Johnstone 2011). Our analysis, however, demonstrates that these predictions 
hold only for a fixed brood size. They are thus relevant when predicting the response of a 
female to experimental removal or manipulation of her mate after offspring have been 
produced (e.g. Bart & Tornes 1989; Raadik et al. 1990; Duckworth 1992; Fetherston et al. 
1994; Markman et al. 1995; Itzkowitz et al. 2001), but not when comparing (either within or 
between species) the behaviour of females who can anticipate the number of helpers at the 
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time of offspring production. The critical assumptions of our model are that individuals show 
systematic variation and respond to changes in offspring number in behavioral time, but these 
assumptions are supported by recent work showing tactical female investment during 
offspring production according to the number of carers available (Russell et al. 2003; Russell 
et al. 2007; Taborsky et al. 2007; Russell and Lummaa 2009; Canestrari et al. 2011; Santos 
and Macedo 2011). Similarly, examples from both observational studies (Magrath & Elgar 
1997) and experiments (Sanz & Tinbergen 1999; Komdeur et al. 2002) show that breeding 
males are capable of responding to greater clutch sizes by increasing parental investment.  
Inflexible brood sizes across different numbers of carers can be seen as a special case that 
occurs when production costs to the breeding female are very high, there is a biological 
constraint, or when it is very difficult to predict the amount of future help at the time of 
offspring production. Inflexible brood sizes lead to the female and helpers escaping more of 
the costs of care as carer number increases, and offspring individually doing better; this 
follows the pattern one would expect if extrapolating from uni- and biparental systems. 
However, when the female is able to modify brood size in response to a predictable number of 
helpers a different pattern of investment can appear. When production costs are cheap relative 
to those of the rearing period, our model suggests that the breeding female should take 
advantage of the helpers' anticipated contributions by producing more offspring (as in Davies 
& Hatchwell 1992; Russell et al. 2003; Woxvold 2005), rather than by fully reducing her own 
level of investment. Under these circumstances, producing a larger brood/litter can be viewed 
as a means of 'manipulation': rather than simply anticipating the care that her group will 
provide, a female can induce the helpers to invest more than they otherwise would have by 
producing more offspring. Even though she too must invest more to raise these extra offspring, 
she gains a net benefit due to the extra total contribution she elicits from the other carers as 
the size of the group increases. This female 'manipulation' is not necessarily harmful to the 
other carers, but this will depend on the similarity of their current and future fitness functions 
to those of the female; in some shorebirds, polyandrous females 'manipulate' more males to 
care for their offspring in a similar way, by producing additional clutches sequentially (Lank 
et al. 1985). From the viewpoint of the helpers, they should always respond to additional 
offspring by increasing investment, because they always benefit from additional offspring 
being reared; combined with the response of the female to predictable help this leads to a 
close positive relationship between group size, offspring number, and total amount of 
investment by the group.  
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In species with less flexible brood sizes, another way for the breeding female to alter initial 
investment would be by manipulating the amount invested in each individual offspring at the 
production stage according to the number of helpers, an effect shown by Russell et al. (2007), 
Canestrari et al. (2011), and Santos and Macedo (2011). This tactic should be expected in 
species that produce small numbers of offspring, as the female will be more heavily 
constrained by the necessity of producing a discrete number of offspring. For example, in a 
species that normally produces four offspring, the minimum increase (to produce a single 
extra offspring) represents a 25% increase in production investment, whereas a species 
producing twenty offspring is capable of producing an additional one and only raising its 
costs by 5%. The analogous theoretical predictions when dealing with tactical manipulation of 
investment-per-offspring, rather than offspring number, are discussed in chapter five. 
In our model, low production costs can lead to individual offspring each receiving less 
investment when helpers are present than they would from a lone female, reproducing a 
theoretical result found in the biparental case by McNamara et al. (2003). In these cases the 
increase in helper investment only partially compensates for the greater number of offspring 
produced by the female to take advantage of the available help. Following this result, we 
predict that a positive effect of helpers on individual offspring survival and success should be 
more often seen when care is compensatory, but that helpers should cause females to increase 
the number of oﬀspring she produces regardless of the cost parameters. 
We treat all individuals other than the breeding female as equivalent in our model, but in real 
systems these carers will vary in their ability or willingness to deliver care due to factors such 
as age (and hence experience) (Heinsohn & Cockburn 1994; Langen 1996) or relatedness to 
the brood (leading to different indirect benefits) (Emlen & Wrege 1991; Nam et al. 2011; 
Browning et al. 2012a). Lowering relatedness between helpers and offspring should decrease 
helper investment if indirect benefits are important, and less experienced helpers will likely 
pay higher costs, also leading to reduced investment. However in most systems there will be 
an inverse relationship between relatedness and experience as older individuals are more 
likely to have lived through a change in the breeding pair; this will lead to similarity in the 
payoff functions of helpers as the effects on investment work in opposite directions. The 
breeding male is a potential exception to the above rule as he will normally possess both high 
relatedness to the brood and significant experience, however studies typically indicate that 
breeding males do follow the same investment patterns as non-breeders during offspring 
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rearing (Wright 1998b; McDonald et al. 2009). In our model the term that governs how 
individual payoff is affected by the costs incurred by other group members is referred to as 
'relatedness', but could equally well represent any direct benefit where an individual's fitness 
is linked to the fitness or survival of other group members. 
Our results suggest that cooperation should evolve more easily when a greater proportion of 
the costs of reproduction can be removed from the breeding female, as this allows more carers 
to invest effectively in offspring. As we have seen, when the female's costs are higher in the 
production stage the effect of additional carers on productivity quickly plateaus, whereas 
when they are lower the number of offspring produced is nearly linear with carer number, at 
least over the ranges considered. Conversely, the more potential carers that are available, the 
greater the advantage to shifting the earliest point that carers can invest towards the beginning 
of the breeding attempt, thus biasing the 'balance' of the attempt towards rearing costs. This 
could be achieved (for example) by producing young that are smaller and less well developed 
(assuming they can be fed by any individual), by developing mechanisms for other carers to 
share the costs of guarding or caring for eggs, or by provisioning the female during incubation 
or gestation to transfer away some of her production-stage costs. 
Given that the eﬀect of additional carers on female payoﬀ is always positive, help should 
never be refused by the breeding female unless additional factors such as resource 
competition become important. This means that group size is likely to be driven by the 
relative values of the alternative options available to the other carers, especially when 
ecological factors are not acting to reduce the fitness of larger groups. In many systems we 
would expect there to be a certain payoﬀ below which one or more alternative options (e.g. 
dispersal, floating, or challenging for breeding) becomes favourable, causing the helper to 
leave the system. Further theoretical work incorporating group formation and outside options 
would be needed to determine stable group sizes in a mixed population of breeders and 
helpers with varying relatedness. Although our model is framed in terms of helpers gaining 
indirect fitness benefits from offspring, the abstract relationship between offspring benefit and 
helper benefit equally well describes helpers accruing direct fitness benefits, provided that 
these direct benefits are contingent on the success of the breeding attempt in the same way 
indirect benefits would be. For example, the outcomes expected when helpers accrue fitness 
through augmenting group size fit well with our model, as this relies on oﬀspring surviving 
and contributing to the future fitness of the helper. By contrast, our model is less useful for 
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systems where selection for helping is based largely on ‘help-for-experience’ (Selander 1964); 
‘pay-to-stay’ (Gaston 1978) or ‘social prestige’ (Zahavi 1995), because in such systems 
helper benefits are based on the act (rather than consequences) of helping.  
Future empirical studies in pair- and cooperatively-breeding species would benefit from 
considering the mounting evidence that maternal investment can vary significantly according 
to partner quality (Krist 2011; Horváthová et al. 2012) and/or group size (Russell & Lummaa 
2009). As with any multi-stage investment system, focusing on decisions within individual 
stages in isolation may produce confusing or contradictory results if individuals can shift 
investment between stages as parameters change, or in response to the behaviour of others 
(Russell et al. 2008). Further theoretical work is needed to understand the effects on 
investment levels of restricted (but non-zero) investment by helpers at early stages. While we 
have focused here on effects of maternal variation in offspring number, one might also expect 
aspects such as offspring size, sex ratio, hatching synchrony and timing of reproduction to 
influence investment decisions in a cooperative group (Russell & Lummaa 2009). 
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Abstract 
In any system where multiple individuals jointly contribute to rearing offspring, conflict is 
expected to arise over the relative contributions of each carer. Existing theoretical work on the 
conflict over care has: (a) rarely considered the influence of tactical investment during 
offspring production on later contributions to offspring rearing; (b) concentrated mainly on 
biparental care, rather than cooperatively caring groups comprising both parents and helpers; 
and (c) typically ignored relatedness between carers as a potential influence on investment 
behaviour. We use a game-theoretical approach to explore the effects of female production 
tactics and differing group relatedness structures on the expected rearing investment 
contributed by breeding females, breeding males, and helpers in cooperative groups. Our 
results suggest that the breeding female should pay higher costs overall when helpful helpers 
are present, as she produces additional offspring to take advantage of the available care. We 
find that helpers related to offspring through the breeding female rather than the breeding 
male should contribute less to care, and decrease their contribution as group size increases, 
because the female refrains from producing additional offspring to exploit them. Finally, 
within-group variation in helper relatedness also affects individual helper investment rules by 
inflating the differences between the contributions to care of dissimilar helpers. Our findings 
underline the importance of considering maternal investment decisions during offspring 
production to understand investment across the entire breeding attempt, and provide 
empirically testable predictions concerning the interplay between maternal, paternal and 
helper investment and how these are modified by different relatedness structures. 
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Introduction 
In many animals, the successful development of offspring requires resources from parents 
beyond those delivered pre-hatching/prenatally. Offspring receiving such resources can obtain 
them from one parent only (uniparental care), both parents (biparental care) or at least one 
parent and non-parent (cooperative care). Understanding the patterns of resource investment 
in developing young by parents and non-parents is a central component of life-history theory 
(Williams 1966; Stearns 1992). Despite this, few attempts have been made to model the 
investment rules of carers across different stages within a breeding attempt (see Shen et al. 
2011 for a two-carer example), even though changes to investment levels at an early stage in a 
breeding attempt are known theoretically and empirically to influence later behaviour of all 
carers (Smith and Härdling 2000; Russell et al. 2007) as well as estimations of carer 
investment rules (Russell et al. 2008). In addition, few studies have explored how the indirect 
fitness consequences of relatedness among carers should influence investment in a 
cooperative group (Johnstone 2011). 
In uniparental care systems, the predicted maternal investment strategy within a given 
reproductive attempt is relatively straightforward, as it is only influenced by the relationships 
between current investment, and both current and future contributions to overall fitness 
(Williams 1966b). When another carer is added, contributions to care become more complex 
because the optimal investment strategy of one parent is also influenced by that of the other, 
as each will benefit when the other takes on a greater proportion of the costs of care (Trivers 
1974). Assuming carers have similar information about offspring need (Johnstone and Hinde 
2006), the usual prediction of biparental care models is that parental investment should be 
reduced to incompletely compensate for that provided by the other partner (Houston and 
Davies 1985; McNamara et al. 1999); although threshold effects (Jones et al. 2002) or very 
high responsiveness to partners (McNamara et al. 2003) can lead to other response rules. 
Cooperative care systems further complicate the possible investment strategies, not only 
because the parent(s) and non-parent(s) may accrue different benefits when contributing to 
offspring care (Hatchwell 2009), but because both the number of non-parents (hereafter 
helpers) and their relatedness to each other and to offspring can vary both within and between 
species (Russell and Lummaa 2009). This complexity may explain why empirical tests of 
provisioning rules are largely supportive of incomplete compensation in biparental species 
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(Harrison et al. 2009), whilst cooperative species have been found to exhibit almost every 
conceivable response to the presence of other carers (Hatchwell 1999; Heinsohn 2004). To 
date, few theoretical frameworks have been provided in which to understand this variation. 
Using a comparative approach, Hatchwell (1999) found that in cooperatively breeding birds a 
significant proportion of the striking variation in investment rules could be explained by the 
probability of offspring starvation. In bird species in which nestling starvation is rare, parents 
are more likely to reduce their personal costs by compensating for the additional investment 
from helpers, while in species with frequent nestling starvation, additive care is more 
common (where each additional carer increases the overall investment to the brood). In a 
three-player negotiation model, Johnstone (2011) showed that this result could be accounted 
for by different rearing cost functions: where such functions are more strongly accelerating 
(i.e. conditions are harsher and offspring payoffs lower), all carers tend towards maintaining 
investment levels such that offspring receive the largest possible amount of resources. In 
addition, Johnstone (2011) suggested an important role for intra-group relatedness in 
determining response rules: when rearing cost functions are similar for both parents, the 
presence of a helper leads to the parent that is less related to the helper compensating for 
changes in helper effort more strongly. However, both the above studies have important 
limitations. 
Firstly, breeding females vary dramatically in their initial investment in offspring production, 
both within and between species (Russell and Lummaa 2009), and this investment is likely to 
significantly influence maternal care allocations during offspring rearing, and by extension 
the contributions of other carers (Clutton-Brock et al. 2004; Gilchrist and Russell 2007). 
Previous studies have rarely considered a role of maternal investment during offspring 
production on carer investment optima during offspring rearing, and those that have (e.g. 
Shen et al. 2011) seldom gave control of offspring number to the breeding female. However, 
growing evidence suggests that breeding females are capable of modifying the number and/or 
quality of offspring produced when they can predict the likely contributions of other carers 
(Davies et al. 1992; Russell et al. 2003; Woxvold and Magrath 2005; Russell et al. 2007; 
Taborsky et al. 2007; Canestrari et al. 2011; Santos and Macedo 2011; Paquet et al. 2013). In 
a recent game-theoretic model, Savage et al. (2013) showed that high production costs 
(relative to rearing costs) should lead to reductions in individual investment with additional 
carers, because in such cases breeding females produce fewer offspring, which consequently 
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need less investment during the rearing period. However, this model was limited by treating 
the breeding male as identical to other helpers, and by neglecting to explore the effects of 
intra-group relatedness on allocations of care.  
Secondly, while Johnstone (2011) considered relatedness structure between the breeding pair 
and a single helper, the potential effects of having multiple helpers of varying relatedness 
were not explored. It is rarely the case that cooperatively breeding groups are restricted to 
parents with a single helper, yet few attempts have been made to predict how individuals will 
respond to each other in larger, interrelated cooperative groups: at most, three individuals 
have been considered (Härdling et al. 2003; Johnstone 2011). The relatedness between helpers 
and breeders within cooperative groups can vary considerably both between and within 
species, because although cooperative breeding typically arises within a family context 
(Emlen 1995; Hatchwell 2009), helpers may be related to both parents, one parent (after the 
other dies/disperses or following group immigration) or neither parent (when both are 
replaced from outside the group or when the helper is a lone immigrant) (Stacey and Koenig 
1990; Dickinson and Hatchwell 2004). Variation in kin-structure is likely to influence helper 
provisioning rules (and by association the parental rules) because related helpers will gain a 
greater benefit from reducing the costs of each other’s contributions than will unrelated 
helpers, either because related helpers that survive to become breeders will provide each other 
with indirect fitness, or because related helpers are more likely to agree on the levels of 
investment to deliver to future broods of offspring (West-Eberhard 1975). 
For the present study we define a cooperative breeding system as any in which non-breeding 
helpers contribute to rearing the offspring of others. In addition, for the purposes of our model, 
we assume that all helpers behave similarly with no significant task specialization or 
qualitative differences in investment strategy, as is commonly the case in cooperative 
breeders (Clutton-Brock et al. 2003; Cockburn 2004; Russell 2004). We present a game-
theoretical model of a cooperative breeding system in which the breeding female can choose 
the number of offspring she produces with knowledge of the number of helpers that will assist 
in rearing them. We then explore the effects of varying the number of helpers and the 
relatedness differences among breeding females, breeding males, helpers and offspring on: (i) 
the expected payoffs; (ii) provisioning rules; and (iii) individual levels of investment in the 
system. We show that several different results should be expected for the same level of intra-
group relatedness, depending on the number of carers contributing, but that higher intra-group 
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relatedness should largely lead to reductions in individual investment by all carers when 
additional carers are added to a given system.  
 
The Model 
We model the breeding attempt as a two-step sequential game, following Smith and Härdling 
(2000) and Savage et al. (2013). In the first step, the breeding female chooses the number of 
offspring to produce, with knowledge of the number of carers that will contribute to the 
breeding attempt, and pays a personal cost for producing each offspring. Following this, the 
entire group plays a “sealed bid” investment game (Houston and Davies 1985) to determine 
the investment levels of each individual contributing to care. The sealed-bid approach 
simplifies the analysis considerably over “negotiation” approaches (as in McNamara et al. 
1999, 2003; Johnstone and Hinde 2006; Johnstone 2011), and the predictions of the two 
modelling frameworks are qualitatively similar, particularly when individual responsiveness 
to other carers is low or moderate (McNamara et al. 2003). We use the same cost and benefit 
functions as Savage et al. (2013) (see below), but rather than focusing on the effects of costs 
incurred at different stages of reproduction (production and rearing), we instead explore the 
effects of relatedness structure on individual contributions to care. We consider three different 
classes of carer: the breeding female, the breeding male, and a variable number of helpers. 
The helpers may be related to the breeding female, the breeding male, or both, and we also 
explore cases in which two different types of helper contribute to care within the same 
breeding attempt.  
We model the cooperative breeding group as an interrelated set of individuals comprising two 
parents (breeding female and breeding male) and H helpers (focusing on 0 ≤ H ≤ 10, which 
encapsulates the majority of mean group sizes across cooperative vertebrates; Russell and 
Lummaa 2009). The breeding female and breeding male are assumed to be unrelated to each 
other, and each related to their offspring by r = 0.5. Helpers are assumed to be related to the 
offspring and to each other (rho and rhh respectively) by values between 0 and 0.5. Helpers can 
be related to offspring through either the breeding female, breeding male, or both, and so 
female-helper and male-helper relatedness (rfh and rmh respectively) are also assumed to vary 
between 0 and 0.5. In natural systems the paired relatedness values between an interrelated 
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group of helpers, offspring, and breeders will never be fully independent, so in several cases 
we alter rho, rfh, rmh and rhh together as a single variable termed “group relatedness” (rg) to 
focus are results on realistic parameters. In other cases we hold one variable constant and 
explore the effects of varying another, for example when quantifying the differences between 
half-sibling helpers (rho=0.25) related through each parent (0 ≤ rfh ≤ 0.5). 
We assume that all group members are able to respond to the number of offspring produced 
by the female in the first (offspring production) step by adjusting their level of investment in 
the second (offspring rearing) step. We treat all helpers of the same type (e.g. female-related 
half-siblings) as identical, ignoring potential consequences of variation among helpers in 
ability to deliver care. To find stable levels of investment for all individuals, we first calculate 
the response of the breeding female, both types of helper and breeding male to a given brood 
size n. The breeding female chooses a level of investment xf, and simultaneously the breeding 
male and helpers choose a level of investment, designated xm for the male and ihx  for the i
th 
helper. We assume that offspring benefit from investment through an increase in survival 
probability and future reproductive opportunities, and that total investment is divided equally 
among all offspring. As such, the benefit b to offspring depends only on n and the total 
investment all individuals provide, xsum, where: 
1
H
i
sum f m h
i
x x x x

   .  
To more realistically approximate the development of offspring we define a minimum level of 
investment per offspring xmin below which offspring survival is not possible and hence carers 
gain no benefit from investment. Consequently, b responds to investment as a function of 
( / )  sum minx n x . We assume that the first derivative of the benefit function must be positive, 
such that greater investment leads to greater benefit to the offspring, but that the second 
derivative must be negative, such that there are diminishing returns on increasing investment. 
To obtain precise results we use a simple illustrative function that satisfies these assumptions 
(over the appropriate range of values) and yields an analytical solution: 
2
min min
sum sum
b
x xb k x x
n n
                 
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Individuals pay a cost c for investing in offspring, determined entirely by their own individual 
level of investment. We define the total cost to the female cf as a function of both the number 
of offspring produced by the female n, and her level of investment in rearing the brood xf. To 
account for variability in the costliness of producing and rearing offspring, the relative costs 
of offspring production and rearing are manipulated by defining two constants kp and kr, 
which act on n and xf respectively. The final cost cf to the female is the sum of the costs 
incurred over the two steps, as in natural systems both production and rearing of offspring is 
costly and often necessitates a trade-off by females (Monaghan et al. 1998). We assume that 
the first derivative of the cost function (c') is positive for all individuals, such that costs 
increase with greater investment, and that the second derivative (c'') is also positive, such that 
costs accelerate as investment increases. As before, a simple quadratic function is used as an 
illustrative example: 
2 2( )f p r fc k n k x     
Similarly, for the ith helper the cost ihc  depends on the helper’s investment level 
i
hx  and the 
relative cost of offspring rearing (a new constant ks, to allow for potential differences from the 
female's rearing costs). We also define the cost cm for the male in terms of his investment xm 
and a constant km. Unlike the female's cost function neither the helpers’ nor the male’s cost 
functions depend on n, as the other carers do not produce offspring themselves. 
2
2
( )
( )
i i
h s h
m m m
c k x
c k x
 
   
We assume that each individual chooses its level of investment so as to maximize a weighted 
sum (w) of the benefit to the offspring minus its personal costs and the costs incurred by the 
other carers in the group, where the weighting of each term corresponds to the relatedness to 
the focal individual of the individual incurring the cost or benefit. At this point differences in 
relatedness values between different classes of helper become important, so we define two 
helper classes h1 and h2, with HA and HB helpers in each class (H = HA + HB), and allow their 
investment ihx  to differ ( 1
i
hx  and 2jhx ). The relatedness values between all types of carer are 
assumed to be reciprocal, and are shortened to the form rxy, where x and y are abbreviations of 
the focal carer types (e.g. rfh1 for the relatedness value between females and class 1 helpers), 
or the form rxo for the relatedness between carer type x and the offspring. Breeding females 
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and breeding males are assumed to be unrelated. To summarize, the maximands (respectively 
wf, wm , 1ihw  and 2jhw  for the i
th helper of class h1 and jth of class h2) are given by: 
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1
· · ( ) · ( )
· · ( ) · ( )
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i i
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At equilibrium no individual can increase their payoff by altering their investment levels, i.e.: 
1
1 2
2 0
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f m
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f m h
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x x x x
           
Solving the above produces rules specifying xf, xm, 1ihx  and 2jhx ). in terms of n and H at 
equilibrium, which are termed, ˆ fx  , ˆmx  1ˆ
i
hx  and 2ˆ jhx  respectively. Within each helper class 
there are no intrinsic differences between the helpers in our model, so each should make the 
same response to investment by the rest of the group, and hence at equilibrium 1ihx  and 2jhx  
are each identical for all i or for all j.  
We are now able to calculate the optimal number of offspring for the breeding female to 
produce in the first step of the model, taking into account the impact of her choice on the 
subsequent investment decisions of all group members. The female should choose a value of 
n such that it maximizes wf, given that ( )ˆf f nx x , ( )ˆm m nx x , 1 1 ( )ˆi ih h nx x  and 2 2 ( )ˆj jh h nx x  at 
equilibrium. For simplicity, we treat n as a continuous variable (a reasonable approximation 
when n is large). Formally, at equilibrium: 
0f
w
n
   
This leads to equilibrium rules for xf, xm, 1ihx , 2jhx  and n at equilibrium that depend only on 
helper number H and the extrinsically specified cost parameters (kb, kp, kr, ks, kt). All solutions 
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were generated and subsequent plots produced in Wolfram Mathematica (v7.01, Wolfram 
Research 2008). 
To plot results we chose values for the constants such that investment levels ranged between 0 
and 1, and such that numbers of offspring approximated a natural range for a terrestrial 
vertebrate. This leads to a relationship of approximately 20 r pk k . We also assume that all 
individuals have the same cost constants through the rearing stage  r s tk k k  , such that 
everyone pays the same costs for delivering the same level of investment to the brood (see 
Savage et al. 2013) for an exploration of differences in this parameter between helpers and 
females, and for the effects of varying the :r pk k  ratio). 
 
Results 
(a) Offspring production 
Our model predicts that patterns of relatedness within groups should have a strong influence 
on the number of offspring the breeding female produces. Breeding females should always 
increase investment in offspring production as the number of available helpers increases, but 
the magnitude of this increase is determined by both the female's relatedness to the helpers (rfh) 
and the helpers' relatedness to the offspring (rho). Male-helper (rmh) and helper-helper (rhh) 
relatedness values have no effect on the equilibrium levels of investment by the female, male 
or helpers, and hence no effect on the investment per offspring delivered by the group. As 
cooperative groups often consist of individuals who are interrelated to some degree (aside 
from the breeding pair), in some cases we assume that rfh and rho vary together as a single 
parameter (group relatedness, rg), Under this condition, females in highly interrelated groups 
(rg=0.5) show greater investment in offspring production than those in moderately (rg=0.25) 
or distantly interrelated groups (rg=0.125) (Fig. 3.1a). This effect largely arises because 
helpers that are closely related to offspring are willing to invest more during the rearing 
period, and the female is able to produce more offspring accordingly. 
When rfh and rho are instead altered independently (i.e. when comparing male-related helpers 
to female-related helpers), female investment behaviour is less straightforward because the 
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two parameters affect offspring production in opposite directions. Greater helper-offspring 
relatedness encourages greater investment by the female (as above) because the helpers will 
contribute more to care, but females also reduce investment in offspring production as female-
helper relatedness increases. Breeding females invest more in offspring production when they 
are less closely related to helpers (assuming rho is constant) because they benefit from 
reducing the costs borne by related individuals during the breeding attempt (Fig. 3.1b). In 
essence, the benefit the female receives from rearing greater numbers of offspring is lessened 
by the impact on the costs and survival probability of related helpers. Consequently, a 
breeding female should invest maximally in offspring production when the other carers are 
closely related to the offspring but distantly related to her, as she has no negative fitness 
consequences from extracting more investment from them. The breeding male represents a 
class of carer that fulfils the above conditions for maximal female investment (high 
relatedness to offspring, zero to female), and as such his presence or absence has a greater 
effect on the female's tactics during offspring production than does that of any single helper: 
all helpers that are related to offspring as closely as the breeding male are also offspring of the 
breeding female (Fig. 3.1c). 
 
(b) Offspring rearing 
Variation in offspring production by the breeding female under differing patterns of 
relatedness and different numbers of helpers has knock-on effects on the investment by all 
carers during offspring rearing. As above, we initially assume that rfh and rho vary together as 
the single parameter “group relatedness” (rg). When group relatedness and helper number 
increase, the female increases offspring production to take advantage of the available care, but 
eventually the personal costs she incurs from doing so prohibit further increases. At this point 
the only effect of contributions from extra helpers is to reduce costs to each other and the 
costs borne by the breeding female, and the benefits individuals derive from doing this will 
depend on the level of group relatedness. In closely-related groups, compensatory care with 
additional helpers is predicted across all group sizes, as the female reaches her constraints on 
offspring production more quickly with harder-working helpers, and all individuals benefit 
from reducing the costs paid by each other. In less closely-related groups, no compensation 
for extra helpers is seen at first, as the female modifies her investment in offspring production 
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in response to the number of carers, but it eventually appears when sufficient helpers are 
present (Fig. 3.2a).  
Unsurprisingly there is also a positive effect of group relatedness on helper investment levels, 
with close relatives (rg=0.5) investing more than those of intermediate relatedness (0.25) and 
those in turn investing more than distant relatives (0.125). Helpers also reduce individual 
investment when there are many helpers and group relatedness is high, but maintain largely 
static investment levels across differing group sizes when group relatedness is low (Fig. 3.2b). 
As before, when female-helper relatedness is allowed to vary independently of helper-
offspring relatedness, the effect of higher rfh is to lower the investment by the female (Fig. 
3.2c). This arises because of the lower rearing investment required to support the reduced 
number of offspring produced in the first step, and as with offspring production suggests that 
female-unrelated helpers should behave more like the breeding male than female-related 
helpers, and have a more similar effect to on group investment behaviour. 
 
(c) Between- and within-group relatedness variation 
In natural systems helpers may be related to offspring through the breeding female or 
breeding male, and because of the fitness dependency between related carers this distinction is 
important even when helper-offspring relatedness is identical. Comparing groups in which all 
helpers are similar, full-sibling helpers invest more than half-sibling helpers due to greater 
benefits, but among half-sibling helpers those that are breeding-female-related invest less than 
those that are breeding-male-related, because the female produces less offspring in the first 
step when helpers related to her are present (Fig. 3.3a). Full-sib helpers reduce investment as 
group size increases in order to escape the costs of care, because the female is already at or 
close to her limit of offspring production. In contrast half-sib helpers largely maintain 
investment levels over a range of group sizes because the female can still invest more in 
offspring production in response to extra helpers. 
A similar pattern can be observed when comparing the outcomes for individual offspring 
across group relatedness structures (Fig. 3.3b). Investment-per-offspring increases with helper 
number when helpers are closely related to the female, but does not when helpers are 
unrelated to her and group size is small. This is because the female produces fewer offspring 
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in total when she has a small number of related helpers than when she has a small number of 
unrelated helpers, so the total investment has to be divided into fewer portions by the 
offspring. With the female being more willing to exploit unrelated than related helpers, each 
additional unrelated helper leads to a large increase in offspring production, and although all 
carers increase their investment levels to provide for these additional offspring, this increase 
may not fully compensate for the greater total investment required; this leads to each 
offspring receiving less care. In contrast, when a related helper is added to a group the female 
makes a more modest increase in offspring production, and consequently the presence of an 
extra carer leads to total investment by the group outpacing the number of offspring, and each 
individual offspring receiving more care. 
When helpers vary in relatedness within a group, each helper still responds independently to 
the number of offspring produced as a function of its own costs and its relatedness to the 
offspring and other carers, and the female tunes offspring production to the sum of potential 
investment across all the helpers. Consequently we find that investment in a mixed-
relatedness helper group should be equivalent to investment in a homogenous helper group 
that possesses the same relatedness values between all carers and offspring as the mean values 
of the mixed group. However, it is instructive to compare the investment by a particular type 
of helper within a homogenous group of its own helper type with the investment by the same 
helper in a mixed group in which other helper types are also present. In these cases mean 
relatedness values to the female and offspring will vary between the groups compared, so the 
female strategy and investment levels of all carers will differ. We find that full-sib helpers 
invest more in mixed groups where half-sib helpers are also present than in homogenous 
groups where all helpers are full-sibs, as there is less investment by the rest of the helper 
group. Conversely, half-sib helpers invest less in a mixed group as the female is less willing 
to exploit them by producing additional offspring when there are full-sib helpers present that 
will provide the majority of the care (Fig. 3.3c). As a consequence, between-group differences 
in relatedness have less influence on individual investment levels than within-group 
differences: full-sib and half-sib helpers differ in investment level more when both are present 
in the same group than in groups with only one type of helper.  
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Figure 3.1: (a) Females produce more offspring with more helpers, but are expected to respond to 
closely related helpers by increasing offspring production further. The plot shows offspring 
production for close (rg = 0.5, dashed), intermediate (rg = 0.25, dot-dashed), or distant (rg = 0.125, 
dotted) relatedness between group members. (b) When only relatedness between females and 
helpers is considered, close relatedness leads to lower investment by females at the rearing stage 
due to costs being shared. In the graph, helper-offspring relatedness is fixed at 0.25 and offspring 
production is plotted for different levels of female-helper relatedness (rfh = 0.5 (dashed), 0.25 (dot-
dashed), 0.125 (dotted)). (c) A male is both closely related to offspring and distantly related to the 
female, and therefore exerts a stronger influence on female production than does a single helper. 
Lines show offspring production in groups with a male and helpful (rho = 0.5) helpers (solid), with 
a male and unhelpful (rho = 0.125) helpers (dot-dashed), with helpful helpers but no male (dashed), 
and with unhelpful helpers with no male (dotted) 
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Figure 3.2: (a) Females reduce rearing-stage investment when they have helpful helpers (high 
group relatedness), as they benefit more by overproducing in the first step due to the greater 
available amount of care. (b) Helpers invest more in closely related offspring, and exhibit a greater 
reduction in individual contribution at high helper numbers. Plots show helper investment for 
close (rg = 0.5, dashed), intermediate (rg = 0.25, dot-dashed), or distant (rg = 0.125, dotted) 
relatedness between group members. (c) When only relatedness between females and helpers 
varies, there is a reduction in care by females when helpers are related to her, as she benefits less 
from extracting more investment from them. Helper-offspring relatedness is fixed at rho = 0.25 and 
the female rearing-stage investment plotted for different levels of female-helper relatedness: (rfh = 
0.5 (dashed), 0.25 (dot-dashed), 0.125 (dotted)) 
 
  
 
 
(3.2a)  
 
 
 
 
3: Intra-group kinship influences maternal allocation and cooperative care behaviour – Results 
 
76 
 
  
 
(3.2b)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
(3.2c) 
 
 
  
3: Intra-group kinship influences maternal allocation and cooperative care behaviour – Results 
 
77 
 
Figure 3.3: (a) Helper investment in groups where helpers are full-siblings to offspring is greater 
than in groups where helpers are half-siblings, and when group size increases individual 
reductions in care are more pronounced. In addition, because of a reduction in production-stage 
investment by the breeding female, helpers invest less in groups where they are closely related to 
the female. (b) Individual offspring benefit from additional helpers that are closely related to the 
breeding female, particularly when both rfh and rhc (i.e. rg) are high. When rfh is low, offspring may 
do less well individually as group size increases, because the female produces more offspring in 
total to exploit the helpers. Plots show investment-per-offspring for groups with half-sib helpers 
(solid lines) and distantly-related (rfo = 0.125) helpers (dashed lines) that are either closely related 
(rfh = 0.5, black), or unrelated (rfh = 0, grey) to the breeding female. The black dot-dashed line 
represents the investment level of a full-sib helper related to both parents and offspring by 0.5. (c) 
Within-group variation in relatedness has a greater influence on helper investment levels than does 
between-group variation. Half-sib helpers invest less in mixed groups than in homogenous groups 
in which all helpers are half-sibs, whereas full-sib helpers invest more in mixed groups than in 
homogenous groups in which all helpers are full-sibs. The plot shows helper investment levels for 
full-sib and half-sib helpers in mixed groups (black, 3 full-sib and 3 male-related half-sib helpers), 
and homogenous groups (grey, 6 helpers that are either full-sibs or male-related half-sibs) 
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Discussion 
Although there is accumulating evidence that females tactically adjust their level of 
investment according to socio-ecological conditions, relatively little theoretical work exists on 
the subject. As such, our work extends previous models in two key ways. Firstly, it allows for 
flexible maternal investment in offspring as a function of the number and relatedness of 
available carers, treating helpers and the breeding male separately. Secondly, it explores the 
effects of variable helper numbers and different relatedness levels on carer investment 
patterns during offspring rearing. Our results suggest that intra-group relatedness will have a 
significant influence on the provisioning rules and levels of investment observed in 
cooperative breeding systems. Broadly, female productivity increases as a function of 
increasing intra-group relatedness due to the increased benefits to helpers of investing  
heavily in more related offspring. However, the effect of helpers on female productivity was 
found to be lower than the effect of the breeding male, because, in contrast to related helpers, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Predicted investment rules across different helper numbers within cooperative groups, 
based on the distribution of costs to the breeding female, the relatedness of helpers to the breeding 
female, and the current number of helpers. Reduction of individual carer investment as helper 
number increases (i.e. compensation or “load-lightening”) is expected when (1) offspring 
production is relatively more costly to the female than offspring rearing (Savage et al. 2013a; 
Chapter 2), (2) when the breeding female is closely related to the helpers (or directly benefits from 
their survival), and (3) when the current number of helpers is large. When the above conditions fail 
to hold, carers are predicted to respond to extra helpers either by maintaining current investment 
levels (fully additive care), or in extreme cases by increasing their individual investment level 
(super-additive care): this is due to the female tactically increasing offspring number to take 
advantage of the extra available care. 
 Compensation             Fully additive   Super‐additive 
(decreased care)       (no response)           (increased care) 
Individual response to 
extra helpers 
 Most costly phase:                       production        rearing 
 Helpers related to:                                  female       male (or neither)
 Number of helpers:                     large                  small 
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the breeding female has no indirect fitness stake in his survival. In addition, the circumstances 
under which carers reduce investment when more helpers are present are strongly influenced 
by intra-group relatedness, as extracting investment from related individuals is less beneficial. 
Our results have implications for provisioning rules on multiple levels, from differences 
between biparental, polyandrous, and cooperative care systems, to the influences of dispersal 
strategy and breeding tenure on group provisioning and investment over time (Fig. 3.4).  
The effects of maternal tactics on individual provisioning rules are particularly clear when our 
results are compared with previous theoretical work modelling investment in offspring during 
a single reproductive stage. In contrast to a female with (up to) two helpers rearing young 
(Härdling et al. 2003), we do not always see a reduction in individual carer investment as 
group size increases: if the female can increase her production of offspring, carers may 
maintain or even increase their investment. In addition, in our model total female costs are 
higher (rather than lower) with full-sib helpers, as the female increases offspring number to 
take account of the greater potential help. Our model contrasts similarly with previous work 
on a breeding pair and single helper rearing young (Johnstone 2011), as we find that carers 
reduce their individual investment less when the female has tactical control of offspring 
number. However we support Johnstone’s (2011) finding that females will pay lower costs 
with related helpers than with helpers related only to their partner provided that the helpers’ 
relatedness to the offspring is the same. Modelling investment as a two-stage process and with 
a range of group sizes shows that carer investment strategies can strongly deviate from those 
predicted by analyses of the rearing stage in isolation, particularly when group size also varies, 
and can additionally be modified by the relatedness structure of the group (see Russell et al. 
2008 for some supporting empirical evidence). 
Our prediction that individuals should provision differently according to relatedness patterns 
in the group has consequences for comparing provisioning rules in cooperative breeding 
systems to those in biparental systems. Biparental care is well-analysed, and whether sealed-
bids (Houston and Davies 1985), negotiation (McNamara et al. 1999; Johnstone and Hinde 
2006; Johnstone 2011), or sequential negotiation (Lessells & McNamara 2012) are used to 
determine investment levels, the results generally predict partial compensation in the presence 
of a partner (though see McNamara et al. 2003; Johnstone and Hinde 2006). Cooperative 
systems (when considered theoretically at all) have often been regarded as direct extensions of 
the biparental case, with simply more individuals that invest in offspring according to their 
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own costs in the same way as the parents; only rarely has theoretical work explicitly 
addressed investment consequences of variation in inter-carer relatedness (Härdling et al. 
2003; Johnstone 2011). However, under our model, a biparental system differs significantly 
from a cooperative one in investment behaviour, as biparental systems contain only unrelated 
carers while cooperative ones usually display some degree of interrelatedness. In particular, 
the relatedness between the carers modifies how much females are willing to exploit the other 
carers by modifying their own investment across offspring production and rearing. As a 
consequence, we predict that provisioning rules in biparental systems will differ from those in 
cooperative systems when indirect fitness relationships exist among carers, for example by 
the breeding female exhibiting weaker responses to the presence/absence of another carer in 
cooperative systems. 
Intra-group variation in relatedness patterns in cooperative breeders might help to explain the 
significant variation in observed carer provisioning rules. While investigations into parental 
provisioning rules in biparental care systems tend to provide support for expected incomplete 
compensation (Harrison et al. 2009), this is less commonly the case in cooperative breeders 
(Hatchwell 1999; Heinsohn 2004). For example, of the 27 cooperative bird species in 
Hatchwell’s (1999) comparative analysis on provisioning rules, helpers were associated with 
reductions in provisioning rate of both parents (44%), one parent only (30%) or neither parent 
(26%). This variation was shown to be attributable to variation in nestling starvation: carers 
tend to reduce investment when carer numbers increase if nestling starvation is rare, but 
maintain investment where nestling starvation is common (Hatchwell 1999). However, all 
else being equal, our model also suggests that individual reductions in rearing-stage 
investment when there are more carers (“load-lightening”) should be a common empirical 
finding over a wide range group sizes when females and helpers in a group are closely 
interrelated. By contrast, when females and helpers are more distantly interrelated, their 
investment levels should remain largely constant regardless of group size because females 
alter offspring production to extract the maximum possible investment from all carers. 
Consequently, our model could provide part of the mechanism behind Hatchwell’s (1999) 
findings: the observed inter-species differences in nestling starvation may arise in part from 
the consequences of variable maternal investment in offspring production, group size, group 
kin-structure, and the interplay between them. 
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That said, an emerging pattern in many cooperatively breeding vertebrates is that different 
categories of carers react differently to the presence of co-carers. For example, in meerkats 
(Suricata suricatta) breeders of both sexes reduce their investment in pup-feeding with 
increasing group size, while non-breeders maintain their levels (Clutton-Brock et al. 2004). 
Such results are not consistent with the above hypothesis regarding offspring starvation risk 
(Hatchwell 1999), and have instead been interpreted as breeders benefiting more than helpers 
from saving resources for future reproduction, particularly in species where the probability of 
attaining breeder status is low (Clutton-Brock et al. 2004; Browning et al. 2012). Our results 
suggest that an additional explanation might be the costs of offspring production and 
relatedness differences between carers in the group. In particular, females constrained from or 
selected against producing more offspring when helper number increases are expected to 
reduce their investment, while helpers investing at lower levels largely maintain their 
contributions to better support the offspring. If enough helpers are available at the rearing 
stage, every group member benefits from a greater proportion of the female’s investment 
being made at the initial stage. In groups with helpers closely related to the breeding female, 
one would expect greater reductions in investment as helper number increases, as a 
consequence of the female being unwilling to foist additional costs on to the helpers by 
increasing offspring production. Studies have yet to consider how carers of differing 
relatedness to each other should respond to changes in group size, but our model predicts 
several possible effects, including differences in investment in mixed group relative to 
homogenous groups, and a greater similarity of investment behaviour between the breeding 
male and helpers related to offspring through him, compared to those related through the 
breeding female. 
While some caution is required due to the lack of demographic and ecological considerations 
in our model, our results also have implications for how female investment should vary across 
species with the system of dispersal and length of breeding tenure. When females are 
unrelated to helpers but helpers still contribute heavily to care we predict an exploitative 
strategy with females producing more offspring to extract more investment from the other 
carers. In contrast, a female with closely related helpers should produce fewer offspring, 
causing an overall reduction in the costs all carers pay. Given that the former case will usually 
arise when females are dispersive and the latter when females are philopatric, we predict that 
in general birds should respond more strongly than mammals to changes in helper numbers by 
altering offspring numbers, except in species with sex-biased dispersal opposite to the norm 
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(Greenwood 1980). Exploitative strategies should be most prominent in newly immigrated 
breeding females, because through their breeding tenure they will become increasingly related 
to their helpers (Johnstone & Cant 2010). Mathematical models and empirical work show that 
such effects could have significant consequences on reproductive skew in humans (Cant & 
Johnstone 2008; Lahdenperä et al. 2012), but the consequences for cooperative breeding 
animals remain untested. Although potentially difficult to implement, a demographically 
explicit version of our model could provide more complex predictions about investment 
behaviour, as helpers might (for example) be expected to adjust their contributions to care 
based on their own sex, the sex of the offspring, and the sex bias in dispersal, because of the 
potential for kin competition (Johnstone & Cant 2008). Similarly, we have ignored variation 
in the costs of cooperation when compared to alternative options for helpers, which is likely 
to modify the degree to which females can extract additional investment from helpers as 
group size changes.  
Finally, despite our framing of the model in terms of indirect fitness benefits, the link between 
helpers and offspring in our analysis has implications for any scenario in which helpers have 
an interest in the survival of the offspring and other group members. For example, under 
group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001), helpers benefit by successfully raising additional 
offspring to boost their own direct fitness, and hence within a single breeding attempt the 
benefits from helping are similar to those generated by inclusive fitness relationships. We 
suggest that our model is a fair approximation for this type of direct fitness benefit, 
particularly for smaller values of intra-group “relatedness”, which would be more accurately 
termed fitness interdependence in the case of directly benefiting helpers (see Roberts 2005). 
The analogy also holds for between-carer inclusive fitness relationships: individuals 
concerned with augmenting group size will be averse to other carers paying high costs, as 
raising additional group members is of limited benefit if current group members perish in the 
process. We would expect carers benefiting through group augmentation to maintain 
investment patterns through time regardless of changes in breeder identity, with the benefit 
attached to group augmentation replacing “group relatedness”, i.e. the breeding female should 
reduce her contribution at the rearing stage when augmentation benefits are high, focusing 
instead on producing additional offspring. Given the current lack of empirical research on the 
topic, we suggest that future work on cooperative care systems should investigate how 
provisioning rules are influenced by variation in the benefits of group size for different classes 
of individual. 
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To summarize, maternal control of offspring production and inter-carer relatedness and can 
both have strong influences on the expected provisioning rules in biparental and cooperative 
systems. Such rules include the numbers of offspring produced, the response to additional 
carers, and quantitative investment levels during provisioning; and we can make empirical 
predictions about how the rules might be expected to vary within and between species (Fig. 
3.4). Our results underline the importance of incorporating tactical female investment when 
modelling the conflict over care: when a female is able to predict the number and helpfulness 
of other carers in advance of producing offspring, her ability to manipulate the initial 
investment can lead to different behaviours among other members of the group than if her 
investment were fixed. Consequently individual investment decisions cannot be meaningfully 
analysed in isolation, either from other carers or from the other stages in which individuals 
can contribute (Smith and Härdling 2000; Savage et al. 2013), and understanding the 
investment decisions of any group that cooperates to rear offspring ultimately depends on the 
integration of models of offspring number, offspring size, carer number, carer relationships, 
and alternative carer options. In addition, the biology of the particular species in question will 
affect the relative costs and constraints of producing offspring compared to rearing them 
(Savage et al. 2013a), further complicating the issue by altering the proportion of total costs 
helpers are able to contribute to. Future empirical work should monitor investment across all 
possible stages of a breeding attempt whenever feasible, as without this wider context 
investment behaviour can easily be misconstrued (Russell et al. 2008). Similarly, theoretical 
work that focuses entirely on fine-scale investment within a single stage of a breeding attempt 
might be expected to have limited relevance outside of its stated context. 
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Abstract 
In species where the number of individuals contributing to offspring care can vary, an 
individual’s investment strategy should depend on the size of the breeding group and the 
relative contributions of each carer. In many care systems the mother has greater control over 
the number and/or quality of offspring than the other group members, and hence can benefit 
by adjusting her pre-birth investment in offspring production to match the expected care 
available from others. Increased quality of offspring at birth can have several possible effects 
on later investment, depending on whether higher-quality offspring require more or less care 
during rearing, and whether they have a higher potential fitness if reared successfully. We 
argue that variable maternal tactics should be most apparent in care systems such as 
cooperative breeding where there is great variation in the level of care available, a position 
supported by empirical findings suggesting that mothers can both reduce and increase pre-
birth investment under different contexts. Existing theoretical work on carer investment rules 
has largely focused on biparental care, and on modelling offspring provisioning in isolation 
from other stages of investment, and hence has been unable to explore the causes and 
consequences of tactical maternal investment in cooperative breeders. Furthermore, the 
potential for investment at one stage to influence the value of investment at another has 
hitherto received little attention within the literature on parental care. We present a game-
theoretical model incorporating cooperative rearing and female control of pre-birth 
investment, wherein maternal investment either substitutes for later investment (allowing 
compensation for differing conditions) or alters the value of later investment (‘complementary’ 
investment). We show that very different patterns of care can arise depending on whether an 
increase in pre-birth investment reduces the need for investment during the rearing period, or 
instead primes offspring to benefit more from post-birth care. 
  
4: Maternal control of offspring size under variable rearing environments – Introduction 
 
87 
 
Introduction 
Classic life-history theory dictates that mothers should vary their investment in reproduction 
according to current ecological conditions and the potential for future reproduction (Williams 
1966b; Stearns 1992), and that this investment can be used to produce either large numbers of 
small offspring or small numbers of large offspring, generating an offspring size-number 
trade-off (Lack 1947; Williams 2001; Roff 2002). More recently, evidence has accumulated 
that mothers can also tactically vary their level of investment in each offspring prior to birth, 
independently of the number of offspring produced, to better match the potential benefits of 
current conditions (Fox et al. 1997; Cunningham & Russell 2000; Verboven et al. 2003). 
When offspring fitness is determined by the total investment in them across all stages of their 
development, mothers can tactically increase pre-birth investment to compensate for poorer 
rearing conditions (e.g. Bolund et al. 2009), or reduce it to transfer costs to other carers (e.g. 
Russell et al. 2007); however the assumption that investment can be substituted across stages 
may not always apply. For example, offspring that are larger at birth may be more likely to 
survive development, or more likely to become dominant as adults (Royle et al. 2005), 
altering the value of investing in them during the rearing period. Similarly, if larger offspring 
also require more food, higher pre-birth investment may require higher post-birth investment 
if the potential benefit is to be realized. The potential for this ‘dynamic complementarity’ 
(sensu Heckman 2007) between the value of investment across developmental stages has 
hitherto been largely overlooked in the literature on parental care. 
When investment is substitutable between pre- and post-birth development stages, one should 
expect mothers to compensate for better rearing environments by reducing pre-birth 
investment, as this transfers more of the costs of reproduction to the stage during which 
investment is less costly than normal (assuming that better rearing conditions impose lower 
costs on carers). One context in which mothers should commonly reduce pre-birth investment 
under favourable conditions is in cooperative breeding systems, in which offspring are reared 
by one or more ‘helpers’ in addition to the parents (Russell & Lummaa 2009). Cooperative 
systems provide an excellent test of adaptive plasticity in maternal allocation strategies 
because the consequences of current ecology on maternal fitness are highly variable and yet 
predictable (Russell & Lummaa 2009). Larger groups are more capable of delivering food to 
the breeding female and/or offspring than smaller groups, and so mothers gain higher 
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breeding success with more helpers, but groups are not static: the number of helpers available 
will vary both spatially and temporally. While there is some suggestive evidence that 
increasing groups size sometimes leads to increased investment in cooperative breeders 
(Russell et al. 2003; Hodge et al. 2009), the majority of studies have reported a reduction in 
pre-birth investment with increasing group size, usually without a corresponding change in 
the number of offspring produced (Taborsky et al. 2007; Russell et al. 2007; Santos & 
Macedo 2011; Canestrari et al. 2011; Paquet et al. 2013). 
Two suggested explanations for females reducing pre-birth investment under favourable 
conditions are the helper compensation (Russell et al. 2007) and reduced predation (Taborsky 
et al. 2007) hypotheses. Russell et al. (2007) supported the direct substitutability of 
investment across development by showing that superb-fairy wren (Malurus cyaneaus) 
mothers benefit from investing less in egg nutrients when in the presence of helpers, because 
helpers fully compensate for maternal reductions, leading to increased maternal survival 
probability to the following year. Taborsky et al. (2007) showed that mothers laid smaller 
eggs with experimentally elevated group sizes in a cooperative cichlid (Neolamprologus 
pulcher), and suggested that smaller fry are less vulnerable to predation when in larger groups, 
a hypothesis that can be extended to cover other passive benefits to having larger numbers of 
helpers. In this case, the female is also compensating for good conditions, indicating a lack of 
complementarity between offspring quality (in this case size) and later care. Nevertheless, no 
formal model exists to explain when females should benefit from reducing pre-birth 
investment in the presence of helpers (as in most cases outlined), or why variation in maternal 
pre-birth investment might occur under different numbers of helpers across species (e.g. 
Russell et al. 2003, 2007; Koenig et al. 2009). 
Under ecological conditions that differ from the average, altering pre-birth investment in 
offspring benefits mothers by more closely approximating the optimum for current conditions 
(Burley 1981; Uller 2008). In birds, for example, mothers sometimes lay larger eggs (and 
hence take on higher costs) when currently paired with males that are more ‘attractive’ than 
the population average (Krist 2009; Pryke & Griffith 2009), rather than laying larger eggs to 
compensate for poor males (Bolund et al. 2009). The viability of these alternative strategies 
revolves around the balance between current and future fitness: if the offspring of attractive 
males are themselves more attractive, and the mother is unlikely to mate with similarly 
attractive males in the future, she may benefit from increasing current investment despite an 
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attendant reduction in her probability of survival (Sheldon 2000). However, when offspring 
attract more investment during both pre- and post-birth development because attractive males 
provides more care (rather than because they pass on genes for ‘attractiveness’), there is a 
strong implication that pre-birth investment is complementary, not substitutable, with post-
birth investment. 
Traditional models of offspring care have generally assumed that investment during offspring 
production must trade-off with that during offspring rearing (Smith & Fretwell 1974), but 
ignored other potential effects of pre-birth investment and the possibility for mothers to 
tactically adjust pre-birth investment in anticipation of varying levels of help during the 
rearing period (Savage et al. 2013a). In light of the empirical findings suggesting the 
existence (but not ubiquity) of tactical maternal investment, more theoretical work is needed 
to explore the potential consequences for carer investment rules and outcomes for offspring. 
Across species, reducing investment at early stages of development may have an enormous 
effect on the final fitness of an individual (Suomi 1999; Knudsen 1999), or may be largely 
irrelevant in comparison to the rearing environment (Van De Pol et al. 2006). In either case, 
substituting investment may not always be possible, hence limiting the scope for maternal 
tactics. Furthermore, if offspring that are higher-quality at birth receive lasting advantages, 
the level of investment delivered at an early stage will directly change the benefits of caring 
for offspring at later stages (Heckman 2007), potentially altering investment strategies in a 
complex manner as the availability of care changes. Another potential concern is the necessity 
of following up early investment (Heckman 2007): if higher-quality offspring require high 
rearing investment for their fitness to be realized (for example because they need more food), 
investment again fails to be substitutable between stages. 
In this chapter, we present a formal model of how females breeding in cooperative groups 
should alter their pre-birth investment in offspring as group size changes. We hypothesise that 
the key influence on maternal strategy is the relationship between pre-birth investment and 
later outcomes for offspring, with this determining whether mothers enjoying good conditions 
should invest more to exploit current conditions, or save resources to boost their future 
survival probability. We suggest that females should reduce pre-birth investment as group 
size increases if the primary benefit to offspring is through giving them a ‘head start’ (i.e. 
when pre-birth and rearing investment are perfectly substitutable). Previous work by 
Hatchwell (1999) has shown that in cooperative species parents compensate for the presence 
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of helpers by reducing their provisioning rate, but only when nestling starvation is rare, and 
we suggest that a similar argument can be applied to pre-birth investment when it has no 
special effects on offspring fitness. Conversely, we predict mothers should increase pre-birth 
investment with group size when higher early investment leads to lasting advantages for 
offspring, providing a ‘silver spoon’ that complements future investment. 
 
The Model 
We model a cooperative breeding attempt as a two-step process with a breeding pair and a 
variable number of helpers. The female first chooses the amount of investment delivered pre-
birth, and then the whole group plays a standard ‘sealed bid’ investment game (sensu Houston 
& Davies 1985) to determine their individual investment levels during the offspring rearing 
period. Our model follows a similar structure to Savage et al. (2013a), but concerns female 
control of offspring quality with the number of offspring fixed, rather than giving the 
breeding female choice of offspring number with quality being fixed. Empirical studies 
support the assumption by generally reporting no adjustment of offspring number when 
offspring quality is found to vary (e.g. Russell et al. 2007; Taborsky et al. 2007; Santos & 
Macedo 2011; Canestrari et al. 2011). All calculations and plots were made using Wolfram 
Mathematica (v7.01, Wolfram Research). 
The cooperative group consists of H helpers and a breeding pair (female and male). All group 
members choose their level of investment in offspring care during the second, rearing step 
with full knowledge of the investment made by the female during the first, offspring 
production step; in empirical terms they are assumed to be able to judge offspring quality 
accurately at the beginning of the rearing period. The breeding female and male are related to 
helpers by the relatedness parameters fhr  and mhr  respectively, are unrelated to each other, and 
are each related to the offspring by 0.5fo mor r  . Helpers are assumed to be identical to each 
other in their cost parameters and relatedness to other group members, and are related to each 
other by hhr  and to the offspring by hor . 
To find stable investment levels for all individuals during the rearing period, we first calculate 
the response of all individuals to any quality of offspring the female could produce. All 
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individuals simultaneously choose an investment level x during the rearing stage, termed 
,f mx x  and 
i
hx  for the female, male and i
th helper respectively. Cost parameters ( , , , )q f m hk k k k  
specify the relative costs of the female quality investment and the female, male and helper 
rearing investments respectively. The total costs incurred by the breeding female are assumed 
to be a function of her investment in offspring quality at production q and her later investment 
during offspring rearing fx . Males and helpers only contribute during offspring rearing, so 
their costs are simply a function of their rearing-stage investments. For all carers, costs 
accelerate with increasing investment: 
2 2( )f q f fc k q k x     
2( )m m mc k x    
2( )i ih m hc k x    
Offspring are assumed to share the investment of the carers equally, and as such are modelled 
as a unit. We assume that the resulting fitness of offspring after both investment stages is a 
function of the mother’s pre-birth investment in offspring quality (q) and the combined 
rearing investment ( comx  ), which in the sum of the rearing contributions of the female, male, 
and all helpers: 
1
H
om hc f
i
i
mx xx x

    
We assume that greater pre-birth quality either reduces or increases the amount of rearing 
investment that is required by the offspring; the former if investment is substitutable, leading 
to high-quality offspring gaining a developmental ‘head start’ over others, and the latter if 
high-quality offspring are larger and thus require more food. To represent this q is multiplied 
by a constant ak , where { 1,1}ak   . The relative importance of different stages of 
development varies greatly across animals with parental care, and as a consequence maternal 
investment in initial offspring quality and investment during offspring rearing need not be 
equally necessary or valuable to offspring. To model this we introduce a parameter v 
(0 1)v   that modifies the value to the offspring of the delivered investment at each stage. 
High values of v represent a sensitive or critical period during early development that can 
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only be effectively supported by maternal investment, or (alternatively) an unimportant 
rearing period, as might occur in a highly precocial species. Low values of v represent cases 
where early variation in investment is largely unimportant, or where offspring are highly 
altricial and hence are influenced far more by investment during the rearing period.  
Offspring are assumed to benefit from care only above a minimum level of usable investment
minx . The first derivative of the offspring benefit function is assumed to be positive above this 
threshold, such that greater investment benefits offspring, while the second derivative is 
negative, implying diminishing returns on investment. For simplicity we use a quadratic 
function, weighted by benefit parameter bk . This function is then multiplied by a factor 
(1 )nq  where {0,1}n  to represent two possible influence of offspring quality on final 
offspring fitness: when 0n   changing offspring quality only influences the amount of 
rearing investment needed, whereas 1n   represents a ‘silver spoon’ situation where 
offspring that are higher quality at birth are more valuable for a given level of later investment. 
Our aim in choosing these two functions is to compare cases in which greater maternal pre-
birth investment (i) increases or (ii) reduces the marginal value of future investment during 
the rearing period. To this end we pair the ‘silver spoon’ value of 1n  with large offspring 
being hungrier ( 1)ak    when generating results, to better contrast with the ‘head start’ case 
in which low-quality offspring can potentially catch up with high-quality offspring during the 
rearing period ( 0, 1)an k  . Using a quadratic function to render the solutions analytically 
solvable, the two offspring benefit functions for the ‘head start’ and ‘silver spoon’ cases 
( ( , )HS comb q x and ( , )SS comb q x ) are hence given by: 
    
    
2
min min
2
min min
( , )
( , )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (11 ) )(
com com
c
HS com b
SS com b om com
b q x k x x
b q x k x
v x v q v x v q
v x v q v x v x qq
        
    
   
       
 
To assist in visualising the differences between the ‘silver spoon’ and ‘head start’ offspring 
benefit functions, we generate plots of how offspring benefit changes under different levels of 
q and comx  with typical model parameters (Figure 4.1). 
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 To find optimal investment rules for all carers, we assume that each attempts to maximise a 
weighted sum of the benefit to the offspring, weighted by relatedness to the carer, minus their 
own costs of care, minus the costs borne by other related carers, again weighted by 
relatedness to the carer: 
1
1
1
1
( , )· ·
· ·
·
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i
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i
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Figure 4.1: Plot of how offspring benefit changes with differing levels of pre-birth maternal 
investment (q) and total rearing investment ( comx ) under the assumptions that maternal investment 
gives offspring either a ‘head start’ (red surface) and is substitutable with rearing investment, or a 
‘silver spoon’ that results in higher-quality offspring requiring more care but gaining greater fitness 
if successfully reared (blue surface). Values of offspring benefit are arbitrary, and are relative to 
typical parameters plotted in the results section. 
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Solving the model 
All carers make a simultaneous choice of investment level after the initial stage, based on the 
level of offspring quality q chosen by the female. At equilibrium no carers should be able to 
alter their maximands by changing their investment levels, i.e.: 
0
i
h
m
f m
i
f h
w w w
x x x
  
      
The resulting equilibrium investment rules are termed ˆ fx , ˆmx  and ˆ
i
hx  for the female, male and 
helpers respectively; all helpers are assumed to behave identically as they all have the same 
cost and benefit functions. These investment rules depend only on the quality variable q and 
the model parameters, so at equilibrium: 
( )ˆf f qx x , ( )ˆm m qx x , ( )ˆih h qx x  
Finally, we substitute the above equilibrium investment rules back into the female maximand 
to determine her optimum choice of offspring quality in the first step. At equilibrium the 
female should not be able to increase her maximand by altering q: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), ( ), ( )
0f f m h
w x q x
q
q x q   
Solving the above gives us rules for q, fx , mx  and hx  at equilibrium that depend only on the 
extrinsically specified cost, benefit, and relatedness parameters.  
 
Results 
Pre-birth investment conveys a ‘head start’ 
We first consider cases in which initial female investment in offspring quality is both additive 
with later rearing investment and of similar value, so that it gives offspring a ‘head start’ 
towards reaching a given level of total investment ( 1, 0, 0.5)ak n v   . Under these 
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circumstances, the model predicts that breeding females should reduce investment in 
offspring quality when greater numbers of helpers are present (Fig. 4.2a), as they are then able 
to reduce their personal costs without major negative effects to the offspring, thanks to 
compensation by other carers. Carers are all predicted to reduce their rearing-stage investment 
with increasing helper number, demonstrating ‘load-lightening’ (Crick 1992), with the decline 
being most noticeable with full-sibling helpers, because these invest the most in small groups 
(Fig. 4.2b). The breeding male behaves similarly to a full-sibling helper during the rearing 
period, although his presence or absence has a greater influence on maternal strategy than 
does a single full-sibling helper, because the mother avoids exploiting related carers to the 
same degree as those to whom she is unrelated. 
The total amount of investment delivered by all carers during the rearing period increases 
with helper number (Fig. 4.2c), and is slightly greater for helpers related to offspring through 
the breeding male than for those related through the breeding female, due to the female 
adopting a more exploitative pre-birth investment strategy when helpers are unrelated to her. 
The increase in rearing investment with group size is largely masked by the reduction in pre-
birth investment by the female, leading to little change in total investment delivered to 
offspring (Fig. 4.2d). Together these results support the helper compensation hypothesis, 
which suggests that females should reduce early-stage investment in offspring when in larger 
groups because helpers are able to compensate, and that this can conceal the positive effects 
of helpers on offspring when the rearing period is studied in isolation.  
 
Effects of altriciality / precociality 
Under generic ‘head start’ conditions ( 1, 0)ak n  , we can change the value parameter v to 
compare investment rules between systems in which pre-birth investment or post-birth 
investment are relatively more valuable to the offspring. An intermediate value of v (≈ 0.5) 
represents investment during either stage being equally effective in altering offspring benefit, 
while high (≈ 0.9) and low (≈ 0.1) values of v represent highly precocial and highly altricial 
species respectively (high v could also represent species in which early-life investment is 
particularly critical to successful development). The relative effectiveness of investment 
between the two stages strongly influences the patterns of investment seen, with female 
investment in offspring quality predictably peaking when her early investment is highly 
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valuable (Fig 4.3a). Individual helpers invest more in small groups than in large groups, and 
when moving along the altricial-precocial continuum helpers initially invest more when 
rearing investment is less effective (in order to continue delivering similar benefits to 
offspring), but eventually reduce investment when the meagre benefits to offspring can no 
longer offset the costs incurred by carers (Fig. 4.3b). Total rearing investment delivered to 
offspring peaks at the point on the altricial-precocial continuum where rearing investment is 
only moderately effective, as the greater requirements of the offspring elicit greater 
contributions from the carers provided that the group is large enough to support them (Fig. 3c). 
 
Pre-birth investment conveys a ‘silver spoon’ 
When higher-quality offspring require more investment during rearing, but do better in 
adulthood if their needs are met ( 1, 1)ak n   , breeding females increase their pre-birth 
investment in offspring quality as helper number increases (Fig. 4.4a). This effect occurs 
because more helpers can more easily feed larger, higher-quality offspring and hence take 
advantage of the greater potential benefit that arises when they are sufficiently provisioned. 
Higher investment in initial offspring quality leads to higher rearing investment to offset the 
hungrier chicks and to deliver the greater potential benefit of the ‘silver spoon’, and as a 
consequence maternal pre-birth investment is highest when the care group comprises half-
sibling helpers that are related to offspring through the breeding male, because the mother 
avoids taxing related carers with high costs (Fig. 4.4a).  
As with ‘head start’ conditions, under ‘silver spoon’ conditions helpers of all types reduce 
their individual investment as group size increases (‘load-lightening’)(Fig. 4.4b), although 
this may be a negligible reduction in groups with distantly-related helpers. As a result, total 
rearing investment by the group still increases with group size, but in contrast to ‘head start’ 
conditions groups comprising breeding-male-related half-sibs match or exceed the investment 
of full-sib helper groups (Fig. 4.4c). Total investment in offspring increases more obviously 
with group size under ‘silver spoon’ than under ‘head start’ (Fig. 4.4d) conditions, because of 
the lack of maternal / helper compensation and greater potential benefits of high group size. 
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Figure 4.2: (a): Under substitutable ‘head start’ investment conditions, maternal pre-birth 
investment decreases with increasing group size, as helpers are able to take on a greater proportion 
of the total investment required by offspring. Breeding females invest less with helpers that are 
full-siblings to the offspring (solid line) than with half-sibs (dashed = maternally-related; dot-
dashed = paternally-related) or cousins (dotted), because closely-related helpers are more willing 
to deliver more care later in the breeding attempt. (b): Individual helper rearing investment 
declines with group size as helpers ‘load lighten’ each other; this decline is more obvious the more 
closely related helpers are to offspring as distantly-related helpers always invest little and thus 
have little scope to reduce costs (in this plot the paternally-related half-sib line is omitted for 
clarity, as it very closely overlaps maternally-related half-sibs). (c): The total investment delivered 
to offspring during the rearing period increases with group size as helpers compensate for the 
lowered investment of the mother; full-sibling helpers lead to greater total investment than half-
sibs or cousins. (d): Total investment in offspring over the breeding attempt (initial female 
investment + rearing investment) increases with group size regardless of the type of helpers in the 
group, and despite the reduction in female investment, but the effect is very small as a proportion 
of total investment delivered and hence might be overlooked empirically. Values of investment 
levels are arbitrary. 
4: Maternal control of offspring size under variable rearing environments – Results 
 
100 
 
  
(4.3a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.3b) 
 
 
  
4: Maternal control of offspring size under variable rearing environments – Results 
 
101 
 
  
(4.3c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.3d) 
 
 
 
  
4: Maternal control of offspring size under variable rearing environments – Results 
 
102 
 
  
Figure 4.3: (a): Under ‘head start’ conditions, investment in offspring quality is generally greater 
when early-stage maternal investment is more valuable to young (precocial species), but decreases 
with extremely important early investment as other carers struggle to deliver any benefits and the 
female cannot efficiently split her costs between the stages. Quality investment decreases with 
increasing group size (3 = solid line, 6 = large dashes, 9 = small dashes), but peaks when early 
investment is more valuable in larger groups. (b): Helper investment is greatest when investment 
is similarly valuable across the stages, and larger groups peak when rearing investment is less 
valuable. Helpers generally work harder in small groups (solid line) than intermediate (large 
dashed) or large (small dashed) groups, but only when rearing investment is similarly or more 
valuable than early investment: when early investment is critical and rearing investment 
unimportant more helpers have little effect. (c): Total rearing investment is lower in smaller 
groups than in larger groups, but diverges more and peaks at higher levels of precociality in larger 
groups: this is because large groups can support the high investment levels needed to benefit 
offspring meaningfully even when unit investment is of low value. (d): Total investment in 
offspring is largely invariant with group size when pre-birth investment is unimportant, when 
maternal investment is highly valuable large groups deliver substantially more investment to 
offspring. 
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Figure 4.4: (a) When larger offspring require more food but gain greater benefits from investment 
(a ‘silver spoon’), mothers increase investment in offspring quality as group size increases. The 
increase is largest when helpers are half-siblings to offspring and unrelated to the mother (dot-
dashed line), however mothers invest less with half-sib helpers related through her (dashed) than 
with full-sib helpers (solid). (b): All helpers load-lighten with increasing group size, with closely 
related helpers reducing the most. Groups with paternally-related half-sibs contribute slightly more 
than those with maternally-related half-sibs due to the female adopting a more exploitative pre-
birth investment strategy. (c): Total investment by all carers during offspring rearing is greatest 
with paternally-related half-sib helpers, as the female is willing to extract greater investment from 
them; full-sib, maternal half-sib, and cousin helpers generate progressively less total investment. 
(d) Total investment in offspring increases with group size more substantially than under ‘head 
start’ conditions, but still plateaus at large group sizes. A large group delivers the largest total 
investment in offspring when all helpers are paternally related half-sibs, whereas in smaller groups 
full-sib helpers generate the most total investment. 
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Recruiting additional helpers 
The benefit accrued by offspring from adding another helper to the group varies depending on 
whether ‘head start’ or ‘silver spoon’ conditions apply. Under ‘head start’ the benefit is 
greater for small groups than for large groups, and greater when helpers are more closely 
related to offspring as they are more willing to provide care (Fig. 4.5a). The level of 
altriciality also has an influence: when rearing investment is largely unimportant to offspring 
(i.e. in precocial species), the presence of an additional helper predictably conveys little 
benefit to the offspring, as the new helper is unable to meaningfully change the effective 
investment received. However offspring in highly altricial species benefit less from an 
additional helper than do offspring in moderately altricial species, because (i) small groups 
can deliver high benefits to offspring when rearing investment is highly effective, leaving 
little for additional helpers to do besides load-lightening, and (ii) the female is unable to split 
her costs efficiently between both investment stages when her investment in offspring quality 
is essentially meaningless (Fig. 4.5b). 
Under ‘silver spoon’ conditions (Fig. 4.5c), the benefits to offspring of recruiting an 
additional helper are much greater than under ‘head start’, as helpers can contribute to 
offspring benefit even in large groups. The extra available care during the rearing period can 
be directed (via increased maternal pre-birth investment) towards larger, hungrier, but 
potentially more valuable offspring, rather than simply reducing the costs of other carers 
through load-lightening. As with ‘head start’ conditions the benefits are greatest with small 
Figure 4.5: (a): Under ‘head start’ conditions, offspring benefit most from an additional helper 
when in small groups, but this effect is much stronger with full-sibling helpers (solid line) than it 
is with half-sib (dashed) or cousin (dotted) helpers. In large groups with less-helpful helpers, 
offspring benefit more from the recruitment of an additional helper than when in similarly sized 
groups with full-sib helpers, as the current total investment in offspring is lower. (b) The benefit to 
offspring of adding an extra helper varies similarly under ‘silver spoon’ conditions as under ‘head 
start’ conditions, but is of greater magnitude due the multiplicative effect of the mother boosting 
offspring quality. However, the differences in offspring benefit between adding a full-sib helper 
(solid line) and adding a cousin helper (dotted line) are much smaller under ‘silver spoon’ than 
under ‘head start’, and substantial benefits to recruiting helpers persist even in large groups. 
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groups and with closely-related helpers, however under ‘silver spoon’ conditions the 
difference between adding a closely- or distantly-related helper is reduced. 
 
Discussion 
We find clear differences in how offspring benefit from care, and in the investment strategies 
adopted by carers, depending on whether maternal pre-birth investment is substitutable or 
complementary with later investment. Mothers are expected to reduce pre-birth investment 
under good conditions when their investment gives offspring a ‘head start’, as this transfers 
more of the costs to the stage that is less costly than usual. In contrast, when pre-birth 
investment provides a ‘silver spoon’ that leads to potentially greater offspring fitness if they 
are reared successfully, mothers should take advantage of good conditions by increasing pre-
birth investment. Better rearing conditions can arise through greater numbers of helpers 
available to assist with rearing, as we explore here, but equally applies to pair-breeding 
species where the ability of males to assist with care varies: if better males simply provide 
more care, females should compensate by reducing pre-birth investment, but if they provide 
lasting benefits that are only realised in high-quality offspring, mothers might be expected to 
increase pre-birth investment when paired with a high-quality mate. 
Our results provide support for the concealed helper effects hypothesis proposed by Russell et 
al. (2007) in cases where pre-birth investment is substitutable with investment during the 
rearing period when all carers can contribute (the ‘head start’ condition). Females are 
predicted to reduce their investment in offspring quality when more helpers are present, and 
helpers to respond by increasing investment in offspring rearing, leading to the total amount 
of care delivered to offspring remaining similar across a large range of group sizes. This 
female tactic raises the possibility that empirical studies focusing on the rearing period alone 
might erroneously conclude that large numbers of helpers can deliver additional investment to 
offspring without any positive effect, when in reality the helpers are greatly reducing the 
overall costs paid by the breeding female.  
Concealed helper effects should therefore arise whenever investment is substitutable across 
investment stages, but in practice aspects of ecology or life-history may limit the scope for 
maternal tactics in particular species. In particular, maternal tactics will be less important 
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when (a) group size or helper helpfulness is unpredictable at the time when the mother 
produces the offspring (i.e. there is an unknown supply of care), or similarly (b) when 
conditions during the breeding attempt are unpredictable, which might make the costs of 
delivering care difficult to forecast. In some systems (c) the final quality of offspring may be 
unaffected by early investment (e.g. Van De Pol et al. 2006), represented in our model by a 
very low v, and in others (d) extra carers may only contribute by reducing predation or 
defending territory (Burt & Peterson 1993) rather than removing quantitative costs of care 
from the breeding pair: in both (c) and (d) the female should always produce the minimum 
viable quality of young. In addition, maximal investment in the quality of young should be 
expected when (e) breeding females are unlikely to breed again, and hence will benefit little 
from increasing their own survival probability beyond the breeding season (Clutton-Brock 
1984). As we show in our model, complementary investment across investment stages leads 
to different tactics, but the above factors remain important. 
The relative benefit to the breeding female of trading off offspring quality against personal 
costs will vary depending on the breeding system, because in species with strong competition 
for breeding positions it may be especially valuable to produce very high-quality offspring 
when the opportunity arises, as only high-quality individuals are likely to reproduce. A 
similar effect could also arise more proximally when offspring must compete for survival 
with other broods at an early age (e.g. Van Dijk et al. 2013). If rearing the highest-quality 
offspring is only possible when offspring are born at high quality, the potential benefits lead 
to the female increasing pre-birth investment under good conditions as her contribution boosts 
the value of investment delivered during the rearing period. In our model, this ‘silver spoon’ 
relationship ('dynamic complementarity' sensu Heckman 2007) indeed leads to female pre-
birth investment matching rather than compensating for current conditions. For example, if 
body mass at birth has a multiplicative effect on the likelihood of becoming a dominant 
breeder assuming adequate food during rearing, mothers might favour high pre-birth 
investment even when it is costly and not intrinsically valuable (or is even harmful, if larger 
offspring require more food) without follow-up investment by the group. Conversely, if 
offspring of low quality at birth are produced and investment is complementary, one might 
expect parents to reduce investment during rearing rather than attempting to compensate, as 
the offspring are unlikely to become breeders regardless of the level of rearing investment 
provided. 
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More theoretical work is needed on how tactical maternal investment can modify investment 
rules and outcomes for offspring in cooperative groups. Along with previous work on female 
manipulation of offspring number (Savage et al. 2013a, 2013b), we have shown that maternal 
investment in offspring quality can drastically alter investment rules in cooperative species. 
However, even when assuming a simple trade-off between offspring number and quality it is 
difficult to predict the expected investment strategies if females can alter both factors 
simultaneously. Offspring size is often used as a proxy for offspring quality, but although 
size-number relationships have been widely explored across many taxa (Kaufman & Kaufman 
1987; Smith et al. 1989; Sinervo & Licht 1991; Roff 2002; Walker et al. 2008), changes in 
one factor may have complex effects on the other, making the assumption of simple size-
number trade-offs unreliable (Lepage et al. 1998; Brown & Shine 2009). Most valuable as an 
addition to current theory would be a demographic approach to modelling a cooperative 
breeding system, incorporating dispersal patterns and potential alternative options for helpers 
in addition to maternal control of offspring size and/or number. This would facilitate cross-
species comparisons of investment strategy by exploring intra-group relatedness, the 
costliness of different breeding stages, and helper investment decisions within a more flexible 
model framework. In addition, dynamic complementarity effects between development stages 
require further attention as a potential explanation for the range of maternal investment tactics 
seen in nature. 
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Abstract 
When multiple individuals contribute to rearing a brood of offspring, efficient delivery of 
resources is difficult because each benefits if the other(s) provide a greater share of the total 
investment required. A recent study has suggested that when individuals can monitor the 
investment of others, a simple strategy of turn-taking can resolve this problem, and has 
provided evidence for ‘alternation’ between great tit parents feeding their young. Such 
strategies might prove more difficult for cooperatively breeding birds, in part because the 
greater number of carers in such species makes it more difficult for them to monitor one 
another’s behaviour and hence to maintain turn-taking. To test whether turn-taking occurs in a 
natural cooperative system, we use a continuous time Markov model to deduce the 
provisioning rules governing investment in the chestnut-crowned babbler (Pomatostomus 
ruficeps), an endemic Australian cooperatively-breeding bird with variable group size. Our 
analysis reveals that a high degree of turn-taking occurs between group members, such that 
individual birds are far more likely to visit following other individuals than to make a repeat 
visit themselves. We show using a randomisation test that part of this turn-taking arises 
through the distribution of individual inter-visit intervals (‘passive’ turn-taking) and part 
through individuals deliberately responding to the investment of others (‘active’ turn-taking). 
We conclude that turn-taking in babblers is a consequence of both deliberate response rules 
and foraging ecology, with the latter effect arising from the existence of a typical minimum 
time required to forage and travel to and from the nest. Our work underlines the importance of 
considering both the social and ecological context when investigating parental care behaviour 
in nature, and demonstrates that turn-taking is a feasible way to organise investment across a 
range of cooperative group sizes. 
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Introduction 
Individuals who cooperate to raise offspring face several problems when attempting to 
provision their young efficiently. Firstly, care is costly (Williams 1966b), so each individual 
stands to gain if other carers contribute a greater share of the required provisioning. Secondly, 
each individual has only partial knowledge of the provisioning behaviour of other individuals, 
which results in uncertainty about both the relative contributions of other carers and the 
current needs of the offspring. Both of these factors influence the provisioning decisions of 
carers, and the uncertainty becomes progressively greater as the number of individuals 
contributing to care increases.  
Existing theory on offspring care has focused on the total amount of care delivered and on the 
response of carers to a change in the amount delivered by others. Models have typically 
adopted either 'sealed bid' (Houston & Davies 1985) or 'negotiation' (McNamara et al. 1999; 
Lessells & McNamara 2012) approaches to find the optimum investment level (or response 
rule, in negotiation models) for each carer during the breeding attempt. Both methods produce 
qualitatively similar results, generally predicting incomplete compensation for changes in 
partner investment (McNamara et al. 1999), although additional considerations such as 
asymmetric information about the offspring among carers (Johnstone & Hinde 2006) or 
threshold effects such as partner desertion (Jones et al. 2002) can lead to alternative 
predictions. Empirical support for incomplete compensation is strong in biparental species 
(reviewed in Harrison et al. 2009), but significantly weaker in cooperative species where non-
breeding individuals also contribute to care (Hatchwell 1999). 
The solutions to sealed-bid and negotiation models do not generally lead to the best possible 
outcome for carers as a group, since their joint payoffs could be increased by all carers 
simultaneously raising their investment (Johnstone et al. 2014). In effect, carers are trapped in 
a many-player Prisoner’s dilemma-like situation (Glance & Huberman 1994) in which each 
carer benefits from ‘defecting’ (by reducing care) for a marginal increase in their personal 
payoff, despite the resulting overall loss in payoff when all individuals adopt this strategy. 
When individuals are highly responsive to changes in investment by others, negotiation may 
even result in offspring receiving less investment from two cooperating parents than from a 
lone parent (McNamara et al. 2003). Nevertheless, existing work suggests that cooperation 
can be maintained if repeated interactions allow individuals to reward cooperators and/or 
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police exploiters/defectors (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Frank 2003), relying on simple 
mechanisms such as group knowledge of the contributions provided by others (Keser & Van 
Winden 2000). The tendency of individuals to invest more in a common project if others 
invest similarly is known from studies on humans to assist in optimally providing for a 
common good (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Frey & Meier 2004), but evidence for it in animal 
studies is lacking, possibly due to limitations in cognition (West et al. 2007). 
In many natural systems investment in offspring takes the form of collective provisioning by 
all carers, which is split into many discrete events wherein a single carer brings food to the 
offspring. These repeated events provide an opportunity for individuals to minimize potential 
cheating by applying a turn-taking strategy to offspring care: if individuals reduce their 
provisioning rate after they visit, and increase it after others visit, all carers will broadly 
contribute the same amount over the breeding attempt. Perfect turn-taking is unlikely to occur 
in natural systems due to imperfect information and stochastic factors, however any 
significant response to other carers will improve investment efficiency (Johnstone et al. 2014). 
Recent work on great tits (Parus major) has provided evidence that such reciprocal 
investment rules are used to regulate provisioning of young, and that this strategy can provide 
a solution increasing the fitness of both parents, provided provisioning by one parent can be 
observed by the other (Johnstone et al. 2014). 
Here, we extend the approach of (Johnstone et al. 2014) to analyse investment in groups with 
larger numbers of carers, using a continuous-time Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) 
model (Bremaud 2001; Harcourt et al. 2010) to analyse nest provisioning data from the 
cooperatively breeding chestnut-crowned babbler (Pomatostomus ruficeps). Chestnut-
crowned babblers are medium-sized (50g) endemic Australian passerines that breed in groups 
of 2-15 (mean ≈ 6), with helpers that provision at the nest in addition to the breeding pair 
(Russell et al. 2010; Browning et al. 2012a). Babbler groups forage together within stable 
home ranges (Portelli et al. 2009), and often return to the nest area as a group when 
individuals provision (pers. obs.), providing ample opportunity for individuals to observe the 
contributions of others. Babblers do not ‘cheat’ by pretending to deliver food to offspring 
(Young et al. 2013), and their contributions are not driven by considerations of social prestige 
(Nomano et al. 2013). As such, babblers provide an appropriate model system to investigate 
fine-scale response rules in the provisioning of offspring, including turn-taking strategies. 
Markov-chain models have previously been used with success to describe animal behavioural 
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rules in several contexts (Harcourt et al. 2009, 2010; Patterson et al. 2009; Johnstone et al. 
2014), and we demonstrate here that they are also applicable to studying the fine-scale 
organization of provisioning in cooperative breeders.  
 
Methods 
Data collection 
Provisioning data were collected between July and November of 2007 and 2008 at Fowlers 
Gap Arid Zone Research Station, NSW, Australia (Lat. -31.1, Long. 141.7). Adults were 
caught using mist-nets, ringed, tagged with Passive Integrated Transponder (PIT) tags 
(2x12mm, Trovan Ltd.), and had a small (<100μl) blood sample taken from the ulnar vein. 
Chicks were similarly blood-sampled, ringed and PIT-tagged at around 15 days old. Chestnut-
crowned babblers are sexually monomorphic, so identification of parentage and sex was 
primarily obtained through molecular analysis (Holleley et al. 2009; Rollins et al. 2012). 
Group composition was determined through repeated group counts and colour-ring sightings 
before and after group capture, and only groups known to have all individuals PIT-tagged 
were used for the current analysis. Chestnut-crowned babblers build large enclosed stick nests 
with a single entrance, around which we fitted a coil antenna connected to a data-logger 
(LID650, Dorset ID b.v.) at the base of the nest tree; this allowed us to capture all of the nest 
visits of PIT-tagged individuals. For further details of the system and techniques used to 
collect nest visit data see Young et al. (2013). 
Babbler groups used for this analysis were known from observation and capture to have all 
members PIT-tagged, to remove any ambiguity arising from provisioning by extra birds 
invisible to the data-logger. For our analysis, we restricted ourselves to nest visit data from 
broods above ten days in age to avoid confusing female brooding behaviour with provisioning, 
and also removed any partial days of visit data in which each significant carer (see below) 
visited fewer than ten times. We also discounted data from the last day in the nest prior to the 
fledging date, and any data from periods of disturbance (such as periodic measuring of chicks 
or changing of data-loggers). Any group with at least one complete day of provisioning data 
was then used in the analysis. To determine independent nest visits, we grouped multiple 
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triggers by the same individual into a single visit when they occurred within two minutes, an 
approach validated by direct nest observations and nest camera data showing that repeat visits 
by the same individual within two-minute intervals do not generally represent additional food 
delivered to offspring (Young et al. 2013). 
 
  
 
Figure 5.1: An illustrative Markov model of provisioning in a cooperative group with four carers. 
There are eight possible states, two (A and B) for each carer, and sixteen possible transitions (solid 
arrows), which represent the current provisioner following either itself or one of the other three 
carers. Each time a bird provisions the model moves between states depending on the identity of 
the provisioner. The dashed arrow represents the automatic reset transition (B→A) which we 
impose whenever any carer makes a repeat visit. 
5: Turn-taking in the cooperatively breeding chestnut-crowned babbler – Methods 
 
117 
 
Classification of carers 
In chestnut-crowned babblers some individuals in a group do not visit the nest to assist with 
chick provisioning, or visit infrequently; these individuals are usually immigrants or juveniles 
(Browning et al. 2012b). In addition, birds from other breeding groups will occasionally visit 
a nest, usually when they are members of the same, larger social group. For our purposes we 
are interested only in significant carers not the total group size, as individuals that contribute 
only rarely to offspring care have little opportunity to respond to the investment of others. 
Furthermore, attempting to fit individuals with very few visits into our model is problematic 
because some possible model transitions may never appear in the data (e.g. if two rare visitors 
are included they are likely to never follow one another), making it impossible to estimate 
some theoretically viable transition rates. To determine the number of significant carers, 
individuals in a group were first ranked in order of total visit number. The individual with the 
lowest number of visits was excluded if its total visits failed to exceed 20% of the mean total 
visits of the rest of the group. If excluded, the process was repeated with the next-lowest 
visiting individual until all remaining individuals exceeded 20% of the group mean. When 
important, helpers are differentiated from each other by their visit rate, with the highest-rate 
helper referred to as the primary helper. 
Applying the above process to all groups with complete visit rate data available over several 
days resulted in 4 groups with two (significant) carers, 6 with three carers, 5 with four carers, 
3 with five carers, and 2 with six carers; between zero and five individuals in each group were 
excluded for failing to classify as a significant carer (mean = 1.1). The amount of data 
required to fit our model grows rapidly as group size increases, because the number of 
transitions to be estimated is equal to the square of the carer number. This need for 
disproportionate amounts of data at large group sizes meant that two groups with good visit 
rate data were excluded from the final analysis because they contained too many significant 
carers (8 and 9) for the data available. Among the groups used, brood size ranged from 1-5 
chicks (mean 3.3), and initial chick age from 10-19 days old. Previous work suggests that 
babbler provisioning rate increases only slightly between day 10 and day 20 (Browning et al. 
2012b). Differences in provisioning rates between different classes of carer, and effects of 
nestling age have previously been described for this system in detail and with higher sample 
sizes (Browning et al. 2012a, 2012b), so we did not pursue any further analyses of the relative 
levels of contribution provided by different carers. 
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Markov analysis 
For each breeding attempt ( , one breeding group represented twice) we fitted a 
continuous-time Markov Chain model to the nest visits by the group, using the R package 
MSM (Jackson 2011). Each visit was treated as a discrete event, and the model ‘state’ was 
defined by the identity of the last individual to visit the nest. This formulation violates the 
assumptions of MSM, because some of the events, specifically repeat visits by the same bird, 
do not change the state of the system. To allow for this we added a second ‘dummy’ state for 
each bird to represent a repeat visit by the same individual. Whenever a transition to a dummy 
state occurred (i.e. whenever there was a repeat visit), we imposed an immediate ‘reset’ 
transition to return the system to the base state for that individual. With this arrangement, 
which we used in all of our analyses, groups with c carers featured  states and ( 1)c c   
possible transitions between those states, including resets (Fig. 5.1). The best fit model 
calculated by MSM specifies the rate at which each possible transition occurs (which 
determines how likely particular birds are to follow particular other birds). We assume that 
individuals may react differently to each other carer visiting the nest, and thus estimate, for 
each individual, as many different visit rates as there are carers (so that there are  transition 
rates to be estimated, ignoring resets). However, because of the number of possible transitions 
in larger groups, it is also useful to define an individual’s mean transition rate when they 
follow any bird other than themselves. Following Johnstone et al. (2014), we define this 
transition rate (‘following another’) as λ, and the transition rate when an individual makes a 
repeat visit (‘following self’) as μ. 
 
Model validation 
A major problem with naïvely analysing visit data for patterns of turn-taking is that confounds 
can easily arise from foraging behaviour. If each individual has to spend a certain amount of 
time foraging and travelling to and from the offspring between successive provisioning events, 
then ‘passive’ turn-taking will arise simply because other individuals can visit during this 
interval, while the focal bird cannot. If the minimum inter-visit interval of each individual is 
highly consistent, near-perfect turn-taking might be expected even if individuals do not 
monitor or respond to one another’s behaviour in any way. Passive turn-taking will be less 
20n 
2c
2c
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precise if the ‘refractory period’ is variable, but even with highly variable intervals any 
significant refractory period will introduce some degree of bias towards turn-taking. To 
distinguish between this ‘passive’ turn-taking and ‘active’ turn-taking that is a direct result of 
individuals responding to one another’s visits, we therefore employed a randomization test 
similar to that used by Johnstone et al. (2014). 
To carry out the randomization test, we first removed potential ‘active’ turn-taking from the 
data by eliminating any relationship between the visit times of different individuals. To 
perform this dissociation we first calculated all of an individual’s inter-visit intervals in a 
given day, then randomly reordered these intervals within each individual and day. From 
these randomized intervals we reconstructed a new list of artificial visit times for each 
individual on each day. The artificial visit times for all individuals were then combined to 
form an artificial provisioning day, which was recoded and analysed in the same way as the 
original data. We re-ran the above dissociation followed by our standard analysis 1000 times 
on the data from each breeding attempt, to generate a distribution of expected (passive) turn-
taking given the structure of nest visits. By comparing the extent of turn-taking observed in 
the natural data to the distribution of values obtained from the dissociated data, we can 
determine the degree to which turn-taking is ‘passive’, i.e. simply attributable to the lack of 
immediate re-visits, or ‘active’, being caused by individuals responding to one another’s 
behaviour. 
 
Results 
Visit rates and turn-taking ratios 
Provisioning data were analysed for 20 breeding attempts by 19 different breeding groups 
(315-1475 nest visits per attempt, mean = 765). As an initial test for non-randomness in the 
patterns of individual visits, we used a runs test on the five groups with only two carers, and 
in all of these groups the carers visited significantly non-randomly . Across all 
carers  and group sizes (2-6), individuals were more likely to visit following another 
bird than to visit twice in a row (total: 13096 vs. 2208 visits), with the proportion of visits 
( 0.0001)p 
( 73)n 
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following other birds increasing with group size (0.75-0.94 for group sizes 2-6, mean 
proportion across all attempts: 0.85). 
Our Markov analysis further supports the occurrence of turn-taking, as across all carers 
individual transition rates for visits following another bird (λ = 123.7 ± 43.4) were much 
higher than those of an individual following itself (μ = 50.5 ± 18.2) (mean ± s.d., p < 0.0001). 
One breeding attempt was excluded from further analysis due to insufficient data; for a 
majority (17/19) of the remaining groups, models in which individuals visit at different rates 
following particular other individuals were a better fit (p < 0.05) than models that assumed 
each individual had only two possible visit rates (λ and μ), and in all groups both of the above 
individual-specific models were better fits to the data (p < 0.01) than a null model assuming 
all individuals has the same two possible rates (λ and μ). Despite this variation, across all 
groups mean transition rates were not significantly different between breeding males, 
breeding females, and the most helpful helpers in a group (Figure 5.2a). The only significant 
differences among carers were between the lowest-visit-rate helper and the other carers in 
groups with more than one helper (Figure 5.2b).  
There were no significant effects on individual transition intensity from mean visit rate of the 
breeding group, group size, brood size, brood age, or the number of carers per offspring 
, although this is attributable to small sample sizes and our restricted window of 
analysis, as some of the above factors are known to influence babbler provisioning behaviour 
when the entire rearing period is considered (Browning et al. 2012b). There were no 
significant pairwise relationships between individual transition intensities, leading to the 
conclusion that particular birds were not more likely to follow birds that in turn were more 
likely to follow them (Figure 5.2c). We infer from this finding that there are no sub-group 
organisations within which babblers adopt turn-taking rules. 
 
Inter-visit intervals 
As indicated above, the natural data show that individual babblers tend to alternate their visits, 
and are less likely to visit again after they have just visited themselves. Although potentially 
attributable to ‘active’ turn-taking by individuals responding to others’ investment, it is also 
possible that turn-taking arises ‘passively’ due to constraints on the distribution of individual 
(   0.05)p 
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inter-visit intervals, for instance because individuals require a well-defined minimum period 
to forage for food items and return to the nest. We found that individual inter-visit intervals 
are highly skewed, peaking at short (2-6 minute) intervals with very long tail of larger 
intervals that approximates the shape of a geometric distribution, which would be expected in 
the absence of a refractory period (note that no intervals below 2 minutes are present in the 
data due to the initial processing of the PIT data: see methods). Median intervals across 
different group sizes and carer categories ranged between 393 and 611 seconds (means: 522-
1324 seconds). Approximately 97% of all inter-visit intervals were less than one hour, 
suggesting that provisioning was generally continuous by all individuals within a day: the 
primary difference between high-visit rate and low-visit rate carers is in the number of very 
long inter-visit intervals, suggesting that lower visit rate carers take more frequent ‘breaks’ 
from provisioning offspring rather than foraging less efficiently (Figure 5.3).  
 
‘Passive’ or ‘active’ turn-taking? 
The tendency for babbler visit data to show turn-taking (λ/μ > 1) in all groups is far lower 
under our randomization test than in the natural data (Figure 5.4), suggesting that the largest 
component is ‘active’ turn-taking caused by individuals directly responding to each other. Of 
19 groups, only one randomization test generated turn-taking rates that overlapped with those 
in the natural data. Nevertheless, significant ‘passive’ turn-taking is still present in a majority 
of groups in the randomized data (12/19 groups exclude λ/μ=1 from the minimum possible 
value on 1000 randomized data runs), suggesting that individual inter-visit intervals generate 
some degree of visit structure (Figure 5.4).  
 
Discussion 
We found strong evidence that chestnut-crowned babblers use information about when other 
carers visit to modify their own personal visit rate (‘active’ turn-taking), however part of the 
turn-taking observed in the natural data is attributable to the distribution of individual inter-
visit intervals, and hence represents ‘passive’ turn-taking. Our findings both support and 
contrast with those of a previous study on great tits (Johnstone et al. 2014), as although 
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babblers demonstrate ‘active’ turn-taking in the same manner as great tit parents, Johnstone et 
al. found that great tits show little evidence of ‘passive’ turn-taking. Turn-taking was 
similarly prevalent across all group sizes, and helpers and breeders adopted similar rules 
provided that they were contributing similar amounts of care. 
Our conclusion that turn-taking in our data is partly a passive by-product of individual inter-
visit intervals raises the question of how this passive turn-taking arises; we argue that it can be 
straightforwardly explained through foraging ecology. If an individual takes some well-
defined minimum period to travel to and from the foraging site, and another minimum period 
to find food while foraging, then its inter-visit intervals will have a well-defined minimum 
value. Furthermore, if an individual must regularly cease provisioning chicks to restore its 
personal energy reserves, a further period will be added to the minimum visit interval during 
continuous provisioning. In these cases, likely in many natural systems, there will always be a 
weak signal of turn-taking because other contributing individuals can visit during the 
refractory period while the focal individual cannot. In an extreme case, when foraging and 
travel time are highly consistent and personal needs of the carer are negligible, near-perfect 
turn-taking could appear in natural provisioning data without individuals deliberately 
responding to each other at all. For the above reason, a weak signal of passive turn-taking was 
inevitable in our data due to the way the raw PIT-tag data was processed: no individual inter-
visit interval could be less than two minutes, as PIT readings from the same individual were 
grouped into a single visit if they occurred within two minutes of each other. While the choice 
of a two-minute grouping window has been validated using nest video data and nest-watches 
(Young et al. 2013), and hence we believe our results to be robust, it makes it difficult to 
accurately assessing the relative strengths of ‘passive’ and ‘active’ turn-taking in babblers. 
Several possible reasons for babblers exhibiting both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ turn-taking are 
suggested by their breeding behaviour and ecology. Compared to great tits, babblers forage 
more distantly from the nest (Portelli et al. 2009), are not agile flyers, and appear to suffer 
costs associated with travelling to and from the nest (Browning et al. 2012b). These factors 
decrease the ability of individual babblers to deliver separate food items in quick succession, 
and hence bias the natural data towards passive turn-taking. Unlike great tits, babblers bring 
prey of similar size to the nest on each visit (Browning et al. 2012b), which supports the use 
of simple turn-taking rules because visit rate alone is a reasonable proxy for investment 
delivered (i.e. individuals cannot reduce food item size to free-ride off others’ efforts). Recent 
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work has suggested that babbler groups often visit the nest area as a unit, irrespective of 
whether or not they have food to provision nestlings (Nomano et al. 2012), which potentially 
increases the scope for turn-taking by allowing individuals to more easily monitor the 
contributions of the entire group. Group visits may further contribute to the strong signal of 
turn-taking in babblers by increasing the refractory period (if individuals must visit the nest 
when they do not personally have food to provision), and by increasing the likelihood that 
multiple different individuals provision in quick succession (when several group members 
have food to deliver during a group visit).  
Our results suggest that when analyses of investment in offspring are focused entirely on the 
nest, important influences of foraging ecology can be easily overlooked. In our study we used 
the distribution of inter-visit intervals and a randomization test to check whether we were 
observing true responsiveness to the behaviour of others, and found greater levels of turn-
taking in the natural data than expected when there is no interaction between individuals. 
However, the randomized data still showed ‘passive’ turn-taking, and one can easily imagine 
a case in which turn-taking was entirely attributable to patterns of individual visits. The 
potential lack of robustness in our initial results underlines the importance of considering the 
foraging ecology of the species in question, and ensuring that individuals are actually 
responding to one another. Although our randomization test successfully dissociates ‘active’ 
from ‘passive’ turn-taking, it would be valuable to undertake a more general analysis of how 
different foraging paradigms and group sizes might lead to passive turn-taking in visit data, as 
there is still potential for passive turn-taking to confound the interpretation of future empirical 
results. 
Theoretical and empirical work suggests that turn-taking is an efficient way to organize 
investment in a brood of young (Johnstone et al. 2014), however species will vary in their 
ability to adopt a provisioning rule that requires attending to the contributions of others. 
Whether individuals cooperating to rear young will adopt turn-taking rather than applying a 
strategy of 'negotiation' (McNamara et al. 1999, 2003; Johnstone 2011) or 'sealed bids' 
(Houston & Davies 1985) at the start of the breeding attempt seems likely to depend on the 
biology and feeding ecology of the species in question. If the costs of acquiring the necessary 
information about group investment are high, and the accuracy or benefit of obtaining such 
information low, an individual may do better to make investment decisions based only on its 
knowledge of the brood and its current personal energy reserves. However it remains feasible 
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that cooperative species might adopt a simple alternation rule to organize their investment in 
offspring when contributions to care are easily observable by the entire group. Given the 
potential benefits to adopting a turn-taking rule, and the greater ease in employing one if all 
carers visit the nest together, turn-taking might provide an additional explanation for the high 
visit synchrony observed in several bird species (e.g. Marzluff & Balda 1992; Doutrelant & 
Covas 2007), which is often found to increase breeding success (Raihani et al. 2010; Mariette 
& Griffith 2012). Further work is needed to determine both the prevalence of turn-taking and 
the degree to which its potential benefits are realized in nature. 
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Figure 5.2: (a) Individuals are generally more likely to follow other birds than to visit the nest 
twice in a row, demonstrating turn-taking in the provisioning of offspring. Turn-taking is strongest 
for breeding males (M), females (F) and the most helpful helpers (H1), and then decreases with 
helper visit rate (H2-4). (b) Although all classes of carer show a tendency to alternate, differences 
in visit rate arise between terminal (lowest visit rate) helpers when compared to the other helpers 
contributing to that breeding attempt (‘standard’ helpers). Standard helpers and parents are similar 
in their visit rate and proportion of alternated visits. (c) Birds are not more likely to follow 
particular other birds if those birds follow them, i.e. there is no evidence that babblers employ 
reciprocal alternation rules to organise their investment in offspring. 
R² = 0.0045
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Figure 5.4 (next page): In all babbler groups analysed, the observed mean transition rate following 
other birds (λ) was greater than the rate of repeat visits (μ); the λ/μ ratio did not change across 
group sizes (red dots). Box-and-whisker plots show the distributions of λ/μ ratio for 1000 sets of 
randomised inter-visit intervals, analysed using the same method as the natural data. For all groups, 
the natural data showed significantly greater turn-taking than the randomized data. Individual 
groups are plotted on the x-axis, with the prefix indicating the number of significant carers. 
Figure 5.3: The distributions of individual inter-visit intervals are similar for all classes of carer. In 
groups with only two (a) and three (b) significant carers, the only differences between carers which 
help most and carers which help least is in the visit rate, i.e. a given visit from any individual is 
equally likely to be followed by a short interval as a long interval. In larger groups the 
aforementioned difference between terminal helpers and other carers appears (c): the visits of the 
individual that visits least in 6-carer groups are much more likely to occur at long intervals than 
those of the primary carer. 
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Abstract 
While biparental species commonly exhibit incomplete compensation in response to the 
presence of their partner, much greater variation in provisioning rules is observed in 
cooperative breeders as group size changes. In birds, females pay the majority of the pre-
hatching costs of producing eggs and caring for them until they hatch, whereupon all carers 
can contribute similarly. As a result, the costs incurred by breeding females are biased 
towards the start of the breeding attempt when compared to breeding males and helpers. 
Recent theoretical work suggests that diverse responses to different levels of available care 
should be expected based on whether breeding females can respond by changing the number 
or size of offspring before other carers can contribute. We use data from existing studies to 
review the range of provisioning behaviour observed in 60 species of cooperatively breeding 
birds, and to test whether there is an association between maternal-only allocation, breeding 
group sizes and maternal provisioning rules. We find that females are more likely to 
compensate when incubation periods are relatively longer, and when their breeding group is 
comprised of close kin. Larger breeding group sizes are associated with smaller relative total 
investment in eggs, supporting the hypothesis that helpers facilitate a lowering of personal 
costs paid by the breeding female. Our results reinforce the importance of considering 
investment as a multi-stage process, and may partially explain the greater variation in 
provisioning rules seen in cooperative breeding when compared to biparental systems. 
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Introduction 
Cooperative breeding, in which more than two individuals contribute to the care of offspring, 
is a breeding system exhibited by a significant minority of terrestrial vertebrates (Cockburn 
2006; Lukas & Clutton-Brock 2012). Approximately 9% of all bird species regularly breed 
cooperatively (Cockburn 2006), an estimate which has steadily increased over time as the 
breeding behaviour of more species has been studied in detail. Among avian cooperative 
breeders the prevalence and intensity of care delivered by non-parents varies tremendously, 
from a single helper attending a small fraction of nests (as in pinyon jays, Marzluff & Balda 
1992) to an average of greater than four helpers at every nest, with unhelped nests universally 
failing (white-winged choughs, Corcorax melanorhamphos, Heinsohn 1992; apostlebirds, 
Struthidea cinerea, Woxvold & Magrath 2005). The forces selecting for and maintaining 
cooperative breeding in birds have been the subject of much debate, with suggestions that kin 
selection (Hamilton 1964), group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001), ecological constraints 
(Emlen 1982), aspects of life history (Rowley 1965; Arnold & Owens 1998), and maternal 
effects (Russell & Lummaa 2009) could all lead to individuals benefiting from helping rather 
than attempting to reproduce independently. In this article we focus on the relative importance 
of the different stages of investment across a breeding attempt as an explanatory factor in the 
prevalence of cooperative breeding. 
Whenever care of offspring is shared between multiple individuals, each individual benefits 
when a greater proportion of costs are borne by the other carers (Trivers 1972). Theoretical 
work predicts that individuals should generally respond to changes in the investment of others 
with incomplete compensation, (Houston & Davies 1985; McNamara et al. 1999; Johnstone 
2011), although threshold effects or asymmetric information can modify this prediction (Jones 
et al. 2002; McNamara et al. 2003; Johnstone & Hinde 2006). Empirical results from 
experiments modifying partner contribution in biparental species are largely supportive of 
incomplete compensation (Harrison et al. 2009), although exceptions exist. By contrast, 
cooperative species show far less consistency in their response to additional carers (Hatchwell 
1999): across various studies, responses range from complete compensation (Brown et al. 
1978; Hatchwell & Russell 1996; Russell et al. 2008), through various degrees of partial 
compensation (Wright 1998a; MacColl & Hatchwell 2003) to no change in investment at all 
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(Mumme & Koenig 1990; Emlen & Wrege 1991) or even an increase in individual investment 
(Valencia et al. 2006).  
What causes this variation in provisioning rules, and why is it so pronounced in cooperatively 
breeding species? One possibility is that the observed provisioning rules depend on whether 
the mother can tactically manipulate investment in offspring size or number based on the 
amount of help she expects to receive (Savage et al. 2013a, 2013b). In this case, if the 
breeding female can both anticipate the number of carers and modify her investment to match, 
she can produce more offspring (as in Davies & Hatchwell 1992; Russell et al. 2003; 
Woxvold & Magrath 2005), or offspring requiring greater future investment (Russell et al. 
2007) in response to greater numbers of carers. Recent theory suggests that this will lead to 
additive provisioning rules (by all carers) when female investment is flexible, and 
compensatory rules when it is not (Savage et al. 2013a), however this suggestion has yet to be 
tested on natural data. Regardless of the breeding female’s relative ability to tactically alter 
investment, we should expect compensation by her to be more common than by the breeding 
male, due to greater costs incurred in producing offspring. 
When a breeding attempt comprises multiple non-independent stages of investment it is likely 
that these stages will not be equally costly to individuals or the group as a whole. Carers may 
be restricted in their investment to particular stages, and the relative importance of these 
stages may also influence provisioning rules (Savage et al. 2013a). In birds, typically the nest 
must be built, the eggs produced and incubated, and the chicks and fledglings fed until 
independence, throughout which time the carers must hide and/or defend the offspring from 
predators. Producing and incubating eggs is costly (Monaghan et al. 1998; Visser & Lessells 
2001; Reid et al. 2002; Williams 2005) and incubation is often performed exclusively by the 
breeding female, sometimes with supplemental feeding by other carers (Martin & Ghalambor 
1999). Helpers, when present, may contribute to incubation (Heinsohn & Cockburn 1994), but 
will more often restrict themselves to feeding nestlings, or even only fledglings (Waite & 
Strickland 1997). When the breeding female suffers a large cost of reproduction before other 
individuals invest in offspring (e.g. large eggs and female-only incubation), later stages (e.g. 
provisioning nestlings) become relatively less important and fewer carers will be able to 
meaningfully contribute to the breeding attempt: more helpers may reduce female costs later 
in the breeding attempt, but these are a small fraction of the total costs incurred. This 
inflexibility in female costs with changes in helper number leads to inflexibility in maternal 
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investment tactics with changes in helper number, resulting in incomplete compensation and 
load-lightening as predicted by single-stage investment models (Savage et al. 2013a). The 
opposite case, where costs restricted to the breeding female are small and group costs large, is 
predicted to lead to flexibility in female investment strategy as group size changes, and little 
or no change in provisioning rate as the number of carers changes (Savage et al. 2013a). 
We present an analysis of cooperative provisioning across 60 species whose breeding 
behaviour has been previously studied in detail. For each species we record the prevalence 
and intensity of cooperative breeding and calculate the overall contributions of the breeding 
female to offspring care in terms of her investment in eggs (relative to body size), whether she 
incubates alone, and the relative lengths of different stages within the breeding attempt. We 
then determine the degree to which these factors predict the observed provisioning rules and 
levels of cooperation in particular species. 
 
Methods 
Data collection 
Data on provisioning rules, helper effects and group sizes were obtained from studies 
referenced in Hatchwell (1999) and Kingma et al. (2010), with further studies identified by 
articles citing Hatchwell (1999) and systematic searches of Scopus, Web of Knowledge, and 
JSTOR using the terms ‘cooperative breeding’ and ‘helpers at the nest’ (with irrelevant 
disciplines excluded). The key measures of helping behaviour used were 'proportion of nests 
helped' and 'mean breeding group size', two parameters that together broadly describe the 
prevalence and intensity of cooperative breeding and which were either directly available or 
easily calculable from all studies used in the analysis. Where data were available for 
contributions to care over multiple stages, or multiple dimensions of helping behaviour (such 
as nest defence in addition to provisioning), we focused exclusively on provisioning during 
the nestling stage due to sparse data from other stages and the potential difficulties in 
comparing the relative costliness of different modes of investment. Following Hatchwell 
(1999), we recorded whether males and females compensated for the presence of helpers by 
reducing their provisioning effort, and whether total care delivered to the brood increased 
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when helpers were present. Where the response to additional helpers changed with group size, 
we recorded the response to the first helper (in facultatively cooperative species) or the 
response at small group sizes (in obligate or ubiquitous cooperative species). We also 
recorded whether helpers had a positive effect on reproductive success or not, and whether the 
proposed mechanism of the effect was reduced offspring starvation, reduced nest predation 
rate, or some other benefit (such as an increased probability of immediately re-breeding). 
In species for which provisioning and group size data were available, supplementary data on 
mean egg and clutch sizes, life-history traits, body masses, and kin-structure of groups were 
then collected from the literature. These data were taken from publications arising from the 
same study population where possible, with additional data sourced from encyclopaedia 
sources and review articles (see Appendix B for a full reference list by species). Where body 
masses were available independently for both sexes the mean female mass was used, 
otherwise female mass was assumed to approximate the mean of all adult masses. The mean 
lengths of the incubation and nestling periods, and which individuals contributed to 
incubation were also recorded. Breeding occurred year-round or under particular weather 
conditions in some species, while others had a well-defined breeding period: we divided 
species into two simple classes on the basis of whether multiple successful attempts were 
possible in a given breeding period under good conditions. No data on adult survival rates 
were collected, as these data were only readily available for a few studies beyond those 
analysed in previous studies (Hatchwell 1999; Kingma et al. 2010). Species-specific data on 
egg shape were not generally available, so egg volumes were calculated from mean reported 
length (L) and width (W) measurements (in mm) using a standard formula of 
2(0.6057 0.0018 )W LW    (Narushin 2005). Appendix A provides further details of the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for species used in this study. 
 
Statistical analysis 
The primary aim of this study was to determine whether there is a general relationship 
between relative maternal investment levels and group size or observed provisioning rules in 
cooperative breeders. Life-history traits are variable but highly conserved across birds, and 
hence controlling for the phylogenetic non-independence of species is important (Owens & 
Bennett 1995). Phylogenetic relationships between species in our study were obtained from 
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Jetz et al. (2012) (via birdtree.org), with branch length estimates generated by taking the mean 
of 1000 randomly sampled trees from the Hackett et al. (2008) backbone. When analysing the 
data, we used phylogenetic generalized least-squares (PGLS) models to control for the 
phylogenetic non-independence of species traits (Martins & Hansen 1997; Pagel 1999; 
Freckleton et al. 2002).  
All statistical analyses were performed in the R programming language (version 2.12, R 
Development Core Team), using packages ‘ape’ (Paradis et al. 2004) and ‘caper’ (Orme et al. 
2011) for tree manipulation and PGLS functions. We chose PGLS over phylogenetic 
independent contrast (PIC) methods (Felsenstein 1985) for convenience, as the two 
approaches are mathematically equivalent (Blomberg et al. 2012). Continuous input variables 
were centred by subtracting the mean and scaled by dividing by two standard deviations, to 
facilitate comparisons with binary input variables (Gelman 2008). To select and compare 
between models we used Akaike’s information criterion, corrected for small sample size 
(AICc) (Akaike 1974; Burnham & Anderson 2002). To avoid selection bias from the large 
number of possible models (Zucchini 2000), the number of input variables was reduced by 
fitting models of each input variable in isolation, then excluding those variables that failed to 
outperform an intercept-only model (based on AICc comparison). All retained variables were 
then used to construct a complete set of candidate models. Models with significant support 
(defined as ∆AICc < 3 from the ‘best’ model) were model-averaged using Akaike weights 
(Burnham & Anderson 2002). 
 
Results 
In total, we found 60 cooperative species that met the criteria for inclusion, of which 55 had 
available data on egg size; this is a substantially larger number than previous reviews of 
cooperative care behaviour (e.g. Hatchwell 1999, Kingma et al. 2010). Figure 6.1 presents a 
radial phylogram of all species used in this study, with scientific names colour-coded 
according to the most broadly defined classes of cooperative provisioning rule: Full 
compensation of helper contributions by the breeders (black), partial compensation (blue), 
and no compensation (i.e. fully additive care; red).  
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Figure 6.1: Radial phylogram of species used in the analysis. Relative branch lengths were 
estimated by taking the mean of 1000 random trees sampled from Jetz et al. (2012). The colour of 
species labels denotes the provisioning rule employed when group size increases: Species listed in 
black text (22) fully compensate for the presence of additional helpers, such that total provisioning 
rate remains constant. Species in blue (20) compensate by reducing care, but overall provisioning 
rate still increases, either because all carers compensate incompletely or because only some carers 
compensate. Species listed in red (18) do not compensate for the presence of additional helpers. 
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Variation in cooperative care 
No provisioning rule could be identified as the standard across the cooperative species we 
reviewed, contrasting with the generally supported ‘incomplete compensation’ rule found for 
biparental species (Harrison et al. 2009). Compensatory reduction of feeding rate in the 
presence of an additional helper was found for at least one sex in 42/60 reviewed species 
(70%), however among those that compensated, incomplete compensation (20/42, 48%) was 
similarly frequent to complete compensation (22/42, 52%). In compensating species the 
female more often compensated than the male (♀: 39/42, 93%; ♂: 27/42, 64%), and in species 
where only one sex compensated, this was generally the female (15/18, 83%). Two studies 
reported non-significant changes in both total and individual provisioning rates when helpers 
were present, and hence could not be assigned to a particular rule. In the remaining species 
(16/42, 38%), neither sex compensated for the presence of a helper, and hence provisioning 
rate increased with group size: included in this category is a single case of 'superadditive care', 
in which breeders increased investment in response to the presence of a helper (Valencia et al. 
2006). Superadditive care was by far the rarest of the observed provisioning rules, however an 
excluded study also showed a non-significant trend towards the same rule (Jing et al. 2009). 
Table 6.1 fully separates out all of the possible provisioning rules, and presents the number of 
species exhibiting each rule. 
Other aspects of breeding biology were also variable across the species reviewed, suggesting 
potentially great variation in maternal costs of care. Helpers increased reproductive success in 
67% of species (40/60), and where a mechanism for this benefit was identified (38/40), the 
most common were reduced starvation (20/38, 53%) and reduced predation (13/38, 34%). 
Mean breeding group size ranged from just over two birds (Western bluebird, Siala mexicana) 
to ten birds (Brown Jay, Cyanocorax morio). Mean group size and proportion of nests helped 
were strongly positively correlated for species in which helpers were present at less than 
three-quarters of nests ( 41,  0.83)rn  , but this relationship weakened for groups with 
more prevalent cooperation ( 19, 0.61)rn   (Figure 6.2). The duration of the incubation 
stage ranged from only one-quarter of the total period between laying and fledging (Toucan 
Barbet, Semnornis ramphastinus), to more than three-fifths of the total period (Hoatzin, 
Opisthocomus hoazin), and mean clutch sizes varied between 1.1 (Seychelles warbler, 
Acrocephalus sechellensis) and 9.8 eggs per nest (Long-tailed tit, Aegithalos caudatus). 
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Provisioning rule  Total care to offspring 
Female 
compensation 
Male 
compensation 
Number of 
species 
No compensation / 
Fully additive care  Increase  No  No  16* 
Incomplete compensation 
(symmetric)  Increase  Yes  Yes  9 
Incomplete compensation 
(asymmetric)  Increase  Yes / No  No / Yes  8♀, 3♂ (11) 
Complete compensation 
(symmetric)  No change  Yes  Yes  15 
Complete compensation 
(asymmetric)  No change  Yes / No  No / Yes  7♀ (7) 
Unresolved  No change  No  No  2 
Table 6.1: Provisioning rules observed in cooperatively breeding birds as group size increases. 
Compensating parents reduce their provisioning rate when helpers are present, which may lead to 
no overall change in provisioning rate (complete compensation) or merely a lower increase 
(incomplete compensation). Compensation is asymmetric when exhibited by one sex only. Our 
findings suggest asymmetric compensation is far more likely to be employed by the breeding 
female than by the breeding male. *Includes one example of ‘superadditive’ care (an increase in 
individual provisioning rate as group size increases). 
Influence of maternal investment 
Mean breeding group size was associated with variation in two maternal investment 
parameters: (i) relative total egg investment by the breeding female and (ii) the ability of a 
species to make multiple successful breeding attempts within a season (Table 6.2a). Larger 
group sizes were associated with lower relative total egg investment by the breeding female, 
and with species capable of multiple breeding attempts. Neither proportional length of 
incubation period, nor whether the female incubates alone had any association with breeding 
group size. Groups comprised of kin were the same size as those comprised of non-kin, and 
whether females occasionally joint-nested also had no association with group size. Three 
models were significantly supported (∆ AICc < 3 from the ‘best’ model) and hence 
contributed to the average model. 
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Figure 6.2: Relationship between the mean size of a breeding group (breeders + helpers) and the 
proportion of nests in the population at which at least one helper is present. The lack of strong 
correlation among species with larger mean group sizes may reflect differences between the truly 
obligate cooperative species and those that breed in larger groups primarily for other reasons (such 
as extended parental care, or benefits of philopatry due to ecological constraints). It should be 
noted that for our review statements from the literature that all group members cared for offspring 
were assumed to be accurate, regardless of the quality of supporting data, and hence the proportion 
of nests helped is likely to be an overestimate in species with permanent, large social groups. 
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Four parameters were associated with breeding female compensation: (i) the relative length of 
the incubation period, (i) whether breeders were generally monogamous pairs, (ii) whether 
females sometimes joint-nested, and (iv) whether incubation was restricted to the breeding 
female alone (Table 6.2b). Female compensation was associated with proportionally longer 
incubation periods, and with breeding by monogamous pairs. Females were less likely to 
compensate when joint-nesting occurred in the species, and females incubating alone were 
slightly less likely to compensate than those with shared incubation. No association was found 
between breeding female compensation and her relative total egg investment, and repeated 
breeding within a season was also unrelated to female compensation. Females in groups 
comprised of kin were equally likely to compensate for helper presence than those in groups 
comprised of non-kin. Nine models contributed to the average model. 
We restricted our PGLS models to the 55 species for which high-quality egg size data were 
available. Exploratory analysis on all 60 species (omitting egg size data) revealed no 
differences in the retained variables or best supported models between the two datasets. 
r = 0.83 
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Table 6.2: The influences of maternal investment levels on (a) mean breeding group size, and (b) 
female provisioning rule, across 55 species of cooperatively breeding birds. The tables compare 
phylogenetic generalized least-square models using the Akaike Information Criterion, corrected for 
sample size (AICc). Log-likelihoods (log(L)), degrees of freedom (d.f.), relative AICc compared to 
the best candidate model (∆ AICc), and Akaike weights (Weight) are given for each model. Models 
with weights < 0.05 are not shown. 
(6.2a): Mean breeding group size 
Variates  log(L)  d.f.  AICc  ∆ AICc  Weight 
Repeat breed.  ‐106.98  2  218.19  0.00  0.43 
Rel. tot. egg inv. + Repeat breed.  ‐106.18  3  218.83  0.64  0.31 
Rel. tot. egg inv.  ‐107.47  2  219.18  0.99  0.26 
Intercept only  ‐109.69  1  221.45  3.26    
   Repeat Breed.  Rel. tot. egg inv.  Intercept 
Average model parameter estimates  0.724  ‐0.659  3.218 
Repeat breed.: Whether groups are capable of producing multiple successful breeding attempts 
within a breeding season. Rel. tot. egg inv.: The relative total egg investment by mothers (egg size × 
mean clutch size / mean female mass). 
(6.2b): Female compensation in the presence of a helper 
Variates  log(L)  d.f.  AICc  ∆ AICc  Weight 
Prop. inc. + Joint nest + Pair nest  ‐29.74  4  68.27  0.00  0.22 
Prop. inc. + Pair nest  ‐31.19  3  68.85  0.58  0.17 
Joint nest + Pair nest  ‐31.43  3  69.32  1.05  0.13 
Prop. inc. + Joint nest  ‐31.59  3  69.66  1.39  0.11 
Solo inc. + Prop. inc. + Pair nest  ‐30.69  4  70.18  1.91  0.09 
Pair nest  ‐33.01  2  70.25  1.98  0.08 
Solo inc.  + Prop. inc. + Joint nest + Pair nest  ‐29.61  5  70.45  2.18  0.07 
Solo inc.  + Pair nest  ‐32.10  3  70.67  2.40  0.07 
Solo inc.  + Joint nest + Pair nest  ‐31.08  4  70.95  2.68  0.06 
Intercept only  ‐36.42  1  74.92  6.65    
   Solo inc.  Prop. inc.  Joint nest  Pair nest  Intercept 
Average model param. est.  ‐0.032  0.137  ‐0.193  0.277  0.290 
Solo inc.: Whether the female must incubate the eggs alone. Prop.inc.: The proportion of the mean 
incubation + chick rearing period that is occupied by incubation. Joint nest: Whether multiple 
females sometimes lay in the same nest (1 < mean <  1.3). Pair nest: Whether breeding groups 
generally comprise monogamous pairs. 
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Discussion 
The distribution of provisioning rules found in our review is almost identical to that reported 
by Hatchwell (1999), despite our inclusion of more than double the number of species. When 
restricting our analysis to the 58 species with resolved provisioning rules, we found that 
helpers were associated with compensatory responses by both parents in 24/58 species (41%), 
by one parent only in 18/58 (31%), and by neither parent in 16/58 (28%); the corresponding 
values reported by Hatchwell were 44%, 30%, and 26% respectively (using 27 species). The 
proportion of species in which helpers increased the reproductive success of breeders was also 
identical to that in Hatchwell’s review, at 67% (40/60; 18/27). The striking similarities 
between the results of our present review and those of the Hatchwell’s suggest that our 
observed frequencies of different provisioning rules among cooperative breeders are likely to 
be robust, and hence that all possible provisioning rules (aside from ‘superadditive’ care) 
appear relatively often in natural systems. 
The results of our PGLS analyses underline the importance of considering maternal costs 
when investigating breeding behaviour in cooperative birds. Lower relative total egg 
investment was associated with larger group sizes, supporting the hypothesis that the presence 
of helpers in cooperative species allows mothers to reduce their personal costs during early 
stages of the breeding attempt. Species with larger group sizes were also more likely to breed 
multiple times within a season, potentially because helpers load-lighten (Crick 1992) the 
breeding female’s costs enough that she retains sufficient personal resources after a breeding 
attempt to breed again immediately. An alternative explanation for repeated breeding is that 
the helpers are able to care for fledglings that still require provisioning and/or defence from 
predators (Heinsohn 1991), enabling the female to allocate time to the incubation of a new 
brood rather than extending parental care. 
Our results broadly support previously predicted effects of maternal costs and group structure 
on female investment during offspring rearing (chapters two and three). Proportionally longer 
incubation periods (i.e. higher maternal-only costs) were associated with female 
compensation: this can be explained by mothers being more likely to reduce their effort at 
later stages when they have paid higher costs at earlier stages. Compensation by the breeding 
female was more likely with pair nesting, possibly because faithful pairs produce full-sibling 
helpers that contribute more, and that the breeding female is less willing to exploit. However, 
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contrary to predictions, mothers in kin-groups were not generally more likely to compensate 
for larger group size than mothers living in non-kin groups. 
Diverse explanations have been proposed for the evolution of cooperative breeding, many of 
which have empirical support from multiple species (see chapter 1), including suggestions 
that maternal effects may be a potential contributing factor (Russell & Lummaa 2009). Our 
results support the influence of maternal effects on parental care behaviour and breeding 
groups size, and we believe these influences are currently underestimated in vertebrate 
systems. When mothers are able to tactically manipulate offspring size or number to match 
the care paradigm, all carers benefit from removing her personal costs of offspring production 
to facilitate the production of more offspring for the group to rear (see chapter 2), facilitating 
larger group sizes. Mechanisms for helpers to assist the mother at earlier stages (e.g. assisting 
with nest-building, sharing incubation, or feeding the incubating mother on the nest) should 
be expected whenever the costs of the initial stage are constraining for the mother but helpers 
could still benefit from the production of more offspring, as this allows more individuals to 
effectively contribute to the breeding attempt. Investment in offspring is a complex multi-
stage process, and yet most theoretical and empirical studies have decomposed it into 
individual stages for the purposes of analysis, thereby missing potential influences of 
variation in maternal investment behaviour both within and between species. 
When comparing details of breeding behaviour across a diverse clade such as birds, it is often 
necessary to abstract away many details about individual species. Unfortunately, specific 
aspects of the biology or ecology of particular species can often lead to constraints on how the 
species behaves during breeding, relegating general factors to lesser importance. Within birds, 
clutch size provides an example as it is limited not only by female costs but by the number of 
eggs that can be simultaneously incubated. Other than simple matters of geometry, the climate 
and nest type (and location) that a given species uses will also restrict breeding females to a 
certain maximum clutch size, regardless of their available resources. In extreme cases, where 
egg production costs and rearing costs are both low, breeding females might benefit from 
acquiring multiple mates to incubate several simultaneous or sequential clutches (Lank et al. 
1985), especially if maximum clutch sizes are constrained. A full comparative analysis across 
a smaller clade with a mixture of cooperative and non-cooperative species would be useful to 
obviate some of these problems, however the relative rarity of studies on provisioning rules m 
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Given the large number of species for which provisioning data have been collected, more 
detailed meta-analytic studies of individual response rules should be possible across a 
substantial number of cooperative birds. Behavioural ecology would benefit enormously from 
greater public availability of the raw provisioning data from field studies, not only to combine 
existing results into comparative and meta-analytic reviews, but also to allow interested 
researchers to mine older data using more complex individual provisioning rules (such as 
those employed in chapter five to investigate turn taking). The existence of online repositories 
now makes the deposit and access of such data comparatively straightforward, and represents 
a way of adding new value to otherwise moribund field projects. Currently, much useful data 
for answering more complex questions about provisioning behaviour remains unavailable, 
and will likely be lost permanently over time (Vines et al. 2013) if better archiving practices 
are not employed. 
In summary, our results suggest that early-stage costs borne by the breeding female influence 
later provisioning behaviour and group size in cooperative groups, and hence that single-stage 
models of investment are potentially misleading and should be treated with caution. When 
mothers can transfer a greater proportion the total costs of breeding to helpers, larger group 
sizes are possible as more helpers can effectively contribute to the breeding attempt. 
Consequently, maternal effects may be important contributing factor to the evolution and 
persistence of cooperative breeding. Further work is needed to clarify the effects of maternal 
costs on helping behaviour; a potential first step would be to compare maternal investment 
between cooperative and non-cooperative bird species across a clade in which both breeding 
systems are common. 
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Summary of results 
In the preceding chapters I employed field observations, comparative analysis, and theoretical 
modelling to examine offspring care in cooperative breeders, with particular focus on the 
effects of maternal tactics on investment decisions made by the rest of the group. In this short 
final chapter, I summarise the findings of the previous chapters and discuss how they combine 
into an overall picture of investment behaviour in cooperative breeders. I conclude by 
suggesting some possible future work that would further expand our understanding of 
cooperative offspring care. 
In the introductory chapter I reviewed game-theoretical models of offspring care, cooperative 
breeding in birds, and maternal effects in relation to carer investment. I concluded that 
desirable extensions to current work on parental care included (i) models of care incorporating 
variable maternal allocation to offspring at early stages, (ii) models of cooperative care with 
more than a single helper, (iii) tests of the predictions of these new models, and (iv) study of 
how parental investment is organised on a visit-by-visit basis in cooperative breeders. The 
remainder of the dissertation attempted to address these topics from empirical, theoretical and 
comparative perspectives, beginning with a theoretical exploration of the effects of variable 
maternal allocation on individual investment levels. 
Chapters two, three and four used a common game-theoretical framework to model how carer 
investment rules are influenced by variable maternal investment during initial offspring 
production, and generated predictions about the outcomes expected under different cost, 
benefit, and relatedness parameters. Each chapter uses a two-step sealed-bid model of parental 
care, in which all carers choose their investment levels during offspring rearing (the second 
step) based on the initial choice of offspring number or quality made by the breeding female 
in the first step. This common framework facilitates the comparison of results across chapters 
to generate an overall picture of cooperative investment with variable maternal allocation. 
When mothers’ costs vary between different stages of the breeding attempt (chapter two; 
Savage et al. 2013a), compensatory care is more likely when costs paid entirely by the mother 
are relatively greater than those paid during later stages in which all group members can 
invest. If the costs mothers must bear alone are relatively low, mothers should adjust instead 
the number of offspring flexibly to helper number, resulting in little compensation during 
rearing. These different responses to changing group size can also arise depending on whether 
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helpers are closely or distantly related to offspring (chapter 3; Savage et al. 2013b), and 
whether they are related to offspring through the breeding female or breeding male, as 
females are less willing to increase the costs incurred by related carers. When mothers instead 
control initial offspring quality (chapter four) instead of offspring number, there are two 
possible outcomes depending on how initial quality influences the value of later investment. If 
high initial quality ‘primes’ offspring to benefit from future investment by carers, then 
increasing group size will lead to higher investment by offspring (i.e. a matching response to 
good conditions). In contrast, when initial offspring quality is additive with later investment 
(such that the stages can trade off against each other), mothers are expected to compensate for 
good conditions by reducing initial investment in offspring and hence shifting a greater 
proportion of the costs to the rearing period. In combination, the three chapters provide an 
overview of how maternal allocation strategies are likely to influence cooperative 
provisioning behaviour under different cost and benefit paradigms, and suggest that maternal 
tactics are important to generating accurate predictions. 
Chapter five diverged from the analysis of tactical female investment to consider strategies 
for efficient offspring provisioning in a cooperatively breeding bird. How individuals organise 
joint investment in offspring is crucial to understanding care behaviour in both biparental and 
cooperative species, as individual interactions largely determine the ease with which 
individuals can free-ride on the contributions of others. The results supported recent evidence 
that individuals may adopt turn-taking rules to ensure equitable investment in biparental 
species (Johnstone et al. 2014), and demonstrated some potential pitfalls of visit-by-visit 
analysis by also showing evidence of ‘passive’ turn-taking caused by the distribution of inter-
visit intervals. A better theoretical understanding of how foraging ecology influences the 
ability of individuals to assess and respond to the investment of others would facilitate general 
predictions about the likelihood of turn-taking being employed in particular species, and more 
empirical work is needed to confirm and explore turn-taking behaviour in nature. 
In chapter six, I reviewed all cooperative species for which provisioning behaviour is known 
in detail, in order to test whether maternal costs influence the group sizes and provisioning 
behaviours seen in empirical studies. I found several associations between maternal costs and 
cooperative behaviour, most notably that species with larger breeding groups tend to invest 
less in their eggs, and that mothers in species that spend a larger proportion of their time 
incubating are more likely to take advantage of helpers by reducing care when rearing 
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offspring. I also found a wide range of different provisioning rules present in cooperative 
breeders, at strikingly similar frequencies to those reported in a prior, smaller review of 
cooperative provisioning behaviour (Hatchwell 1999). 
Overall, my results support the importance of incorporating maternal allocation strategies into 
empirical and theoretical studies of cooperative investment, although more work is needed in 
both areas. The importance of considering offspring investment as a multi-stage process, 
particularly when multiple individuals are involved, is hard to overstate. Any studies that 
confine their analysis to a single stage will only be relevant when comparing species with 
identical maternal allocation strategies, and a similar ability to predict the availability of later 
care. The much greater variation in provisioning rules within cooperative species, when 
compared to biparental ones, is partly a result of cooperative species varying more widely in 
both of the above. 
To summarise the questions addressed, and conclusions made within this dissertation: 
1) Does maternal control of initial offspring quality and/or number influence the predicted 
investment levels of carers in cooperative breeding systems?  
YES: maternal strategies can strongly influence how individuals are predicted to 
respond to changes in group size, and there are multiple possible responses to 
receiving additional helpers. 
2) Is variation in costs between different stages of a breeding attempt predicted to influence 
investment behaviour in cooperative breeding systems? 
YES: lower rearing costs are predicted to lead to load-lightening at later stages, while 
lower offspring production costs are predicted to lead to noncompensatory care at 
later stages through more flexible maternal investment during offspring production. 
3) Do differences in intra-group relatedness influence this predicted investment behaviour? 
YES: load-lightening is predicted to be more common when helpers are related to the 
mother, and exploitative strategies are predicted to be more common with unrelated 
helpers. 
4) Does evidence from comparative analyses support maternal allocation levels as predictive 
of group size and/or female provisioning rules? 
YES: Total investment in eggs and whether multiple breeding attempts are possible 
both associate with breeding group size. Maternal provisioning rules are influenced 
by the proportion of time spent incubating, and also by the breeding system. 
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5) What strategies can carers use to ensure that investment is equitably divided among 
group members? 
ACTIVE TURN-TAKING is used in cooperative chestnut-crowned babblers when 
bringing food to offspring, although passive turn-taking also occurs. 
 
Conclusions and future work 
Cooperatively breeding species vary widely in their behaviour and ecology, making it 
difficult to establish universal benefits or specific conditions under which cooperative 
behaviours evolve and are maintained. The level of investment necessary to raise offspring, 
the potential sources (and stochasticity) of success and failure with and without helpers, the 
viability of alternative options to helping, and the possible routes to fitness through helping 
will all influence the benefits and costs of cooperation in a given species, and may interact in 
complex ways. To these factors, we must now also add the influence of tactical maternal 
investment on the investment rules, costs, and benefits of other carers. 
Many questions remain regarding the potential influence of maternal tactics on investment 
behaviour in cooperative breeders. More detailed comparisons within particular species and 
across small clades of mixed cooperative and non-cooperative species would be helpful in 
removing some phylogenetic biases, and greater reporting of egg and clutch size variation in 
empirical studies would help to facilitate within and between species comparisons. Some 
questions that follow directly from the conclusions within this dissertation are: 
1) Do non-cooperative species show consistently lower flexibility in maternal investment 
than cooperative species, due to lower variation in the amount of care available across 
breeding attempts? 
2) How do alternative options available to helpers influence the ability of mothers to 
tactically manipulate the investment of other carers? 
3)  How would we expect carer investment rules and maternal tactics to differ between 
different types of cooperative breeders, such as those that queue for breeding positions, 
those that nest jointly (with one or multiple females) with all individuals breeding, and 
those in which helpers are juveniles that later disperse? Do future direct benefits of 
helping lead to different predictions than indirect benefits? 
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4) In stable cooperative groups, when should mothers invest ‘selfishly’ (by producing 
helpful or low-quality offspring), and when do they benefit from maximising offspring 
quality? 
Beyond maternal tactics, it is currently unclear how widespread turn-taking strategies are in 
cooperatively breeding (or even biparental) species. The high efficiency and overall simplicity 
of turn-taking strategies suggests that they should be a relatively common solution to ensuring 
investment in offspring is equitable, but empirical tests are rare despite the enormous amounts 
of provisioning data collected by field studies investigating total contributions to care. More 
theoretical work is required to identify the ecological conditions under which turn-taking 
strategies are most easily employed, and better availability of older data would mean that only 
re-analysis, rather than new work, is needed to establish some estimates of the prevalence of 
turn-taking.  
Although it seems unlikely that we will ever formulate a concise, overall explanation for 
cooperative breeding, incorporating maternal tactics into theoretical and empirical studies 
may explain some of the variance so far unaccounted for by phylogeny, life-history, or 
environmental factors. The conclusions of this dissertation suggest that future studies must 
take care to justify any assumptions made about the independence of different investment 
stages, or the degree to which parental care represents a symmetrical game between carers.  
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Appendix A: Selection criteria for species 
used in comparative analysis 
Criteria for inclusion 
Species were used if the following data were available from published sources: 
1) Clutch size 
2) Body mass of female (or adults when monomorphic) 
3) Mean group size 
4) Proportion of nests with helpers 
5) Whether breeders compensated for the presence of helpers 
6) Whether offspring were fed more in the presence of helpers 
Criteria for exclusion 
Species were excluded from our analysis if any of the following conditions were met:  
a) Joint-nesting occurred at a large proportion of nests (mean above 1.3 laying females per 
nest). This was to avoid difficulties in accurately assessing individual female 
contributions to the breeding attempt; species with lower (but non-zero) proportions of 
joint-nesting were included to maximise the available data and the potential presence of 
multiple females coded as a binary effect. 
b) Provisioning by helpers occurred only after fledging. Post-fledging care is more 
difficult to quantify than care delivered to nestlings, and may not be directly comparable. 
c) Egg dimensions and at least one other important datum were unavailable (incubation 
behaviour, incubation period, nestling period, or the effect of helpers on reproductive 
success).  
d) The species was a very recently split or currently debated species with a better-studied 
sister species (e.g. Aegithalos (caudatus) glaucogularis excluded in favour of 
Aegithalos caudatus). 
No minimum sample size was required for studies to be included. Species were excluded and 
data collection abandoned after one exclusion criterion was met, so it is not possible to 
determine whether particular species would have been excluded on multiple criteria. 
 
Appendix B: References for data used in 
comparative analysis 
 
General data sources 
Egg dimensions:   [1] 
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